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This dissertation concerns armed intervention by invitation in international law. In its 
essence, intervention by invitation entails the use of force with the consent of the territorial 
State, which appears simple. However, the modern form of the concept is fraught with legal 
complexities, including its relationship with the United Nations Charter. The instrument, which 
should regulate the use of force and make it a collective matter, does not mention unilateral 
intervention by invitation, leaving its legal basis complicated. Still, this impasse has been 
bypassed, allowing the concept to exist despite its inherent contradictions.  
The thesis examines the position of intervention by invitation in international law governed 
by the Charter: why the doctrine continues to exist as an international legal concept and how it 
has fared since 1945. Accordingly, the dissertation has been divided into three research topics: 
(1) the exact legal basis of intervention by invitation and how it is related to other uses of force, 
(2) the concept in practice, and (3) its current and future prospects. The thesis deploys the New 
Haven School approach to international law, thus adopting a policy-oriented perspective. 
Upon examination, it is held that the concept is a result of decision-making processes which 
took place following the adoption of the Charter. These processes were pushed by the most 
powerful States, which endorsed invited interventions in the absence of collective security. 
Thus, the concept’s emergence is attributed to the failure to implement the scheme of the 
Charter wholly in the midst of the Cold War, which led to political developments that 
necessitated the return of invited interventions. Modern intervention by invitation hence exists 
due to changing circumstances and the State policies adopted in response, not the black letter 
of law itself. This is mirrored in the practice of the doctrine, which is erratic in many senses, 
and its current place in international law. 
 Despite this antagonistic character quality, intervention by invitation has also played a 
stabilising role during the UN era, as it has quietly served the common values of the global 
community. This was particularly the case during the Cold War, when the concept — while 
deepening the polarisation of relations — prevented the political crisis from reaching the point 
of no return. The doctrine has thus served a dual purpose, attending to both sovereign and 
common interests. This ambivalence is relevant, because the definitions between unilateral and 
collective measures, as well as internal and international matters, are becoming hazier. Such 
developments inevitably have an impact on intervention by invitation and the values it serves. 
Of late, intervention by invitation has been invoked to promote global interests more 
expressly, which suggests that the concept is indeed transforming. However, this 
transformation may be hindered by the fact that unlike during the Cold War, when it kept the 
balance of terror in check, intervention by invitation currently has no wider purpose to serve. 
Finding such a purpose is of upmost importance, should the concept aspire to embody global 
and sovereign interests in a balanced manner. 
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Introduction — the Objective and Approach of the 
Study 
 
1. Armed Intervention by Invitation as a Research Topic 
 
1.1. The Polarised Intervention by Invitation and the Balance Hidden Within 
By its very name, the concept of armed intervention by invitation — using force at the 
behest of the territorial State — entails an inherent oxymoron. The term simultaneously 
suggests coercion and consent, bringing forth a conundrum which quickly engulfs the 
concept’s supposedly simplistic appearance. The oxymoronic flair is manifested 
throughout the concept, from its precise legal justification to the objectives it seeks to 
serve in practice. Such an outcome has occurred since accommodating sovereign interests 
and collective objectives, the two notions that intervention by invitation constantly 
juggles, has proven difficult. In fact, the latter is in constant fear of being absorbed by the 
former, which has led to invited interventions appearing to be rather contradictory. 
To illustrate this dilemma, we should return to March 2014, when the world was 
captivated by the developments on the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea. Following the 
revolution which resulted in the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych, the area had 
been marked by the appearance of Russian military troops.1 The intervenor, Russia, 
argued that its military presence was justified by an invitation supplied by the ousted 
President Yanukovych, who had requested armed assistance to restore order to the 
peninsula. 2  In other words, the State invoked intervention by invitation as a legal 
argument, and claimed that its armed activities were necessary to recover the internal 
stability of Ukraine.3 However, Russia noted that it had also been invited by the then 
newly-appointed autonomous government of Crimea, which added a possible 
complication to this apparent simplicity.4 
 This complication went into full bloom when the peninsula, mostly inhabited by 
Russian-speaking people, sought to break free from Ukraine.5 Such goals were set with 
                                                 
1 Olivier Corten, ‘The Russian Intervention in the Ukrainian Crisis: Was Jus Contra Bellum 
“Confirmed Rather than Weakened”?’ (2015) 2 Journal on the Use of Force and International 
Law 17, p. 18; James A. Green, ‘Editorial Comment – The Annexation of Crimea: Russia, 
Passportation and the Protection of Nationals Revisited’ (2014) 1 Journal on the Use of Force 
and International Law 3, p. 5. 
2 Record of the Security Council’s 7125th Meeting, 3 March 2014, UN Doc. S/PV.7125, pp. 3-4. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., p. 3; Green, ‘Editorial Comment’, pp. 6-7. 
5 Record of the Security Council’s 7134th Meeting, 13 March 2014, UN Doc. S/PV.7134, p. 2. 
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the hopes of joining Russia instead.6 This venture directly contradicted the previous 
Russian claim that it was in Crimea to restore order, especially after the State began to 
support the secessionist aspirations directly.7 Ultimately, Russia chose to discard the 
invitation previously given by former President Yanukovych, instead stressing 
cooperation with the autonomous government of Crimea.8 However, this combination of 
the secession attempt and invited intervention was met with predominantly negative 
opinions from the international community.9 This was the response even though the 
venture was argued to be based upon the self-determination of peoples,10 which is a 
commonly valued erga omnes norm of international law.11 Hence, the Russian attempt to 
invoke intervention by invitation to further the supposed self-determination of Crimea’s 
people was rejected, as most observers felt that the State was rather exploiting the concept 
for its own geopolitical interests.12 
The modern example of Crimea showcases the oxymoronic nature of intervention by 
invitation as a form of armed force. On the one hand, it is a doctrine predominantly 
exhausted by States to further their sovereign interests, hence bearing a rather antagonistic 
image. On the other, throughout its existence, intervention by invitation has also served 
various common normative values of the global community, albeit in the background. 
Hence, while the concept is perhaps best known for adhering to unilateral aspirations, 
intervention by invitation is not ignorant of the international community’s values, either. 
It is committed to these interests as well, and thus attempts, although not always 
successfully, to attend to both unilateral and collective objectives. The ultimate goal of 
the concept is thus to strike a balance between these two interests, so that one does not 
utterly overshadow the other. 
In the Crimean case, the Russian attempt to bring these two sides together resulted in 
a contradiction in terms so severe that it challenged sheer logic.13 This is because the State 
                                                 
6 Corten, ‘Russian Intervention’, p. 18. 
7 Record of the Security Council’s 7134th Meeting, pp. 15-16. 
8 Record of the Security Council’s 7144th Meeting, 19 March 2014, UN Doc. S/PV.7144, pp. 8-
10; Corten, ‘Russian Intervention’, pp. 31-32 and 39. 
9 Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, GA Res. 68/262, 27 March 2014, UN Doc. A/RES/68/262, 
paras. 1-6; Record of the Security Council’s 7125th Meeting, pp. 4-8 and 10-13; Record of the 
Security Council’s 7144th Meeting, pp. 2-3, 7, 10, 13 and 15-18. 
10 Record of the Security Council’s 7134th Meeting, pp. 15-16; Record of the Security Council’s 
7144th Meeting, p. 8. 
11 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, 136, para. 88. 
12 Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, paras. 1-6. 
13 For a more detailed argument on the matter, see Heini Tuura, ‘Intervention by Invitation and 
the Principle of Self-Determination in the Crimean Crisis’ (2013-2014) 24 Finnish Yearbook of 
International Law 183, pp. 223-224. 
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failed to establish equal footing for the different interests supposedly encompassed in the 
invited intervention. 14  For instance, its claim on the self-determination of Crimea’s 
people, a norm generally championed by the international community, directly 
contradicted the equally common interest of not allowing territorial acquisitions resulting 
from the use of force.15 Consequently, the scales tipped towards the unilateral objectives 
of Russia, leaving any common values up in the air. As a result, the intervention and its 
aftermath have not been recognised as legitimate by the international community.16 
The outcome of the Russian venture, while highlighting the issues of invited 
interventions, does not mean that all such attempts are destined to be doomed, at least not 
from the outset. After all, the dual part of the concept has persisted throughout history, 
and the attempted collaboration between these roles has not always ended in conflict. In 
fact, the concept managed to strike a balance between sovereign interests and common 
goals back in the 1800s, when it first became a distinguishable legal notion. Some of the 
earlier appearances of intervention by invitation are attributed to the alliances that were 
formed in Europe following the regime of Napoleon Bonaparte, the turbulences of which 
were still fresh in minds across the continent.17 For this reason, these alliances sought to 
preserve inter-State peace by upholding the internal stability of the contracting parties, 
with military interventions if such measures were deemed necessary.18 
As the decades turned, these military alliances crumbled, but the practice of invited 
interventions persisted.19 However, certain new legal developments began to cause the 
doctrine’s position to waver. Namely, these changes consisted of the growing reluctance 
to intervene in incidents of internal unrest of others, let alone non-international armed 
conflicts, as well as the budding attempts to rein in inter-State use of force altogether.20 
                                                 
14 Record of the Security Council’s 7125th Meeting, pp. 4-8 and 10-13; Record of the Security 
Council’s 7144th Meeting, pp. 2-3, 7, 10, 13 and 15-18. 
15  Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, GA Res. 2625, 24 
October 1970, UN Doc. A/RES/2625(XXV), Principles I and V. 
16 Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, paras. 1-6. 
17 Georg Nolte, ‘Intervention by Invitation — Oxford Public International Law’,  The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, January 2010, 
<opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e1702?prd=EPIL>, para. 2; Antonio Cassese, International Law (Second Edition, New York, 
Oxford University Press Inc., 2005), pp. 28-29; Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of 
Force by States (London, Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 19. 
18 Cassese, International Law, pp. 28-29; Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force, p. 
19; Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011), p. 
37. 
19 Nolte, ‘Intervention by Invitation’, The Max Planck Encyclopedia, January 2010, para. 2. 
20 Gregory Fox, ‘Intervention by Invitation’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook of the 
Use of Force in International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 816-819. 
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These developments reached their apex following the end of the Second World War, 
when the international community agreed on restricting the use of force by States, instead 
bestowing the right to such measures to the new-born United Nations (UN).21 The status 
of intervention by invitation, especially considering its part in the early stages of the War 
in 1939,22 was left astray in the midst of this, which lead to the distortion of the concept. 
What is further, the first decades of the life of the UN were marked with the duty to not 
intervene in the civil wars of other States.23 Thus, the Charter originally appeared to 
denounce the previously championed idea of linking the internal stability of sovereign 
nations to inter-State peace. Given how invited interventions were traditionally used to 
sustain this connection, the concept was thrust into an even deeper state of confusion, one 
wherein its survival did not seem apparent. 
However, this did not turn out to be the case. Despite the attempt at the contrary, the 
centralisation of the use of force to the UN famously failed during the first steps of the 
organisation. This led to the re-emergence of intervention by invitation, which was now 
forced to reinvent itself to accommodate the new individual and collective interests of the 
global community. Moreover, this task subsequently became even more problematic for 
two reasons. Firstly, the commonly agreed upon initial objective of firm non-use of force 
was no longer such, for other aspirations had caused it to retreat.24 Secondly, despite this 
failure to implement wholly the plan of the Charter, it was not discarded altogether.25 
Rather, it has continued to stay in effect, and States determinedly rely on the document 
in argumentation, even if practice does not strictly follow suit.26  
The combined effect of these two facts pushed the regulation on armed force into 
limbo, subsequently causing the exact position of invited interventions to become 
indeterminate as well. This inevitably caused further problems for the balance within 
intervention by invitation, as it was already reconfiguring itself in the context of the 
Charter. As is well known, under the document’s regulation ‘(a)ll Members shall refrain 
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
                                                 
21 UN Charter, Preamble and Article 1(1). 
22 Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force, p. 317. 
23 Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States, GA Res. 375, 6 December 1949, UN Doc. 
A/RES/375(IV), Article 4; Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic 
Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, GA Res. 2131, 21 
December 1965, UN Doc. A/RES/2131(XX), para. 2; Friendly Relations, Principle III; Franck, 
Recourse to Force, pp. 40-41. 
24 Franck, Recourse to Force, pp. 3-4. 
25 Ibid., pp. 3-7. 
26 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In And Against Nicaragua  (Nicaragua 
v. the United States of America), Merits, ICJ Reports 1986, 14, para. 186; Christine Gray, 
International Law and the Use of Force (Third Edition, New York, Oxford University Press Inc., 
2008), p. 25.   
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integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations’, unless an exception to this rule permits armed 
activities.27 Furthermore, it is equally well known that this instrument makes no reference 
to intervention by invitation, which in the eyes of a formalist lawyer leads to a default 
assumption about the doctrine’s unlawfulness. 28  In other words, it appears that 
intervention by invitation does not accommodate the norms established by the Charter,29 
let alone its core objectives of centralising the use of force.30 At the same time, even a 
quick glance at the practice of States since 1945 suggests that they consider the concept 
to be perfectly applicable, creating a clear contradiction between the black letter of law 
and the actions of sovereign States.31 
Here, we encounter another example of the rather paradoxical essence of intervention 
by invitation. For one, it is undeniable that the concept is admissible when requested by 
the territorial State’s government. This much was famously confirmed by the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Nicaragua, although almost in passing: ‘(I)t is 
difficult to see what would be left of the principle of non-intervention in international law 
if intervention, which is already allowable at the request of the government of a State, 
were also to be allowed at the request of the opposition (emphasis added).’32 Yet, despite 
this brief yet often cited affirmation,33 the doctrine remains vaguely characterised as far 
as specific justifications go, while practice on the matter is simultaneously reverent and 
uneven.34 Hence, it could be stated that intervention by invitation is a manifestation of the 
identity crisis that the regulation on armed force has been undergoing since 1945. While 
it is apparent that the initial objective of the Charter will not be achieved, no clear, all-
encompassing alternative to the scheme has been suggested, either. Rather, the 
international community has relied on specific forms of relief, band aids even, to sustain 
the damage caused by the non-implementation of the Charter. 
Since intervention by invitation is but one of these forms of relief, its position is that 
of an outlier form of armed force rather than a defined part of a functioning system. Still, 
                                                 
27 UN Charter, Article 2(4). 
28 Cassese, International Law, p. 369. 
29 Ibid., pp. 369-370. 
30 UN Charter, Preamble and Articles 1(1), 2(4) and 24. 
31 Cassese, International Law, p. 370. 
32 Nicaragua, para. 246. 
33 The ICJ itself upheld the finding when it accepted consensual use of force in Armed Activities 
on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Merits, ICJ Reports 
2005, 168, para. 45. 
34 Erika de Wet, ‘The Modern Practice of Intervention by Invitation in Africa and Its Implications 
for the Prohibition of the Use of Force’ (2015) 26 European Journal of International Law 979, p. 
980; Bannelier and Christakis, ‘Under the UN Security Council’s Watchful Eyes’, p. 860; Gray, 
International Law and the Use of Force, pp. 80-81. 
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despite this rather fractured position, intervention by invitation has managed to hold on 
amongst changing circumstances. The most notable of these changes has been the 
eventual cessation of the Cold War, which brought about an attempt to install collective 
security to its originally envisioned position.35 Although this venture has not been fully 
successful in installing the normative framework spelled out in the Charter, it has 
managed to make collective use of force a possible option.36 Moreover, collective security 
began to be deployed in internal conflicts rather than international ones, which not only 
marks a notable evolution of the Charter’s contents,37 but also once again brought the 
doctrine into the same field as invited interventions. 38  While this development was 
undeniably modern, it is also laced with an undeniable throwback to the 1800s and its 
military alliances, which were established with the purpose of maintaining peace by 
safeguarding internal stability.39 
When this historical background is put together, we are ultimately left with a 
contradiction in terms, and on many levels of law for that matter. On the superficial level, 
it can be observed that intervention by invitation is a concept that has been applied for 
centuries, but it is yet to gain a clearly-defined legal basis.40 More thematically, however, 
one can also note that the doctrine has borne two, sometimes conflicting, purposes: the 
sovereign interests of the select few and the common values of the community on the 
larger scale. Ever since the adoption of the UN Charter, these themes have appeared to 
clash, having been unable to find a proper balance. This has turned modern intervention 
by invitation into an enigma of sorts, one which needs to be decoded. 
 
1.2. The Main Objective and Research Questions of the Study 
All in all, it could very well be stated that intervention by invitation is one of the most 
contradictory practices of international law. On one hand, it is a recognised legal doctrine 
which has been put into practice in constant rotation.41 On the other, both its practical 
limits and legal core remain unrefined, as they continue to evade precise description.42 
Moreover, in many respects this often self-cannibalising concept suffers from a lack of 
constructiveness, an issue which is enhanced by the willingness of States to execute 
                                                 
35 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, pp. 110 and 254. 
36 Ibid., pp. 254-255. 
37 Franck, Recourse to Force, pp. 40-41. 
38 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, p. 113. 
39 Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force, p. 19. 
40 Nolte, ‘Intervention by Invitation’, The Max Planck Encyclopedia, January 2010, para. 2. 
41 Nicaragua, para. 246; Mali, SC Res. 2100, Preamble; Definition of Aggression, Article 3(e); 
Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles, pp. 769-770. 
42 de Wet, ‘Modern Practice of Intervention by Invitation’, pp. 980-981. 
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invited interventions much too leisurely, without sufficiently defined requirements. In 
fact, as noted by Professor Christine Gray, this lack of thorough explanation on the 
doctrine, in particular by the ICJ in Nicaragua, ‘(…) masks the complexity that may arise 
in the interpretation and application of this rule. The basic principle of the right of a 
government to invite a third State to use force and the absence of any such right for an 
opposition may be accepted in theory, but its application in practice has not been 
simple.’43 
For these reasons, intervention by invitation stands as an oddity of its own, as it 
remains rather disembodied. This fragmentation has been reflected on prior academic 
research on the matter. For instance, intervention by invitation is frequently featured on 
compilation works and other studies on the use of force, but often only as a part of an 
ensemble cast.44 In other words, coherent and all-encompassing studies on the matter are 
difficult to find, which is unfortunate given how important and frequently-used the 
doctrine is. The at times unpredictable State practice, which has continued for decades, 
has done nothing to resolve the issue. In fact, such activities may have made matters 
worse, as commentators have been forced to examine intervention by invitation on a 
constant case-by-case basis, an approach which leaves little room for thorough studies. 
All factors considered, the concept is difficult for an international lawyer to put 
together. Metaphorically speaking, contemporary intervention by invitation is 
reminiscent of an unsolved jigsaw puzzle with mismatching pieces: no matter how hard 
one tries, the pieces do not seem to form a coherent picture. If anything, some parts 
required to fulfil the task appear to be missing, whereas the available pieces belong to 
other puzzles. The result can only be described as a perpetual conundrum.  
This inherently conflicting two-fold nature of intervention by invitation is the main 
research problem that my study will address. Working towards the solution, the purpose 
of my dissertation is to form a cohesive study on intervention by invitation, which fills 
the various gaps about its legal basis and application in both present and future. To this 
end, the study focuses on the formation of modern intervention by invitation, seek to find 
out why and how it emerged and evolved within the UN’s normative perimeter. Hence, 
the specific research questions are divided into three main sections: intervention by 
                                                 
43 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, pp. 80-81. 
44 See for instance Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, pp. 67-113; Marc Weller (ed), 
The Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2015), pp. 816-840; Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention, pp. 13-50; Lori Fisler Damrosch and 
David J. Scheffer (eds), Law and Force in the New International Order (Boulder, Westview Press, 
1991), pp. 113-142; Antonio Cassese (ed), The Current Regulation of the Use of Force 
(Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986), pp. 147-166; Eliav Lieblich, Intervention in Civil 
Wars: Intervention and Consent (Columbia University, 2012). 
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invitation as a legal concept (1), the concept’s application in practice (2) and its current 
and possible future prospects (3). 
I should expand these three research questions further. Firstly, the dissertation will 
discuss the exact legal justification of intervention by invitation and the reason for its 
conceptual indeterminacy. This means studying how intervention by invitation gained its 
current position since 1945, and how it has managed to accommodate the Charter’s legal 
requirements. Hence, the research question will examine the responses to the lawfulness 
of intervention by invitation and its conceptual relation to other forms of armed force, 
both in and outside the context of the Charter. Secondly, following the conceptualisation 
of intervention by invitation, the thesis will also shed light on the various practical 
problems caused by the doctrine, for example the issues concerning the invitation itself 
and the concept’s application under different circumstances. The second research 
question hence focuses on how invited interventions pan out in practice and what clear 
conditions, if any, they should follow. 
Thirdly and finally, the three-point focus will end in providing analysis on the current 
dilemmas and possible upcoming issues of the doctrine. These matters include the 
doctrine’s application in the fight against terrorism, alongside collective security and 
during different, formerly non-international armed conflicts, including those of 
secessionist nature. Therefore, the third research question builds on the context 
established by the preceding research issues, bringing the enigma that is intervention by 
invitation to the stage of current world events. Moreover, the final question will be closed 
with remarks on the possibility of State responsibility for the intervention. 
Ultimately, this triad of points will confirm the major statement of this thesis: that 
intervention by invitation, despite undeniably doing the sovereign bidding of intervening 
States, has also been fundamental in maintaining international stability through the 
centuries. Consequently, the task of intervention by invitation has been to uphold peaceful 
inter-State relations using invited armed interventions into other sovereign States, as 
paradoxical as that statement may sound. Thus, the concept portrays a dual role in 
international law, attending to both individual and common interests, while hoping to 
strike a manageable balance between the two. During the early UN era, this balance tipped 
in favour of sovereign interests, making intervention by invitation a necessary evil rather 
than a celebrated champion of justice. 
Nevertheless, this connection between the dual purposes of invited interventions was 
manifested more wholesomely in the 1800s, in the form of that era’s military alliances, 
short-lived as they may have been. Since then, however, the dual objective of intervention 
by invitation has been distorted due to changing circumstances, the first of which was the 
growing hesitance to intervene in civil wars, a development which eventually culminated 
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in an express ban to engage in such activities.45 The second circumstance is that of the 
evolving regulation on the use of force by States. This development ultimately led to 
intervention by invitation being banned under the ambitious plan of the Charter, which 
was meant to serve the role previously held by consensual use of force.46 In other words, 
excluding the exception of self-defence, unilateral uses of force were meant to be made 
redundant with adoption of the Charter.47 
However, as this scheme never came to full fruition, intervention by invitation could 
re-emerge through the policies of the time’s superpowers, in an effort to sustain the 
faltering of the Charter. Given that this new incarnation of intervention by invitation was 
forced to operate within the political atmosphere of the Cold War, the doctrine had to 
bring the sovereign interests of the bickering superpowers to the forefront.48 However, 
this did not denote that the common values were discarded altogether. Rather, they were 
pushed to the back-burner, from which they managed to subtly influence invited 
interventions. Hence, even though the practice bore an antagonistic image, it was still 
necessary to advance common, yet well-disguised objectives.  
What is further, the end of this polarisation of relations allowed the global interests to 
return to the limelight, which has led to invited interventions being invoked in a purpose-
oriented manner that caters to common values. Examples of such purpose-oriented 
application include the use of consensual use of force to combat international terrorism, 
or to assist the implementation of collective security.49 This could mean that intervention 
by invitation is currently returning to the themes based in the 1800s, when upholding 
internal stability of individual sovereign nations was the publicly acknowledged — and 
even embraced — key to inter-State peace. However, this latest development is still very 
much in progress, and thus it remains to be seen if the unilateral and collective interests 
have truly managed to find a more sustainable connection. 
Having now established the main research objective, questions and statement of the 
dissertation, a mention should be made about the limitations and possible omissions of 
the study. Namely, the focal point of this research is set in the UN era of the use of force, 
meaning that the main analysis focuses on events which have taken place since 1945. 
                                                 
45 Fox, ‘Intervention by Invitation’, pp. 816-817; Franck, Recourse to Force, pp. 40-41; Friendly 
Relations Declaration, Principle III; Rights and Duties, Article 4; Inadmissibility of Intervention, 
para. 2. 
46 UN Charter, Preamble and Article 1(1). 
47  Ibid., Preamble and Articles 1(1), 2(4) and 51; Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: 
International Law and How We Use It (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 238. 
48  Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, p. 84; Rein Mullerson, ‘Intervention by 
Invitation’ in Lori Fisler Damrosch and David J. Scheffer (eds), Law and Force in the New 
International Order (Boulder, Westview Press, 1991), pp. 127-30. 
49 Karine Bannelier-Christakis, ‘Military Interventions against ISIL in Iraq, Syria and Libya, and 
the Legal Basis of Consent’ (2016) 29 Leiden Journal of International Law 743, p. 747. 
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While the historical developments are not discarded in this dissertation, they are only 
examined to the extent they assist the main objective of the study. In other words, 
developments on intervention by invitation pre-1945 only have supporting roles in the 
analysis. Moreover, since intervention by invitation presupposes sovereignty, this 
dissertation will focus on the actions of States, while non-State actors will be examined 
more limitedly.   
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2. The Methodological Aspects 
 
2.1. Preliminary Considerations 
Setting out the research questions and limits of the dissertation alone is not enough, as 
they need to be analysed through a proper legal method in order to form a truly academic 
piece of research.50 Hence, before moving on to the analysis itself, I will discuss the 
methodological approach that has been applied in the thesis. And indeed, examining any 
topic rooted in international law requires specific methodological equipment, which 
comes with a variety of options over specific theoretical approaches. However, whichever 
one believes to be the correct method to examine international law, all these approaches 
have relented and accepted a particular observation. 
This observation concerns a concession, one which is present in all legal disciplines: 
law, despite its best efforts to regulate any society concisely, is inherently indeterminate 
at heart.51 This is because no norm can ever be drafted with perfect knowledge on how it 
will actually be enacted in practice.52 As a result, no legal norm in itself can be complete, 
as all the possible circumstances it is applied to remain unforeseeable.53 Hence, law needs 
to seek additional evaluation for its interpretation. 54  Nevertheless, these issues of 
interpretation can usually be managed in national contexts, which ideally contain a 
defined legal system with pertinent institutions. These authorities can be referred to when 
the contents of law are in dispute, thus offering the predictability of rational decisions to 
the application of norms.55 
However, the indeterminacy of law is enhanced in international law, which is of a 
special nature. Several reasons can be attributed to this premise, perhaps most notably the 
lack of impartial central authorities that can clarify the content and applicability of 
international legal norms.56 Rather, the international community must continuously rely 
on the vastly varied individual policies and values of various sovereign States.57 What is 
further, enacting these policies can turn into a struggle, on in which the more powerful 
                                                 
50 David Kleimann, ‘Positivism, the New Haven School, and the Use of Force in International 
Law’ (2006) 3 Brussels Journal of International Studies 27, p. 27. 
51 Joseph William Singer, ‘The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory’ (1984) 94 Yale 
Law Journal 1, pp. 11-13. 
52 Ibid., p. 12; Koskenniemi, Politics of International Law, pp. 206-207. 
53 Koskenniemi, Politics of International Law, pp. 206-207. 
54 Singer, ‘Player and the Cards’, pp. 12-13; Higgins, Problems and Process, p. 9. 
55 Singer, ‘Player and the Cards’, pp. 12-13 and 19-20. 
56 Higgins, Problems and Process, pp. 5-7 and 10. 
57 Ibid., pp. 5-7. 
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tend to rule over others.58 In any event, this setting inevitably waters down the definitions 
of international legal norms, and thus leaves them open to various interpretations.59 
Accordingly, all lawyers working in the field of international law must be equipped 
with a certain sense of realism. While the discipline aspires to be a legal framework built 
upon supranational values and goals, its functioning is often hampered by particular 
sovereign interests.60 As a consequence, the international community as a whole depends 
on an uneven vision of sorts, one which may become shattered at any second.61 Thus, 
despite having its earnest intentions of regulating this community, international law is yet 
to shake off the stigma of indeterminacy, consequently leaving its interpretation 
perpetually subjective.62 
However, this does not denote that all effort on the discipline should be discarded 
altogether. Conversely, the indeterminacy bestows certain responsibilities upon the 
international community — and by extension the lawyers who examine it in an attempt 
to categorise and illuminate its contents.63 These responsibilities entail the establishment 
of a balance, one which keeps the indeterminacy of international law in check, by 
identifying normative values that allow actors in this field to make choices between 
different types of interpretation.64 This can inter alia be achieved by not exploring the 
letter of the law alone, but by also considering the circumstances wherein it is applied and 
the various components that influence it.65 Placing law in a distinguishable context should 
hence be regarded as a strength, as it not only enables the possibility to make rational 
choices, but also results in those choices contributing towards an ever-continuing 
process.66 
In the field of armed force specifically, the flexibility of international law has not only 
been recognised but to a certain extent even embraced. In fact, many studies on armed 
force tend to stress the importance of the Charter as a dynamic rather than static 
                                                 
58 Shirley V. Scott, International Law in World Politics: an Introduction (London, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc, 2010), p. 14. 
59 Emmanuelle Jouannet, ‘Koskenniemi: A Critical Introduction’ in Martti Koskenniemi, The 
Politics of International Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011), p. 9. 
60 Charles De Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law, translated from French 
by P. E. Corbett (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. 89-91; Hans J. Morgenthau, 
Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson 
and W. David Clinton (Seventh Edition, New York, McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 2006), pp. 
7-8. 
61 De Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public International Law, p. 91. 
62 Koskenniemi, Politics of International Law,  p. 298. 
63 Higgins, Problems and Process, p. 9. 
64 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
65 Ibid., p. 9. Of course, this suggested relief is the very aspect that international law is often 
criticised for, see Koskenniemi, Politics of International Law, p. 62. 
66 Higgins, Problems and Process, pp. 9-10. 
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instrument, stating that the document, despite being the cornerstone of international law, 
is subject to constant process arising from new interpretations.67 Hence, the Charter does 
not remain stationary, as it is constantly evolving in accordance with the context within 
which it applied.68 It has been interpreted that this view is shared by the ICJ as well, for 
the Court has noted that when evaluating the Charter’s contents, one needs to take the 
customary international law on the use of force into consideration as well.69 As further 
confirmation, the Court has highlighted similar contextual interpretation in the past, thus 
acknowledging that various elements need to be examined in legal argumentation.70 
Thus, focusing on context may be the unavoidable remedy for the indeterminacy of 
international law, even if such an approach may flirt with the risk of creating further 
haziness. No matter how one spins it, it is evident that the regulation on the use of force 
is not conclusively encoded in the Charter alone, bringing additional sources, such as 
customary international law, into play.71 What is further, the ICJ has also noted that when 
assessing the components of international custom — State practice and opinio iuris — 
the individual agendas and goals of sovereign States need to be addressed as well.72 In 
other words, the actions and statements of States alone do not necessarily always 
contribute towards the formation of new customary international law.73 Hence, they too 
need to be set against a context first, which will reveal if they are worthy evidence of new 
legal developments. 
Consequently, the regulation on the use of force, with regard to both its goals and 
specific provisions, is not of pure black letter law, wherein all that is necessary for 
successful legal argumentation is conclusively found in the letter of the law itself.74 On 
the contrary, these legal notions depend on circumstances particular to each situation, as 
well as the agendas and values of specific States.75 However, in accordance with the 
general observation on the indeterminacy of international law, 76  this finding is not 
necessarily a detriment, as it can result in sustainable developments concerning the use 
of force as well. Given that the UN Charter’s vision for the use of force is not working 
                                                 
67 Tarcisio Gazzini, The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 2005), pp. 1-2; Franck, Recourse to Force, pp. 6-7. 
68 Gazzini, Changing Rules, pp. 1-2; Franck, Recourse to Force, pp. 6-7. 
69 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, p. 8; Nicaragua, para. 176. 
70 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ 
Reports 1971, 16, para. 53. 
71 Nicaragua, para. 176. 
72 Ibid., paras. 206-207. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Franck, Recourse to Force, pp. 6-7. 
75 Legal Consequences, para. 53; Nicaragua, paras. 206-207. 
76 Higgins, Problems and Process, p. 9. 
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out as planned — a fact well-exemplified by the mere existence of intervention by 
invitation — such flexibility may be vital. 
 
2.2. Which Legal Method Prevails Against the Theoretical Outset?  
2.2.1. Dodging the Stalemates of Traditional Theoretical Approaches  
Having set out the general requirements for the theoretical approach, the focus will 
now turn to the available methods. This selection of a specific method should begin with 
short acknowledgements on positivism and natural law, the prominent approaches in the 
field of international law. On their own both are unlikely to yield pertinent results on 
intervention by invitation, albeit for different reasons. In its essence, legal positivism is 
grounded upon following the treaties and customary international law that States have 
proactively consented to, ultimately promoting a unified and systemised batch of legal 
norms. 77  However, this approach, while it does emphasise certain components of 
intervention by invitation by focusing on sovereign activities, still proves inadequate. 
This is because it does not concentrate on the other side of the coin, supranational values, 
a notion more thoroughly attended to by natural law. 
Natural law may also prove insufficient for the purposes of this thesis. In its classic 
form, this approach sees law as being inherently derived from a certain set of values and 
institutions instead of being clearly created by man to regulate any given society.78 At 
first sight, this would seem to suggest compatibility with the present study. However, the 
normative framework of the UN Charter, specifically designed to limit the abilities of 
States, 79  may contradict the approach too severely. Despite this conclusion, both 
positivism and natural law include elements which ought to be included in or at least 
addressed by the method of choice: emphasis on sovereign interests and supranational 
values, respectively. 
Consequently, we need to discover a legal method that entails certain echoes of both 
positivism and natural law, while engaging in contextual interpretation. With this being 
the case, it appears that the dissertation must adopt an approach from the legal field which 
more heavily draws from and relates to sociology.80 Choosing to do so offers many 
                                                 
77Anne-Marie Slaughter and Steven R. Ratner, ‘The Method Is the Message’ (1999) 93 The 
American Journal of International Law 410, p. 411; Robert Cryer, Tamara Hervey and Bal Sokhi-
Bulley with Alexandra Bohm, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2011), p. 38. 
78 Alan Hunt, ‘The Problematisation of Law in Classical Social Theory’, in Reza Banker and Max 
Travers (eds), Law and Social Theory (Second Edition, Hart Publishing, 2013), p. 19. 
79 UN Charter, Preamble and Article 1(1). 
80 Higgins, Problems and Process, p. 9. 
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alternatives, from classical takes to critical ones.81 Overall, however, this general method 
on law contends itself in using social theories to inter alia examine different legal aspects, 
such as behaviour and institutions, thus focusing on how law behaves in action.82 The 
core objective of all of this is to evaluate legal phenomena in their respective, vastly 
varying settings.83 It is a foundation that can be applied in the international community as 
well, since such sociological approaches can already be linked to the start of the 20th 
century, with many branching schools of thought having emerged since then.84 However, 
while such approaches can be deployed to study international law in general, are any of 
these schools of thought well-suited to the needs of this particular thesis? 
As far as general requirements for the method go, it appears that we need a sociological 
legal approach that offers a way out of the impasses of prevalent legal traditions. Such an 
approach is vital because intervention by invitation in its modern form is an incomplete 
picture, since the current sources of international law do not offer a concise explanation 
for its legal basis. 85  This means that one needs to dive much deeper into how the 
international community functions in order to draw out the doctrine’s true basis. In other 
words, what remains to be found then is a sociological legal approach that also satisfies 
the requirement of reflective and assertive interpretation of international legal 
argumentation. Without such a take, the examination of argumentation can easily end in 
contradictions and stalemates, as States often tend to discard the supranational goals of 
international law for their own ends, at least on the surface.86 
In addition, the use of force being the subject of this thesis sets certain more-specific 
demands. These requirements were touched upon earlier in this section: the deployed 
method must understand the dynamic nature of the use of force, as well as how it is prone 
to reflect the continuous changes in the policies of States.87 Fortunately, a sociologically-
based legal method could satisfy such conditions, since they usually aim to consider the 
                                                 
81 Reza Banakar and Max Travers ‘Introduction’ in Reza Banakar and Max Travers (eds), Law 
and Social Theory (Second Edition, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013), pp. 1-8; Reza Banakar and 
Max Travers, ‘Critical Approaches’ in Reza Banakar and Max Travers (eds), Law and Social 
Theory (Second Edition, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013). 
82 Banakar and Travers, ‘Introduction’, p. 2; Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley and Bohm, Research 
Methodologies, p. 86. 
83 Banakar and Travers, ‘Introduction’, p. 2. 
84 Jost Delbrück, ‘Max Huber’s Sociological Approach to International Law Revisited’ (2007) 18 
European Journal Of International Law 97, pp. 97-98; Cryer, Hervey, Sokhi-Bulley and Bohm, 
Research Methodologies, pp. 86-88. 
85 Byrne, ‘Consent and the Use of Force’, p. 98; de Wet, ‘Modern Practice of Intervention by 
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86 Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, pp. 2-3; De Visscher, Theory and Reality 
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various circumstances and factors which affect legal norms.88 This finding further stresses 
the compatibility of such methods with discussing the legal reasoning and practice of 
armed intervention by invitation. Consequently, with all these ingredients considered, 
making an excursion to the field of sociologically-based legal approaches is indeed 
fundamental in finding a proper method. Only by doing so can one find a method which 
accepts the flexible nature of the use of force, and by extension, intervention by invitation.  
 
2.2.2. The New Haven School as the Solution  
In the context of sociologically-based legal methods, the requirements detailed above 
essentially lead us to the New Haven School of International Law, first founded as a 
critical school of thought in the Yale Law School during the mid-1940s.89 The school of 
thought has been championed as the critical counter-argument to the Cold War realism 
that engulfed the globe for decades, while also serving as an opposing force to strict 
positivism.90 And indeed, with what is often labelled the policy-oriented approach, the 
New Haven School asserts international law to comprise non-stop decision-making 
processes which transcend the definitions of national and international.91 Accordingly, 
the key words here are process and decision-making.92 
These decision-making processes, mainly involving States and other important actors, 
are ‘both authoritative and controlling’, yet conscious in the sense that they place 
normative evolutions in their respective contexts, which are created by a variety of 
factors.93 To state it differently, the method does not deem international law to be merely 
a strict, clearly defined and neatly categorised set of norms.94 Consequently, international 
law is not a body of rules laid in stone, existing without an express purpose or goals.95 
Rather, it is a notion which evolves constantly, and at times at the behest of the very 
subjects it attempts to bind. However, at its heart remains the target of serving the 
mutually-held values and goals of the society it governs — in other words, the 
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international community.96 These values also serve as the means for reigning in the 
sovereign actions of States, thus bringing forth a balance, at least a tentative one, between 
the two notions. 
Still, concisely discerning such global values, while vital for the objectives of this 
thesis, can be a difficult task, especially from a legal standpoint. However, through the 
use of logic, it can be deduced that these common values must be embodied in norms 
chosen by the members of the global community as being the most important.97 The 
common interests must then be the norms in which all States have interests, and which 
have been selected as primary in international law.98 Assistance can thus be sought from 
the notions of ius cogens and erga omnes, which stand for peremptory norms and rules 
owed towards all States, respectively.99 The ius cogens rules elevate certain norms of 
international law above others, such as the prohibitions on aggression and genocide, 
making them primary in nature. 100  Thus, in the event of conflict, these rules enjoy 
normative supremacy.101 Moreover, obligations erga omnes always concern all sovereign 
States, regardless of the particular situation: this means that all States may make claims 
over any purported violation of these norms, essentially making them communal 
matters.102 
The existence of ius cogens and erga omnes norms does show that States have put 
certain international rules over others, making them a pertinent candidate as far as 
common interests go.103 However, as will be discussed later in this thesis, although these 
rules serve as a much needed starting point for deciphering the contents of international 
law, they have faced a thoroughly ambivalent response in the international community.104 
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Nevertheless, regardless of one’s exact views on these concepts, it can be observed that 
they at least give guidance on which norms the international community views as being 
the most important. More specifically, it can be noted that ever since the birth of the 
United Nations, the primary global objective has arguably been preserving peace.105 This 
essentially places a prohibition on the aggressive use of force at the forefront of global 
interests, perhaps even giving it a certain edge over other norms of ius cogens and erga 
omnes.106 
In this vein, it ought to be noted that the global values may not always manifest 
themselves as beacons of justice: sometimes they might instead be reflections of the 
commonly held necessities that keep the world community together. This premise is well-
exemplified by the prohibition of the aggressive use of force, which is undeniably a 
peremptory norm.107 However, the norms concerning armed force are also a direct result 
of certain realisations made by States following the two World Wars, most notably the 
need to prevent the reoccurrence of such wars at all costs. 108  This necessity may 
sometimes result in seemingly unpleasant decisions, such as choosing not to intervene in 
humanitarian catastrophes for the fear of violating the prohibition on the use of force.109 
Furthermore, it may be difficult to draw the exact lines for each value,110 especially when 
they are pitted against one another. After all, peremptory norms come in many shapes, 
which means that clashes between them can be unavoidable, consequently causing 
international actors to make difficult choices.111 
In any event, the various layers of the method’s value-based premise are also reflected 
on the New Haven School as a whole, as it aims to observe the many faces of international 
law in a levelled manner. The method does not abandon the idea of an international 
normative system of sorts, nor does it adopt a thoroughly pessimistic view on 
international law as a legal discipline.112 Rather, the New Haven School stresses the 
perspectives of the various actors of the international community, and their motivations 
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and abilities in making social decisions.113 These social decisions, while undeniably 
meant to serve the individual interests of the participants, are also interpreted as 
contributing towards the various common normative values of the community, ultimately 
serving international law as a legal system.114 Thus, the policies of individual States are 
seen as the ingredients that built the international community and laws which are aimed 
to govern it.115 As a result, despite containing a heavy dose of realism, the New Haven 
School regards international law with determined optimism, since it maintains that the 
discipline is a benefit, rather than a detriment, to both States and the global community 
as a whole.116 
In addition, given its policy-oriented approach, the New Haven School steers away 
from the rocks often encountered by legal positivism, which first and foremost advocates 
a firm focus on the legal rules themselves, without too much regard to other factors or 
contexts.117 In fact, the New Haven approach in and of itself is a clear rebuttal of positivist 
outlooks on international law.118  Moreover, despite sharing certain notable common 
aspects, such as the emphasis on the perspective of different actors, the New Haven 
School also distinguishes itself from natural international law.119 In other words, the 
approach stands as an independent, sociologically-based legal method, which can be 
deployed to study any development of the use of force as well. This in turn means that 
the approach on hand fulfils the above-mentioned conditions and serves the purposes of 
this thesis, making it a fitting method to examine intervention by invitation with. 
 
2.3. Further Reflections on the New Haven School 
It has thus far been established that this dissertation will apply the method developed 
by the New Haven School, since it fulfils the requirements detailed above. However, 
certain additional remarks ought to be made about this methodological decision, which 
means discussing the New Haven approach and its core elements in a bit more detail. 
These remarks include observations on the inevitable cons that any method of law has. 
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Furthermore, one should observe how the method relates to the use of force by States. 
Quite naturally, the notion of intervention by invitation is of specific interest, as is how 
the New Haven approach can be deployed to draw out pertinent research results on the 
said topic. 
One ought to begin this examination by looking harder at the New Haven School itself. 
The core gist of the method’s policy-oriented approach was introduced earlier in this 
chapter. However, the method’s contents are naturally much more multi-layered than a 
brief explanation would immediately suggest. Still, as with any methodological approach, 
the exact elements of the New Haven School can be up for debate. Regardless of this, a 
couple of commonly accepted ingredients of the method can be observed. These 
ingredients contribute towards the analysis of how and why social decisions are made, 
which is at the heart of the New Haven School’s manifesto.120 
First of all, the New Haven approach is by no means solely focused on the word of law 
itself, as it aims to include multiple factors and contexts in its analysis, ultimately building 
a socio-legal setting.121 For instance, it emphasises not only the proactive measures of 
different actors, 122  but also their statements and opinions. 123  This means that when 
examining the development of any concept of international law, the method considers a 
wide variety of data produced by States and other participants within the global 
community. 124  Second, the method does not divide matters into clear paradigms, as 
instead it adopts transnational and interdisciplinary outlooks on the global community 
and its laws.125  This further widens the scope of the sources exhausted in analysis, 
meaning that many factors ought to be considered when assessing international legal 
phenomena. Third, the method is always intended to consider the perspective of the 
decision-maker in international law, and thus acknowledges and dissects the factors that 
affected the decision in question.126 
Adding these components to the general outlook of the New Haven School leads us to 
a realisation about the method’s compatibility with the themes of this dissertation: there 
is a discernible similarity between the New Haven School and the evolution of the use of 
force. As it has transpired, the method’s emergence and development has happened in 
clear conjunction with the timeline of the UN era’s regulation on armed force. Both were 
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jump-started in the 1940s as responses to the Second World War, and were then 
subsequently practised while the political realities overtook and shaped the international 
community.127 What is further, both notions are characterised by their emphasis on a 
preferred communal order: for the use of force this is manifested in collective security, 
for the New Haven School in common values and interests.128 However, the misgivings 
and even failures of such frameworks do not create impossible obstacles for either notion, 
as they are capable of readjusting themselves to accommodate different contexts. 
Moreover, such developments have not taken place in a perfectly straight-forward 
manner, as multiple factors — both great and small, and at times not strictly legal — have 
left their imprint.129 
Thus, the New Haven approach in itself embodies the very same elements that have 
moulded the use of force as we have known it since the Second World War. This finding 
automatically binds the method to intervention by invitation as well. In fact, the 
connection between the New Haven approach and the use of force might be most 
prominently manifested in invited interventions. The current incarnation of consensual 
use of force is a direct result of a process involving policy-oriented decision-making,130 
the very same phenomenon that the New Haven School focuses on. 131  To state it 
differently, there is a strong understanding between this dissertation’s subject and the 
appointed method, which ought to provide solid theoretical basis for the analytical 
portions. 
Despite this perceived compatibility, the selection of any method comes with 
unavoidable downsides along with the benefits. This is the case with the approach of the 
New Haven School as well. Firstly, as its name alone suggests, the New Haven School is 
a slightly more particular school of thought, at least when compared to traditional 
methodological approaches.132 Such particularity can be attributed to the approach’s birth 
and subsequent development, which primarily took place at Yale Law School. 133 
However, given the wide general applicability of the approach it would be difficult to 
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argue that the school of thought should be in any way geographically based. Such an 
argument would also go against the aforementioned components of the New Haven 
School, which inter alia advocate interdisciplinary and transnational outlooks on 
international law.134 
Secondly, concerns have been raised over certain aspects of the New Haven School’s 
policy-oriented approach and its apparent disregard for the letter of the law alone.135 After 
all, the method not only allows, but to a certain extent even advocates, modifying (in other 
words, violating) the law in accordance with the policies and decisions made by States, 
the would-be subjects of the same law.136 This can result in arbitrary decisions, ones 
which may ultimately threaten the legal framework established by the Charter in regard 
to the use of force.137 These worries certainly do not subside because this school of 
thought is based in the United States, which has not always been regarded as a champion 
of international law, particularly when its policies on the use of force are concerned.138 
However, as established earlier, this recourse to other contexts is necessary due to the 
indeterminate nature of international law. 139  Moreover, the New Haven School’s 
adherence to commonly held values tethers the individual policies of States to a 
manageable setting, which by extension should alleviate the worst concerns on the matter. 
To state it differently, the sovereign interests are not allowed to run amok within the 
parameters of the New Haven School, as the most unspeakable violations of international 
law ought to be deflected by the method’s outlook. 
Thirdly, there has been uncertainty about the continued relevance of the New Haven 
School. Given not only the school of thought’s aforementioned particularity but the 
timing of its golden years as well, one can question the footing the approach maintains in 
today’s scholarly community. 140  After all, can a method conceived in such a clear 
timeframe and setting still hold significance? Despite these concerns, it can be discerned 
that a persistent group of New Haven practitioners does continue to exist, since the 
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approach is still championed by several scholars.141 In fact, one could even state that a 
‘new’ New Haven School has emerged, which in turn emphasises the claim that the 
approach remains pertinent and thus applicable.142 
All in all, it can be concluded that while the New Haven approach does come with its 
bundle of problems, the method is still the best choice for this dissertation. Not only does 
it attend to the various issues that come with international law and the use of force, but it 
also offers valuable tools for decoding intervention by invitation more specifically. The 
method shares much common ground with invited interventions, which should result in 
relative harmony between these two. Thus, the core components of the New Haven 
School correspond to the fundamental elements of intervention by invitation, effectively 
furthering the objectives of this thesis.  
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3. The Structure of the Dissertation  
 
Having established the relevant introductory matters, I will now set out the structure 
of the thesis, which has been formulated in accordance with the triad of research questions 
detailed above. Following the conclusion of this introductory chapter, the focus will shift 
to the international norms behind armed interventions to establish the legal basis pertinent 
to the research question (Chapter II). The matters discussed in the section include the 
relationship between the use of force and State sovereignty, the principle of non-
intervention and the regime of State responsibility for internationally wrongful actions. 
The combination of these three regimes of international law has been chosen due to its 
specific relevance with regard to intervention by invitation. 
Following this, the dissertation will move to the major analytical sections, which cover 
the three main research questions. These chapters comprise discussions on modern 
intervention by invitation as a legal concept, this concept’s application in practice, and its 
current and future prospects. Of these analytical issues, the matter of defining intervention 
by invitation as a concept will be examined first (Chapter III). This conceptualisation 
discusses intervention by invitation’s justification under the UN Charter’s system, the 
reason behind its conceptual confusion, as well as the concept’s position amongst other 
forms of armed force. Studying intervention by invitation in this manner will also provide 
the necessary context for the following sections of the thesis. 
This legal concept of intervention by invitation will then be fleshed out by the second 
research question, the doctrine’s application in practice (Chapter IV). Issues concerning 
the practice of intervention by invitation include issuing and redacting the invitation to 
intervene, as well as applying invited interventions under different circumstances. As 
noted above, this analysis will take place in the setting established by the preceding 
section, all the while supplying further basis for the third and final research problem. 
The analytical sections will hence be concluded by studying the current and future 
prospects of invited interventions (Chapter V). The contents of this portion are based on 
the findings of the preceding sections, thus continuing the general continuum of the thesis. 
The topics of the section will therefore comprise the new circumstances in which 
intervention by invitation is applied. Namely, these new scenarios will use invited 
interventions as a means of merging unilateral and collective armed activities, including 
in the global fight against terrorism and within the context of collective security under the 
Charter. Furthermore, the chapter will examine applying the concept in different 
internationalised internal conflicts, from more traditional civil wars to secessionist ones. 
The section will then examine how these changed circumstances have affected the pool 
of States who exhaust intervention by invitation, pondering whether intervention by 
invitation still primarily belongs in the repertoire of the more powerful States. Finally, 
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the analysis will conclude with a discussion about the opportunity for State responsibility 
for intervention by invitation in light of modern developments. 
Following the analytical sections, the thesis will be closed with general conclusions on 
invited interventions and their status in the international community (Chapter VI). The 
section rounds out the dissertation by concluding the core issues of the concept, its 
evolution since the beginning of the Cold War and how it appeared to be faring at the 
moment the thesis was finalised.143 Therefore, the final section will offer findings on not 
only the overall process of intervention by invitation, but also what one could except from 
the concept in the future. 
A mention needs to be made of the order of the three main research questions. Given 
how varying State practice has affected intervention by invitation, the analytical 
examination of the doctrine could very well begin with its application. However, this 
dissertation has opted to begin with the concept’s legitimisation first, and for a very 
simple reason: given how erratic the practice of intervention by invitation is, its analysis 
requires a legal backdrop against which it may be projected. Due to this reality, it is better 
to set a proper context by examining the contents of the legal concept first, a technique 
often seen in legal argumentation within academic circles.144 
When built on the analysis of legitimisation, the practice of invited interventions flesh 
out this established legal context even further, thus contributing to a well-rounded picture 
of the concept.145 Moreover, while examining the issues concerning the practice of the 
doctrine, the analysis will also pave the way for the third research question, the present 
and future position of invited interventions. The conceptual context established by the 
first two analytical sections will thus be ended with the third one, ultimately fulfilling the 
study’s objective.  
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Establishing the Legal Basis for Armed Interventions 
 
1. The Use of Force and State Sovereignty   
 
1.1. The Foundations of Armed Force and Its Relation to State Sovereignty  
Given the objective of this thesis, we must begin the examination of the legal basis 
with the relationship between the use of force and State sovereignty. To say that armed 
force by States and the notion of sovereignty are interlinked would be a vast 
understatement. In fact, the former cannot be examined without giving some regard to the 
latter. Over the centuries, the two concepts have participated in constant back-and-forth 
communication: this happened in solidarity in the past, but since the conclusion of the 
Second World War the relation has turned increasingly strained. 146  Balancing the 
different and occasionally conflicting needs of sovereignty with the regulation on the use 
of force is a difficult task, and, as demonstrated by the UN era, the perfect combination 
appears still to be in the making. 
History has seen the two concepts co-exist in a more comfortable manner. Before the 
World Wars, a State’s right to resort to force was widely regarded as being an integral 
part of Statehood and consequently sovereignty itself, making war a natural part of the 
discourse.147 Such ideals can be traced back to Westphalian sovereignty, which afforded 
States the right to see their matters through as they saw fit, and preferably without outside 
intervention.148 However, even centuries ago armed force was acknowledged to be a 
double-edged sword for States: although resorting to it came with the entitlement of 
sovereignty, it was also clear that doing so might result in the end of another State’s 
existence.149 Consequently, the international community attempted to limit tentatively the 
right to resort to force at different historical points, but with little success.150  
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As a result, the ever-looming possibility of States asserting their sovereignty with 
extreme measures became more probable during the first half of the 1900s, ultimately 
resulting in the First World War.  However, this development did yield a counter-reaction, 
as the global conflict ended with the international community establishing the League of 
Nations, which made an effort to limit the use of force by States.151 The League of Nations 
Covenant even took tentative steps towards a more collective system on the use of force 
by making all possible wars a matter which concerned the entire League and its 
Members.152 Moreover, although it did not completely prohibit war, it demanded the 
contracting States to settle their disputes peacefully, first and foremost through the 
various forums provided by the League of Nations.153 Only in the event of these forums 
proving insufficient was war an option.154 
In addition to the regulation of the Covenant, the Pact of Paris — adopted soon after 
the establishment of the League — also included similar provisions aimed at restricting 
the use of force by States, even going as far as explicitly renouncing war as a dispute 
settlement method.155 Furthermore, the Pact echoed the Covenant’s demand to resolve 
conflicts and disputes in a peaceful manner.156 However, alongside the Covenant, these 
measures soon proved futile, as sovereign States took to enacting the use of force for their 
own political agenda: Japan’s military intervention in Manchuria and Shanghai in 1931 
is a prime example of such practice.157 Hence, it can be stated that the former threats were 
at constant danger of being realised again.158 
These threatening scenarios became a global-scale reality during the Second World 
War, when the initial advancement of both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union came 
with attempted and successful forceful annexations of other sovereign States.159 The 
global war that soon followed suit forced the international community to rethink its 
position on settling matters with armed measures, and instead focus on ensuring stability 
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and peace.160 It was therefore not surprising that the end of the War and the dawn of the 
UN era was marked by an attempt to limit the right to resort to force, even if it meant 
dabbling with the concept of sovereignty in the process.161 
The end result, codified in the United Nations Charter, is well known: States may only 
use force in self-defence, as otherwise armed measures are supposed be at the discretion 
of the United Nations Security Council.162 The purpose of this scheme was to shift the 
focus of armed measures to a collective entity instead of individual States, for the 
purposes of international peace and security.163 However, while the Charter was adopted 
with much fanfare and promise in 1945, even its drafting process was plagued with 
concerns over its actual applicability in practice.164 The concerns were soon realised and 
resulted in the fragmentation of the regulation on the use of force, as the norms struggled 
to uphold the collective scheme of the Charter and the right of sovereign States to resort 
to force. 
 
1.2. The Current Use of Force and Its Various Sources and Dimensions  
1.2.1. United Nations Charter: Original Intent, Current Status and Interpretation  
As with most norms of international law, the legal regulation of the use of force by 
States exists on multiple, overlapping and at times, slightly mismatching levels.165 This 
naturally makes understanding the legal schematics of the matter rather difficult. 
Nonetheless, this much is clear: if one wants to examine the current regulation on the use 
of force, the primary source is the UN Charter, in which the norms on the matter are 
primarily codified.166 
The United Nations and its goals were born out of the still-smoking ashes of the Second 
World War.167 The Charter, meant to act as the blueprint of the organisation, reflects this 
premise to the core.168 The theme of wishing to stop the further destruction of mankind is 
evident from the first few sentences of the Charter’s Preamble, and it is echoed throughout 
the instrument’s subsequent provisions.169 Thus, one of the instrument’s cornerstones has 
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been the prohibition of the use of force coded in Article 2(4), which essentially removes 
the admissibility of States using force against one another as they saw fit.170 Instead, a 
new world order was meant to be installed, one that championed scarce use of force which 
benefitted the global community as a whole.171 
At first glance, the Charter’s plan on the use of force is simple enough. Unilateral 
armed force is only permitted when a State has suffered an armed attack which triggers 
the right to self-defence.172 Otherwise, armed force was to be at the discretion of the 
Security Council, which was supposed to safeguard international peace and security.173 
This has been interpreted as an attempt to bring about a global regime reminiscent of 
national law enforcement: unilateral force is only allowable when absolutely necessary, 
and otherwise such measures belong to a collective entity tasked with maintaining 
safety.174  
It can also be seen as an initiative to further the goals first envisioned in the League of 
Nations Covenant and the Pact of Paris, both of which were adopted after the First World 
War and suggested clear limitations to the uses of force available for States.175 Despite 
the relatively fast collapse of the League of Nations, the United Nations sought to take its 
plan on the use of force to a whole new level, one not yet witnessed by known history. 
Hence, the Charter sought to further the centralisation of force, a considerably lighter 
version of which had already failed under the League of Nations.176 
Despite these admirable aspirations, it is also well known that the scheme is yet to be 
applied to its fullest effect. In fact, the system — or lack thereof, should one get cynical 
— in place today can at best be described as the poor man’s version of the plan introduced 
at the San Francisco Conference in 1945. Due to the immediate problems faced by the 
Security Council and its permanent members, the current plan has largely abandoned the 
initial role of collective security. 177  For many decades, collective security remained 
dormant, only existing in the unimplemented text of the Charter.178 Although the Security 
Council has gained authority in the past couple of decades, collective security has still 
been doomed to play the role of a statist who makes sporadic, short-lived appearances on 
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stage.179 This is partially because collective security as a globalist instrument is not truly 
such, as the organisation is yet to establish the UN-controlled troops who safeguard 
international peace and security.180 In other words, the centralisation of armed measures 
has failed in many respects, meaning that a fully collective take on the use of force has 
not seen daylight outside the Charter’s text.181 
Instead, the billing has been studded with the most politically and militarily powerful 
States of the world, most prominently the United States and Russia (and formerly the 
Soviet Union): during the Cold War this duo was often joined by the United Kingdom 
and France.182 As such, the focus has been on unilateral forms of armed force, which have 
often pushed the legal limits of the Charter.183 This has not only meant that the concept 
of self-defence has been tested, but also that other justifications not explicitly spelt out in 
the Charter have gained footing in legal argumentation.184 The main topic of the thesis, 
armed intervention by invitation, is naturally one of them.185 Other examples include the 
protection of nationals abroad and unilateral humanitarian intervention, but are not 
limited to these.186 
The misgivings of the Security Council are naturally at the centre of this modification. 
This makes one question how the current take on unilateral armed measures would have 
shaped if Chapter VII had been fully implemented from the outset. Imagining a world in 
which collective security acts exactly as it is set out in the UN Charter is very difficult. 
However, it is clear that the presence of any kind of centralised armed force would have 
had a tremendous effect on how unilateral measures would have developed. Any 
development aiming at the emergence of new unilateral forms of armed force would likely 
have met significant resistance, as opposed to the more accepting, albeit reluctant, stance 
taken in actual practice. 
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The admitted failure to completely fulfil the purpose of the UN Charter has brought 
into question the proper approach to interpreting the instrument.187 As established earlier, 
the Charter cannot be regarded as a black-letter convention that is tied to the limits of 
1945,188 which means that its interpretation is of upmost importance if the system wishes 
to perform even in a moderately successful manner. It has thus been suggested that the 
Charter should be viewed as comprising a continuous process, one which allows for the 
emergence of new modifications of the norms involved; even the ICJ is argued to have 
subscribed to this view.189 A point of concern, however, can easily be identified. In 
international law, this type of modification often appears to be in the hands of the 
politically and militarily powerful, leaving other States to resume the roles of 
bystanders. 190  This means that the evolution of the use of force, amongst other 
international legal regimes, is mostly spearheaded by the select few, while others stay 
more silent when it comes to initiative.  
What we have then is a worryingly frail shell of a system that is prone to the sometimes-
questionable motivations of the powerful States. Of course, this premise would have been 
present even with the full scheme of the Charter in place: after all, the system of collective 
security was designed to make certain States more powerful than others.191 In fact, the 
Charter itself mentions the term ‘enemy States’ against whom force may be deployed, 
suggesting that a truly utopian union of all nations was perhaps never the ultimate goal of 
the organisation.192 Nonetheless, it remains clear that the Charter has not completely 
managed to disconnect the use of force from sovereign interests and concede it to a 
collective entity, in this case the Security Council. It would rather appear that the 
connection continues to stand, although with aspirations of a more global character.  
 
1.2.2. Customary International Law: Reflections on Practice by States and UN Organs  
Despite being codified in the Charter, the regulation of the use of force has continued 
to exist and evolve in customary international law.193 In other words, the Charter did not 
mark the end of other legal evolution concerning the use of force. On the contrary, 
customary international law has played a markedly important part in the field of armed 
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force.194 But how does customary international law fare when compared to its treaty 
counterpart? By how much does it differ? At first glance, not much. As noted by the ICJ 
in Nicaragua, the two sources are by no means identical, but the customary take on armed 
force is generally similar to that of the Charter.195 In fact, the rules encoded in the Charter 
are reflective of pre-existing customary international law, which means that the core rules 
prohibiting the use of force would also bind States that are not parties to the Charter.196 
However, certain sprawling branches which cannot be found in the Charter exist, making 
them unique to customary international law.197 
These branches come with complications. The use of force is one of the more 
politically charged parts of international law, which has meant that State practice on the 
matter has often been confusing and even self-contradictory. This makes decoding the 
practice immensely difficult — and subsequently customary international law as a whole. 
However, some guidance on the matter can be sought from the practice of the UN organs, 
which over recent decades have made pronouncements on various matters concerning the 
use of force by States.198 By the sheer virtue of their eminency, the decisions of the three 
major bodies, the Security Council, the ICJ and the General Assembly, ought to be at the 
centre of this consideration. Of these three organs, specific weight has been given to the 
Court, perhaps because as a judicial establishment, it is bound to offer well-rounded legal 
findings on the use of force. In comparison, the General Assembly and the Security 
Council are organs consisting of sovereign States, inevitably making their statements less 
objective in nature.199 
This reliance on the ICJ for guidance over the customary rules has not been unfounded. 
Although the Court was not an instant success in terms of the quantity of cases it resolved, 
it has surprisingly many judgments which concern the use of force by States.200 The most 
important is the judgment on Nicaragua, delivered in 1986, over a dispute between 
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Nicaragua and the United States. The case concerned the US involvement in Nicaragua’s 
civil strife, and it was inter alia alleged that former’s actions had included supplying 
armed and financial support to the rebel contras in Nicaragua.201 Due to jurisdictional 
limitations, the Court was unable to examine the matter in light of the Charter, and instead 
had to base its findings on customary international law.202 The ICJ’s findings on the 
matter have become a much-cited staple when one examines the use of force, in particular 
its customary dimension.203 
While customary international law was generally found to be aligned with the Charter, 
it does exist as a standalone legal source.204 Consequently, there are certain dimensions, 
perhaps even legal exceptions, in customary international law alone. 205  Subsequent 
scholarly evaluations of the case have interpreted it as a confirmation that the evolution 
of customary international law may affect the Charter itself as well, making the 
instrument into one that is evolving in nature.206 Hence, new customary international law 
can also shed new light on how the Charter’s provisions on the use of force should be 
interpreted: after all, the rules contained in the Charter have been deemed as being subject 
to change when sufficient evidence has been presented within the international 
community.207 This interpretation appears to be backed by the Court as well,208 since it 
has accepted views which have modified the limitations on the use of force set by the 
Charter in 1945.209 
Consequently, while the provisions of the Charter and the norms of customary 
international law do not match to perfection and thus technically exist as separate entities, 
they do share a symbiotic relationship. In fact, they maintain continued reciprocity with 
one another. Firstly, the Charter’s regulation is reflected in customary international law, 
which also develops the regulation in accordance with the practice of the global 
community. 210  Secondly, this development in turn affects the interpretation of the 
Charter, allowing the instrument to adjust to the changes in State practice; this could even 
denote new exceptions to Article 2(4).211 Accordingly, the Charter ought to be mindful of 
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practice insisting that sovereign interests cannot yet be fully set aside, despite the 
document’s initial plan. 
Thus, despite their symbiosis, the customary dimension of the use of force does not 
tend to move international regulation towards the ideals established in the UN Charter. 
Rather, customary international law on armed interventions is tethered to the 
temperamental actions of States. However, as established by the ICJ throughout 
Nicaragua, international custom is not blind when it comes to the lopsided global 
community, as it does take into account the fact that armed interventions are most often 
enacted, and hence developed, by the biggest States.212 Such imbalanced State activities 
do not always necessarily result in new customary international law, especially if the 
actions are met with a negative response from the majority of the international 
community. 213  This threshold, while not firm and definite, does add an element of 
stability to the customary dimension of armed intervention, a necessary attribute given 
the many levels of legal regulation. 
 
1.2.3. The Ius Cogens Aspect of the Prohibition and Its Legal Effects 
As noted above, the current regulation on the use of force comes in many dimensions. 
One of them is yet to be examined in this chapter: when it comes to prohibition of the use 
of force, many international commentators often assert that, to a certain extent, the 
principle is a peremptory norm of international law.214 This means that the core idea of 
the prohibition sits on top of the hierarchy of international law, leaving any contradictory 
notion powerless when pitted against it.215 However, anyone monitoring the use of force 
by States can discern that this is not the case, bringing the peremptory dimension of the 
prohibition into question. 
Indeed, the legal effect of the ius cogens aspect of the ban has been left unclear. This 
is due to two major factors. First, the idea of a peremptory norm, or a rule of ius cogens, 
is not quite clearly cut in international legal regulation, which means that it has not been 
steadily invoked in argumentation by different actors.216 Consequently, the content and 
legal effects of such norms remain debated, leaving their place in practice slightly 
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vague.217 This connects directly with armed force: since the very idea of peremptory 
norms in general is debatable, the exact contents of the peremptory prohibition on the use 
of force are equally unclear as a consequence.218 Second, many international norms have 
been presented as peremptory rules, which means that these concepts may sometimes 
contradict each other. For instance, it has been submitted that both the territorial integrity 
of States and the right to self-determination may qualify as peremptory norms, even 
though the most extreme form of self-determination questions the established 
international borders.219 
For these reasons, the idea of ius cogens norms, which bind all States despite their 
individual commitments and maintain primacy in case of normative conflict, has been 
regarded as deeply multifaceted and complicated.220  Those in favour of peremptory 
norms see them as a much-needed anchor in international law.221 Such statements are 
understandable. International law is a difficult discipline to navigate due to its rich and 
often confusing variety of sources, and hence having a strong and unwavering starting 
point such as norms of ius cogens is alluring. However, critics of the concept have pointed 
out that such simplicity cannot exist within the various layers of international law, which 
does not have the clarity of a domestic legal system.222 As such, the tempting straight-
forwardness of peremptory norms may be incompatible with the international legal 
framework, making their application difficult, sometimes perhaps even practically 
impossible.223 
Hence, the very concept of a peremptory norm is in constant disarray. Identifying such 
norms and their limits can be an excruciating task, as many opinions on the matter exist. 
Still, the prohibition enshrined in Article 2(4) has partially been considered to be a 
peremptory norm.224 However, the exact scope of the peremptory dimension of the ban 
has been left unidentified. Nevertheless, defining the scope of this aspect of the 
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prohibition is crucial for the purposes of this thesis. As will later be demonstrated, host 
State consent to the use of force is not sufficient in cases in which the unlawful armed 
measures violate peremptory rules.225 Thus, tracing the general lines of the peremptory 
dimension of the prohibition even tentatively is of upmost importance. 
We may as well state the obvious: the peremptory dimension of the prohibition does 
not include all forms of armed force. Reaching such a conclusion is an easy deduction, as 
the Charter itself allows for specific exceptions, namely those of self-defence and 
collective armed measures.226 In other words, the prohibition cannot be regarded as 
absolutely definite, which leaves some room for available armed measures.227 In addition, 
asserting that all forms of armed force not specifically mentioned in the Charter would 
automatically violate the peremptory aspect of the appears short-sighted, particularly if 
such actions have been approved by the majority of the members of the international 
community. 228  After all, the general legal regulation on the matter makes a clear 
distinction between ‘regular’ uses of force and acts of aggression, with the latter being 
deemed to be much smaller in scope.229 Moreover, the various attempts to widen the 
scope of applicable armed force, both successful and unsuccessful, do suggest that States 
do not deem the entirety of Article 2(4) to be a rule of ius cogens. 
Thus, the ius cogens aspect of the prohibition entails measures which amount to 
aggression against the victim State.230 In other words, acts which could trigger the victim 
State’s right to self-defence fall within the ius cogens scope of the prohibition.231 In 
addition, acts which threaten the sovereignty or territorial integrity of the victim State can 
possibly qualify as violations of the peremptory sphere of the norm.232 This indicates that 
uses of force which result in the modification of existing international territorial borders 
could violate norms of ius cogens. In the end, the peremptory aspect of the prohibition 
may be so limited that it scarcely becomes pertinent. However, despite its apparently 
small role in actual practice, the peremptory sphere may become important when 
examining invited interventions and the possible extent of host State consent.233 In any 
event, the peremptory sphere of the ban does not diminish or erase the historical link 
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between the use of force and State sovereignty. It does add yet another regulatory layer 
to armed measures but does not completely remove them from the clutches of sovereign 
States. 
 
1.3. Trampling the Line: Where Does the Current Connection Between the 
Use of Force and Sovereignty Stand?  
1.3.1. Relationship in the External Relations of States  
As stated earlier, armed measures by States are irrevocably tied to the notion of 
sovereignty itself. This much has been well-established, but the connection between the 
ideas is still far from being devoid of complexities. The right to resort to force has evolved 
from an integral part of sovereignty to something that international law has attempted to 
confine, mostly to preserve international stability and world order. 234  As such, the 
relationship offers many takes on the international legal regulation involved. This has 
resulted in the norms on armed force being scattered and often disjointed, leaving their 
interpretation and analysis equally perplexing. While the current regulation of the use of 
force is complex and even contradictory in places, its clear aim has been to limit the 
sovereignty of States to resort to force.235 Whether or not this has been a success is 
debatable. Even though the regulation has arguably thus far upheld its goal of preventing 
another global-scale war, it has been unable to put an end to the tantrums of sovereignty 
which often dictate the use of force by States.236 This means that the Charter has not fully 
bestowed armed force to the United Nations, far from the hands of individual States.237 
It would therefore appear that while the idea of centralised use of force is still 
uncontested in theory, in practice certain States have attempted to reassert their 
sovereignty according to their own wishes.238 In other words, the turn towards a more 
sovereign approach to the use of force already took place various decades ago, and this 
movement is showing little signs of slowing down.239 As a consequence, the globalist 
approach to the use of force has, safe for occasional appearances, remained dormant in 
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practice. And indeed, not even the most devout supporter of the original Charter scheme 
would suggest that collective use of force is holding its place in an appropriate manner. 
Although it is now absolutely possible, collective use of force still remains far from being 
a probable option, let alone the primary mean of deploying armed force.240 
Furthermore, collective force under Chapter VII has yielded to the demands of certain 
powerful States. This has left the practice a far cry from its initial plans, and instead it has 
been modified to accommodate unilateral use of force, indicating a reversion of power 
back to States themselves. For instance, the previous scheme of establishing armed forces 
solely under the command chain of the UN never came to be, even though collective 
armed measures themselves managed to break through into practical existence. 241 
Enacting collective measures has instead been left to ‘coalitions of the willing’, which 
have often consisted of militarily active States.242 The development has meant that the 
pure globalism of collective use of force has at least partially been compromised, leaving 
the legal framework in a distorted form between its planned position and the needs of 
powerful sovereign States. 
Since Chapter VII should be a central piece of international regulation on the use of 
force, its current position is reflected on the system. And indeed, it would appear that the 
regime of armed force has not shaken its old habit of conforming to the needs of 
individual States. 243  This means that armed force very much remains a tool which 
advances the sovereign needs of select States, instead of solely upholding international 
peace and order.244 In other words, the ability to resort to force is still connected to 
sovereignty itself, but perhaps slightly differently. Whereas in traditional times, using 
force was an inherent right of all sovereign entities, today it is an opportunity coveted and 
ultimately seized by the most assertive ones, which often leaves smaller States at bay.245 
Thus sovereign interests, of some States at least, remain at the heart of the use of force, 
firmly linking the current system to individual State agendas.246 
 
1.3.2. Developments and Issues Concerning the Internal Matters of States  
Much of any debate over the use of force focuses on inter-State relations: after all, 
restricting the use of force between States is the primary purpose of the Charter’s 
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system.247 Still, the relationship between State sovereignty and the use of force is not 
limited to external matters. In fact, one cannot deny the existence of an internal 
dimension, which deserves academic inspection as well, given the contents of this thesis. 
Indeed, an additional aspect needs to be covered: the right of a sovereign to use force 
to restrain its subjects. This matter will be of importance later on in the thesis, once the 
practical requirements and limitations of invited interventions have been discussed. As 
will be explained later, the mere need to invite foreign armed intervention signifies a deep 
crisis in the host State. In such circumstances, the invited use of force is bound to affect 
the people of the country directly, even if not so targeted.248 The issue is not limited solely 
to invited interventions: the use of force by States always bears the risk of the loss of 
human life, a reason for its tight regulation.249 
The idea that a sovereign State may do as it wishes, even if it harms its subjects in the 
process, was unproblematic for many centuries. The power of the sovereign was absolute 
and thus subjected to few derogations.250 Hence, if one follows the traditional Hobbesian 
take on the matter, citizens do not pose issues. The State is sovereign, and its subjects are 
simply subjected to the power held by the King— as their title already suggests.251 
Accordingly, the one who holds the position of sovereign may do as it wishes on the 
earthly plane and is thus not limited by the hopes and ideas of commoners.252 
However, the current views do not correspond to this. In fact, in the last few centuries, 
many legal researchers have often tended to emphasise the idea of people behind the State 
being the legitimising factor of sovereign capacity, a notion which also appears in the 
modern international legal debate.253 In other words, the legitimacy of the sovereign 
stems from its people. Such a statement introduces us to a problem. If the source of a 
sovereign’s power is its people, how can sovereign power be exercised against those 
people? This is important when using foreign armed force in a State’s territory or against 
its people. How does this affect the capacity of inviting a foreign armed intervention, 
especially if it may be directed at the people of the State? Should the source of the 
sovereign mandate not invalidate this? 
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In more modern legal argumentation, these matters connect to the principle of the self-
determination of peoples, which may provide additional issues to the already unhinging 
relationship between sovereignty and the use of force.254  As its name suggests, the 
principle of self-determination aims to limit the actions of States in reference to their own 
populations.255 It inter alia obligates States to ensure the people’s sufficient participation 
in the political processes of their homeland, and give safeguards to different groups of 
peoples who live in their territory.256 This should make the State’s right to use force 
against its population much more complicated, as such force may be undertaken to put 
out an uprising or other demonstrations of the people. 257  Furthermore, it can be 
questioned if uses of force deployed in a State’s territory should base its legal justification 
directly to the people itself.258 
Nevertheless, the dilemmas between the power of a sovereign and the rights of the 
people may be too convoluted, meaning that the principle of self-determination alone 
appears unable to solve them completely. The idea of the people, let alone the will of 
those people, is a multifaceted concept which has evaded thorough legal classification. In 
fact, it should be further noted that the principle of self-determination tends to focus on 
setting certain frameworks in which the people may participate in their homeland’s 
matters: it largely stays quiet on the actual outcomes of democratic processes.259 Hence, 
the norm itself remains neutral on many substantial matters, instead choosing to focus on 
technical qualifications.260 
In any event, a sovereign State’s right to resort to force without any regard to its people 
has lost support among States, at least in the last few decades.261 Of course, this does not 
automatically mean that the State has lost all its sovereign capacities in favour of the 
supposed democratic will of the people. This is because debates still rage over how much 
regard should be given to the will of the people, in particular since this could be difficult 
to extract and define properly. In addition, whether this is a lasting outcome remains to 
be seen. The current loss of popularity might be due to more superficial reasons which 
may not ultimately result in permanent legal regulation. Nonetheless, a return to the take 
on sovereignty as presented by Thomas Hobbes is evidently not on the cards. Instead, the 
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tides seem to be moving in the opposite direction, which also has an immediate effect on 
armed intervention by invitation. 
 
1.4. Concluding Notions  
To speak of the use of force is also to speak of sovereignty. In the earliest centuries 
marked by nation States, the ability to use armed force was a mark of sovereignty, as 
resorting to armed measures was a mantle that all States could claim. However, in the last 
century, the relationship between the two concepts has been in constant rotation, which 
has left the connection strained. Such strain was already visible during the era of the 
League of Nations, when the organisation attempted — ultimately unfruitfully — to 
restrict the use of force by sovereign States. Nevertheless, following World War II, this 
movement managed to culminate in the adoption of the UN Charter, which restricted the 
use of force to self-defence and collective armed measures.  
However, the utopian plan of the Charter is yet to be realised in practice, since the idea 
of centralising the use of force to the Security Council was forced to yield in the face of 
the Cold War. Over the decades, this has led to certain States testing the limits of the use 
of force, often with the intention of reverting power to the biggest sovereign States. Such 
practice has meant that the use of force is often deployed to protect the sovereign interests 
of the powerful, leaving the global balance lopsided. Moreover, collective security, the 
crown jewel of the Charter’s system, has been forced to conform to the persistence of 
sovereign interests even after the conclusion of the Cold War. This has resulted in the 
globalist aspirations of the concept being cast aside. To put it differently, the use of force 
remains non-centralised, and unilateral forms of armed intervention continue to dominate 
the field. 
To conclude, the use of armed force continues to be linked to State sovereignty despite 
the international community’s best efforts to reduce this connection in the aftermath of 
World War II. The entanglement has remained despite the adoption of the Charter and 
the grand ideas of collective security which soon turned out to be utopian. Although there 
have been new developments, the concept is still a far cry from what was imagined in 
1945, meaning that the ultimate sovereign restraint not to use of force is yet to be found. 
Instead, sovereignty and armed force engage in a back and forth struggle, attempting to 
find a sustainable balance. This balance is further destabilised by the principle of non-
intervention, which shares considerable overlap with the current system on the use of 
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2. The Notion of Intervention in International Law 
 
2.1. The Basics and Birth of Non-Intervention in International Relations  
2.1.1. The Concept of Intervention Throughout History  
In the public eye, the term ‘intervention’ is used in international political rhetoric to 
the point of boredom.262 More often than not, the notion is included in the vocabulary of 
States when they decry what they perceive as being intrusive acts by others.263 However, 
the evident overuse of the term has not meant that such claims have always been uncalled 
for. In fact, interventions by States into the affairs of others have been frequent throughout 
the history, all the way to the UN era.264 Still, this practice is not fully reflective of 
accepted international law, at least in the contemporary context. 
For quite some time now, the international community has witnessed and encouraged 
a movement towards restricting the intervention of one State in the matters of another, 
now commonly known as the duty of non-intervention.265 At first glance, the principle is 
fairly clear-cut: States must refrain from intervening in affairs which essentially belong 
in the domestic jurisdiction of other sovereign nations.266 This principle, codified in 
customary international law, has a firm grounding in international relations — at least on 
paper.267 Nevertheless, as noted above, this apparent strength has not translated into 
practice quite as well. States continue to intervene in the affairs of others despite 
regulation, meaning it is pertinent to examine interventions in the history of international 
relations. 
Since the concept of intervention into another State’s affairs, at least how we currently 
understand it, crystallised during the 1800s,268 beginning the examination from this era is 
the most sustainable option. During this time, some notable developments were the 
establishments of coalitions such as the Holy Alliance and other agreements which were 
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built upon the right to stage armed interventions on the contracting parties’ territory.269 
This development was of major importance, as it is often regarded as the first incarnation 
of intervention, including invited and collective interventions. 270  Furthermore, the 
century became notable for various civil wars, and other States’ stances on them: to 
intervene or not to intervene appeared to be the major question amongst the sovereign 
States. These musings had profound effects on the doctrine of belligerency, which would 
later become the staple used when examining civil wars in other States.271  
The beginning of the 1900s showed little signs of slowing down the willingness of 
States to intervene in the matters of their peers. The first few decades of the century were 
littered with interventions, often in military form, in the non-international armed conflicts 
of other States: examples include the civil wars of Finland (1918) and Spain (1936-
1939).272 However, the notion of armed intervention did face some significant opposition 
at the conclusion of the First World War, as during this time, the global community began 
to take its first tentative steps towards a more peaceful co-existence of States. 273 
Nonetheless, such a development failed to achieve lasting effects, as the world was soon 
plunged into yet another global conflict, which first began as smaller interventions turned 
into invasions in 1939 and 1940.274 The Second World War on the whole, of course, 
cannot be fruitfully examined as a basis for non-intervention, as the conflict represents a 
state of exception in international relations. 
The period that followed the Second World War, however, offers a solid backdrop for 
legal evaluation. And indeed, the importance of interventions — and consequently the 
legal duty of non-intervention — has not wavered in the post-1945 era. On the contrary, 
the concept became one of the most prominent terms within the international community, 
as the Cold War was heavily built around politically powerful States intervening in 
smaller countries, either in military or non-military fashion. 275  However, due to 
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developed international norms, the interventions of the UN era have had certain perks 
over their predecessors. In fact, the interventions post 1945 have tended to assert the 
intervenor’s power in the target States in a more confined and controlled manner, which 
is of course preferable to full-scale conflicts.  
This does not mean that intervention has been uncontroversial, especially from the 
perspective of international organs and commentators.276 After all, interventions of all 
sorts are meant to act as a catalyst for change, and on the international stage they 
inevitably result in modifying the status quo in another sovereign State. This means that 
although intervention is a preferable option to many concepts put into practice in the past, 
it is nevertheless a measure which requires identifiable and executable restrictions. The 
principle of non-intervention has been tasked with attaining such results. 
 
2.1.2. Ideals Behind the Duty of Non-Intervention and Its Evolution 
As noted before, while intervention has been more than a staple in international 
relations from time immemorial, the idea of its opposition in the legal sense did not fully 
emerge until the 1800s.277 This opposition came to be out of sheer necessity. Indeed, this 
century was marked by various intrusions by States into the affair of others, resulting in 
the idea of intervention becoming prevalent within the international community.278 Since 
then, the notion has made continuous appearances in international relations, necessitating 
the emergence of the duty of non-intervention.279 This principle aims to protect the 
sovereignty of each State by allowing them to decide upon their internal and external 
matters without outside involvement. 280  The duty of non-intervention thus exists to 
prevent other States from intervening in matters which essentially belong to the domestic 
jurisdiction of others.281 However, it does not create an impenetrable shield which makes 
every sovereign State immune to the criticism of its peers.282 
In today’s international law, the principle of non-intervention is a widely accepted 
norm of customary international law.283 It was notably omitted from the UN Charter as 
an explicit rule vis-a-vis States, but it is mirrored in the document in other respects: for 
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instance, Article 2(7) prohibits the United Nations from intervening in the domestic 
matters of its member States.284 However, these are only small reflections, resulting in 
customary international law being the primary legal source for the principle.285 
This premise can be problematic, as any customary rule of international law consists 
of State practice and opinio iuris.286 In other words, customary rules evolve in response 
to State activities, which means that the duty of non-intervention is also subject to 
constant pressure within the international community.287 State activities on the matter, at 
least those of prominent States, have tended to not follow the limits or even the basic 
guidelines of established legal norms, creating a contradiction between the principle’s 
legal limits and practice.288 Given the dependence on State practice and opinio iuris of 
any customary norm, said activities could result in the modification of the legal rule.289 
This contradiction is yet another problem discussed by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case. 
While examining the case, the Court noted that when it comes to the principle, practice 
and established norms appear to clash, especially where intervention in favour of 
opposition groups was concerned.290 As readily admitted by the Court, this situation could 
have resulted in the modification of the duty of non-intervention.291 Nevertheless, the 
Court did not view the existence of this particular collision as immediate evidence of new 
customary international law which had affected the principle.292 It based this conclusion 
on several points. The Court inter alia stated that the aforementioned practice lacked clear 
legal argumentation and consequently intent, both of which are required to modify 
existing international customs.293 It was also hinted that much of this practice was not 
wide-spread enough to warrant the evolution of the principle of non-intervention.294 
Moreover, the ICJ regarded much of the conflicting practice to be politically motivated 
in nature, which in its opinion undermined the importance and longevity of the actions’ 
effect on customary international law.295 
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The ICJ’s stance on the matter raises certain issues. After all, the entirety of 
international law, including the practice of States, is politically motivated by default.296 
As a result, distinguishing worthwhile State activities from ones that should be discarded 
can be an almost impossible task at times. Perhaps more importantly, it may be impossible 
to perfectly objectively decide which State practice is free of a political agenda and which 
is not, particularly when interventions are concerned.297  
However, the clear political motivations behind the State practice may result in said 
practice not being consistent enough. It is well known that consistency is required for 
such practice to be counted as relevant evidence of new customary international law.298 
This makes the ICJ’s stance in Nicaragua understandable: if one was to follow the 
practice of States with no discretion given to their agenda, the outcome would be 
confusing and unconvincing. 299  Quite often the practice of States, in particular the 
powerful ones, is laced with hypocrisy which borders on, and sometimes crosses over to, 
being blatant. This makes the evaluation of such State practice difficult, as reaching 
sustainable findings which mark the existence of a long-standing legal practice is 
difficult. 
Moreover, the fact that intervention is a tool reserved for the most powerful States in 
world may mean that the aforementioned practice lacks not only wide State practice, but 
opinio iuris sive necessitatis as well.300 It is in no way out of the ordinary to have only a 
handful of States handle the actual interventions, whereas the vast majority remains 
uninvolved.301 In addition, more often than not the smaller and militarily more restrained 
States have opposed the activities of the superpowers, which can create divisions in the 
international community.302 Such divisions inevitably separate the bigger and smaller 
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powers, consequently leaving the development of the duty of non-intervention in a 
perpetual state of uncertainty. 
 
2.2. Interventions of All Sorts: Where Does the Line Between Lawful and 
Unlawful Lie? 
2.2.1. What Denotes a Violation of the Duty of Non-Intervention? 
The current stance of non-intervention into the affairs of other States is based on 
understandable grounds: sovereign States wish to conduct their own matters without 
interference from outside influences. 303  Such aspirations have emerged even more 
prominently in the aftermath of the two World Wars, similar to those concerning the use 
of force. One might even argue that the non-intervention in the affairs of others was one 
of the main influences behind the establishment of the United Nations.304 However, one 
must remember that the norm as such is not present in the organisation’s Charter, even 
though the document does entail paying certain homage to the principle.305 
As a legal norm, the duty of non-intervention comprises two aspects, both of which 
need to be present in a suspected violation.306 Firstly, breaching the principle requires that 
a State intervenes in a matter that is the sole discretion of another sovereign State:307 this 
intervention can take place either directly or indirectly.308 In other words, an intervention 
is only such when it concerns affairs that other States legally have no say in.309 Such 
affairs can include both internal and external matters of the State. For instance, each 
sovereign State should be entitled to decide upon its internal organisation without 
intrusion from others, just as it should be able to formulate its international relations as it 
wishes.310  
Naturally, the scope of the matters which belong to the national discretion of each 
sovereign State is not utterly limitless. After all, correspondence is the basis of 
international relations, and thus States at times must inevitably take a stance on the 
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conduct of others, be it on internal or international matters.311 Furthermore, since the duty 
of non-intervention is codified in customary international law, these lines can be subject 
to constant change. 312  And indeed, these definitions and limitations have been 
exceedingly tested of late, meaning that either the contents or the core justification of 
non-intervention itself may be currently undergoing a trial. This notion will be elaborated 
on later in this chapter. 
Secondly, the element of coercion needs to be present. 313  This means that the 
intervenor must have forced its actions upon the target State, in one way or another.314 As 
with the act of intervening itself, coercion can take place either explicitly or implicitly.315 
The requirement of coercion is natural, as no intrusion can occur if the target State itself 
allows the particular action.316 For instance, it is a different matter for a State to require 
assistance, as opposed to having such ‘assistance’ forced upon it. However, when does 
regular international correspondence cross over to the realm of intervention? After all, no 
community can exist without interaction, and this premise naturally applies in the global 
setting as well. Consequently, the notion of an unlawful intervention greatly depends on 
the perspective of States themselves, meaning that case-by-case evaluation is needed. If 
a State in question does not regard its rights as having been breached, the duty of non-
intervention is also likely to have remained intact as.317  
One should further note that this requirement of coercion is a key element when it 
comes to armed intervention by invitation, the whole legality of which is based upon the 
consent of the host State. As intervention can only be unlawful if it is dictatorial, the duty 
of non-intervention does not pose many legal challenges to invited interventions.318 
However, this does not mean that the principle is without meaning in this context. Rather, 
it relocates these issues to the practical sphere of the doctrine, where the principle of non-
intervention continues to govern several aspects and imposes many limitations. These 
practical aspects will be discussed in more detail later in this thesis.319 
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2.2.2. Military and Non-military Interventions: The Core Difference 
Merely concluding that some actions may result in a violation of the duty of non-
intervention is not quite enough. Instead, once it has been established that certain types 
of interventions are unlawful, these acts can be further categorised into two types of 
measures, non-military and military. 320  The main difference between these types of 
interventions is what their names already suggest: the latter includes the use of armed 
force, whereas the former does not. 
Non-military intervention can occur in many ways, for example in the form of 
economic coercion and other measures which aim at influencing the domestic affairs of 
the victim State.321 Such measures may be both explicit and implicit, both are equally 
unlawful.322 It should be noted that economic coercion does not by itself amount to an 
armed measure.323 Although this statement appears obvious now, this has not always been 
the state of matters: in fact, when the prohibition on the use of force was formulated in 
1945, many developing States suggested that economic measures be included in Article 
2(4).324 However, this addition was eventually left out of the prohibition, meaning that 
unlawful economic measures, while they may constitute an unlawful intervention, do not 
amount to the use of force.325 
This quick finding leads us directly to armed interventions themselves. Although it is 
much more limited in its scope, military intervention is exactly what the term suggests: 
an unlawful armed intrusion into another State.326 Such an intervention always entails the 
use of armed measures to an extent, and thus corresponds with the use of force. In other 
words, an unlawful armed intervention will inevitably occur in conjunction with a 
violation of the prohibition on the use of force as well.327 Since it comprises violations of 
both the duty of non-intervention and the non-use of force, 328  unlawful armed 
intervention may take many forms, from small-scale measures to much more blatant 
ones.329 Such interventions can vary from limited activities, such as sending weapons and 
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military assistance to non-governmental entities, to a fully-fledged armed intervention 
with the intervening State’s own army.330 
The connection between the duty of non-intervention and the prohibition on the use of 
force is sturdy in this regard, as a breach of the latter is bound to include a violation of 
the former as well. By default, armed interventions are slated to have a profound effect 
on the target States’ internal matters, including their political order and affairs, which 
should belong to the sovereign discretion only.331 In fact, it is not a stretch to state that 
the use of armed force tends to worsen the act of intervention in another State’s affairs.332 
Thus, while all forms of intervention are considered undesirable at the very least, military 
interventions unmistakably pose the biggest threats.  
And indeed, this continues to be the case in the UN era as well, despite the regulation 
on the matter. Armed interventions take place on a regular basis, and this may pose 
difficulties for both the customary, and thus modifiable, rule of non-intervention, and the 
inherently flexible ban on force.333 For the duty of non-intervention, however, perhaps 
the most perplexing forms of armed interference have taken place during another State’s 
internal armed conflict, a matter which was initially meant to remain domestic even after 
the adoption of the UN Charter.334 This concerns many recent developments, and will 
thus be elaborated upon next. 
 
2.3. The Duty of Non-Intervention and Its Development Since the Cold War  
As the scope of interventions is  wide, it is no surprise that a principle has emerged 
with hopes of limiting such activities. The duty of non-intervention aims to achieve just 
that. While the norm has a long-standing position in history, its appearances in practice 
have not been similarly convincing. In fact, we know numerous examples of States 
intervening in the matters of others, worryingly often in a military fashion. Such practice, 
however, has not always meant that States have sought to reform the customary duty of 
non-intervention, as on the surface, they have pledged their support for the principle’s 
status and limits. This can be exemplified by the Cold War interventions, which were 
often undertaken due to the political necessities that plagued the global community.335 
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The politically charged interventions of this era are not void of importance, but their effect 
on the duty of non-intervention and modern international law in general cannot be taken 
at pure face value.336 
While the worst whims of the Cold War are still yet to be matched, recent practice on 
the principle of non-intervention does reflect the sentiment presented above. On paper, 
States continue to hold the duty of non-intervention in high regard. Nonetheless, practice 
has not fully followed suit, as interventions are a regular occurrence in contemporary 
international politics.337 Hence, while the end of Cold War initially raised hopes of fewer 
perceived violations of the duty of non-intervention, contemporary practice remains very 
different from such aspirations.338 Since the principle is based in customary international 
law, this practice inevitably leads to a problem: if the opinio iuris and State practice 
collide so magnificently, what effect does the collision have on the principle itself? In 
order reach a feasible conclusion, we should pinpoint where such developments have 
taken place, and what has been the general reaction to them. 
Although interventions of many sorts have taken place following the end of the Cold 
War, conflicting practice has been perhaps most notably manifested in the interventions 
into non-international armed conflicts of third States.339 By the beginning of the UN era 
it had become clear that States must desist from intervening in such conflicts,340 but 
intrusions in civil wars were nonetheless a common occurrence during the Cold War.341 
Moreover, the last couple of decades have further shown certain further developments in 
this field. Such changes were in part instigated by the re-emergence of UN’s collective 
security in the 1990s, when collective measures began to be applied in internal crises and 
full-scale conflicts.342 This development essentially meant that civil wars could validly 
hold external interests as well,343 resulting in unilateral military interventions in such 
settings.344  
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Naturally, interventions in internal conflicts did take place during the Cold War as 
well. However, during that time, States engaging in such interventions often had the 
decency to execute their actions in secrecy, leaving few activities for public inspection.345 
Furthermore, when intervening in non-international armed conflicts, the interveners often 
denied that the situation in question had passed such a threshold, instead maintaining that 
the matter was that of internal unrest.346 This indicated that intervening in a civil war, 
although perhaps a measure de facto exhausted by some, was still considered to be 
unlawful. That these interventions are now deemed to be fit to bear the burden of publicity 
suggests that many States may also deem them to be in accordance with international law 
under certain circumstances. Moreover, at least one occurrence has gone further: during 
the current Ukraine crisis, when a Russian military intervention ultimately resulted in the 
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the latter.347 
These changes have yet again raised questions about the position of the duty of non-
intervention, and also the formulation created by the ICJ in the Nicaragua case. As noted 
earlier, the Court did not consider the emergence of conflicting State practice as such to 
be an immediate sign of changing customary international law.348 In other words, if one 
follows the findings of Nicaragua, contradicting practice may not absolutely denote the 
modification of the duty of non-intervention.349 However, it must have some effect, be it 
temporary or that of mere political disturbance. The types of interventions will be 
discussed in more detail later in the thesis, but a general observation can be made 
immediately.  
Given the norm’s status as a customary rule, the modern changes discussed above 
could indeed be seen as alluding to a possible dissolution of the duty of non-intervention, 
at least in certain respects.350 However, if one keeps Nicaragua in mind, reaching this 
conclusion seems slightly premature. Therefore, for the time being, the developments 
might better be described as having amended the requirements of an unlawful 
intervention, in particular the notion of a matter which essentially belongs to the sovereign 
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State only. In other words, it appears that the range of purely internal affairs has slimmed 
down, a development well exemplified by the multifaceted fight against terrorist 
organisations.351 According to this logic, the aforementioned practices could be seen as 
manifestations of a more global world, where the lines between internal and international 
matters have begun to fade, perhaps to a point where definite distinctions are borderline 
impossible.352 Muddling the definitions between domestic and global matters may have 
an effect on the principle of non-intervention, especially towards civil wars. Nonetheless, 
it does not diminish the fundamental duty which requires States to remain uninvolved in 
affairs purely belonging to others.353 
To state it differently, the principle of non-intervention has not ceased to exist. 
Nevertheless, it would still seem that intervening in matters which, at least traditionally, 
have belonged to States themselves has once again become a public staple in international 
relations. In the end, intervention is a concept that will most likely never fully perish, at 
least as long as States form the world community. State discourse functions on interaction, 
and sometimes that interaction can cross accepted boundaries. Therefore, the duty of non-
intervention should continue to retain its position in international law, even amidst 
modern, sometimes fast-paced developments. While it may be unable to curate the 
conduct of States fully, it still provides a framework within which States at least attempt 
to keep their argumentation and actions. 
 
2.4. Conclusions 
Intervention has been both an important and unfortunate part of international relations 
for many centuries. For a sovereign State it has a negative ring to it and is often perceived 
as a threat to any given State’s internal matters. From the perspective of a globalist, 
however, it can present itself as an opportunity to resolve international matters, conflicts 
even. This dual nature of intervention has made it a perplexing concept. Consequently, 
the principle prohibiting such activities has not been wholly convincing in its attempts to 
confine the use of interventions in international relations. 
Since the duty of non-intervention is based in customary international law, the 
principle may be subject to change more easily than norms codified in the Charter for 
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instance. Of course, as the ICJ noted in Nicaragua, this development cannot be based on 
clearly politically-motivated State practice, which lessens the immediate influence of 
incoherent State activities. It does, however, create a problem with interpretation. Given 
the incoherency of the perimeter established by the ICJ and other actors, how can one 
identity a legally sustainable, objective manner of evaluating State practice concerning 
intervention in international relations?  
Nevertheless, this premise can make the principle unpredictable in many senses. 
Whereas the use of force has various sources, albeit ones admittedly often trampled upon, 
the duty of non-intervention has not enjoyed similar codification. Even though its distant 
reflections can inter alia be found in certain parts of the Charter, it is completely 
manifested only within the depths of customary international law. The norms on the use 
of force can always find background and comparison points from the initial system as 
enshrined in the Charter: in other words, the evolution of these norms can follow a certain 
path, and thus be more easily traced. The duty of non-intervention does not have this perk. 
Instead, it ultimately remains a legal norm which depends on the whims of the most 
powerful States in the world, a situation that the doctrine in itself attempts to fight. 
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We have thus far covered the legal basics concerning the use of force and its relation 
to State sovereignty, in addition to discussing the foundations of the duty of non-
intervention in international affairs. Nevertheless, one last level still needs to be explored 
to understand fully the legality behind intervention by invitation: State consent and its 
effects on precluding the wrongfulness of any given State activity, including the use of 
force.354 At the heart of this analysis lies the principle of volenti non fit iniuria, according 
to which an illegal act is no longer such when the would-be victim gives consent, a stance 
that has been widely encoded in national law of sovereign entities since time 
immemorial.355 Before the days of the UN Charter, this principle was applied between 
States without much discretion, and it could be regarded as having been valid with respect 
to armed measures as well.356 However, in the current era, the principle’s status is not 
quite as clear cut as it may find itself clashing with the modern regulation on the use of 
force, for instance.357 
In contemporary international law, this issue is largely governed by the regime of State 
responsibility.358 This body of international norms has perhaps been most notably studied 
by the International Law Commission (ILC), which concluded a comprehensive report 
on the matter in 2001.359 While covering the many issues of State responsibility, the report 
also takes a clear stance on consent as an act which precludes wrongfulness, thus 
accepting it as an applicable concept under international law.360 Furthermore, the official 
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commentary attached to the Draft Articles suggests that consent may validate certain uses 
of force that would otherwise be unlawful.361 However, neither the Draft Articles nor their 
commentaries offer a comprehensive list of activities that can be legitimised by victim 
State consent, which leaves the matter much too ambiguous.362  
In any event, solving the current status of volenti non fit iniuria requires an analysis of 
the doctrine of State responsibility. This means delving into the Draft Articles crafted by 
the ILC, particularly the portions that may affect the notion of State consent as a condition 
with which an illegal act is no longer such. Consequently, attention must be given to 
Article 20 (which covers the issue of consent), the commentary attached to it, as well as 
the international responses to the Draft Articles in general. 
 
3.2. International Law Commission’s Report on State Responsibility: The 
Rationale Behind Article 20  
3.2.1. The International Law Commission’s Work and Article 20 in General 
Despite its vastness, the doctrine of State responsibility has been studied thoroughly 
over the years. The research has been undertaken by the ILC, which was tasked with 
crafting a report on the principles of State responsibility in international law. The 
assignment, which lasted for several decades and resulted in numerous preliminary 
reports, was finally concluded in 2001, when the Commission released its Final Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility. 363  The Draft Articles were accompanied by a 
commentary, which took to explaining the contents, rationale and interlinked connections 
of the Articles.364 
The Draft Articles form a comprehensive study on the various aspects of State 
responsibility over unlawful conduct in international law. As a consequence, when 
discussing State consent as a circumstance which negates wrongfulness, many legal 
scholars rightly bring up Article 20 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility as 
presented by the ILC. In its final state, the Article reads as follows: ‘Valid consent by a 
State to the commission of a given act by another State precludes the wrongfulness of that 
act in relation to the former State to the extent that the act remains within the limits of 
that consent.’365 
The wording of the Article is straight-forward for an outcome of a global discussion 
that was spread over several decades. The work of the Commission on the Draft Articles, 
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including Article 20, was over 40 years in the making, and thus covers interpretation of 
international law over an extensive period of time.366 As a document by the ILC, the 
report on the Draft Articles is not by itself a legally binding source of international law. 
Nevertheless, the Draft Articles have been interpreted to reflect existing customary 
international law, giving them an immediate legal significance.367 In any event, the Draft 
Articles have become a staple when discussing the legalities of State responsibility, 
including State consent and its effects.368 
Although it does not specifically refer to it by name, Article 20 of the ILC Draft 
Articles supports the principle of volenti non fit iniuria in international law in general.369 
As the Article suggests, the consent of the victim is enough to remove the illegality of an 
act that would otherwise be unlawful. However, the extent of the principle’s application 
can be questioned. The Article itself takes no stance on the matter, but the official 
commentary on the Draft Articles does suggest that consent cannot limitlessly legitimise 
otherwise unlawful acts.370 This begs the question, are there some acts, perhaps those 
concerning the use of force, which fall beyond the principle’s scope? 
And indeed, certain issues concerning Article 20’s application exist in reference to the 
use of force. However, they do not mean that the Article is utterly inapplicable to armed 
measures. While it does not mention armed measures explicitly, the commentary on 
Article 20 has interpreted it as covering certain unlawful uses of force as well.371 The 
examples of armed measures mentioned in the commentary include specific operations 
involving rescue and arrest and the stationing of foreign troops on another State’s 
territory.372 This commentary has also been supported by international scholars, who have 
regarded Article 20 as one of the basis for consensual use of force.373  
Nevertheless, not all acts involving armed force can be covered by the consent of the 
host State.374 This is due to the aforementioned ius cogens aspect of the prohibition of 
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armed force, which makes the ban both a primary norm and a matter belonging to all 
States.375 All peremptory norms are automatically norms of erga omnes as well, which 
means that any State may make claims over the violations of such rules. In other words, 
host State consent alone is not enough to preclude the unlawfulness of the activities in 
question, making Article 20 inapplicable.376 In the end, this matter is debatable as the 
report itself decided largely to stay silent on the matter.377 
 
3.2.2. Article 20 and Armed Interventions: Possible Limitations 
Applying Article 20 to armed interventions is not absolutely free of complications, 
even though both the international community and various commentators have backed 
the existence of such a connection.378 And indeed, even though the Draft Articles and 
their commentary do not offer conclusive answers to the applicability and scope of Article 
20, it has been asserted that it can be put to use in reference to armed force, only barring 
the most severe forms of armed intervention. While this premise has received general 
acceptance, certain legal questions remain. Most of these are concerned with the status of 
the prohibition on the use of force, a rule coded in the UN Charter and widely hailed as a 
cornerstone of international law. These concerns are addressed in this section. The 
nuances concerning non-intervention, although much smaller in the legal sphere, will also 
be discussed. 
Most of the issues with applying Article 20 to the use of force concern the latter’s 
status in international legal regulation. As a part of the Charter, the ban entailed in Article 
2(4) enjoys primacy over obligations arising from other agreements, and through the use 
of interpretation, customary rules as well.379 In other words, other commitments should 
subsequently yield to it if they were to come into conflict with one another. Furthermore, 
the peremptory character of the prohibition380 must be considered. As all peremptory 
norms are obligations erga omnes as well,381 they are also owed to States not immediately 
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involved in the matter. This means that one State’s consent is not enough to legitimise the 
use of force, as the entire international community would have to be consulted.382   
Nevertheless, it would appear that suggesting Article 20 is completely inapplicable 
where the use of force is concerned has not gained much momentum.383 Instead, it has 
been argued that certain acts of armed force remain within the Article’s scope, a view 
which is inter alia mirrored in the official commentary to the ILC’s work.384 This can be 
attributed in part to the Charter’s ability to reformulate itself in accordance with State 
practice, as it is not a legal instrument which should be interpreted in a fixed manner.385 
Rather, it is a flexible set of norms which accommodate to the changes if necessary.386 In 
other words, while holding an elevated position, the Charter is not something which 
automatically rejects and nullifies any attempt to challenge it. Of course, this does not 
mean that the provisions of the Charter are completely obsolete. Moreover, the consent 
of the host State cannot limitlessly cover all military operations, given that the prohibition 
on the use of force is also in part a peremptory norm as well. 
Still, as established before, the ius cogens aspect of the ban on use of force is more 
limited than Article 2(4) of the Charter in its entirety.387 The peremptory nature of the ban 
covers most extreme forms of armed force, such as armed attacks and actions which 
modify the territorial sovereignty of existing States.388 Hence, the use of force based on 
the consent of the host State should be allowable as long as it does not cross such 
thresholds. In such cases the peremptory aspect of the ban is not violated, meaning that 
other States have no agency in the matter.389 
Whereas the use of force continues to be a conundrum in Article 20, the principle of 
non-intervention would appear to present a smaller, perhaps even non-existent, challenge. 
As the entire illegality of intervention depends on it happening against the other State’s 
will, actions executed with valid consent from the sovereign entity should not pose a 
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threat to the principle.390 One can therefore observe that the duty of non-intervention with 
its own components solves the perplexities concerning State consent, meaning that no 
conflict between the principle and Article 20 of the Draft Articles occurs at all. Of course, 
under certain circumstances, intervention by default remains unlawful despite purported 
sovereign consent. Such situations include non-international armed conflicts, which are 
discussed later in this thesis.391 
 
3.3. Effects of Host State Consent: When Does State Responsibility Become 
Plausible?  
The legality and applicability of armed intervention on invitation partially relies on the 
doctrine of State responsibility, more specifically the consent of the host State acting as 
a factor precluding the wrongfulness of the military intervention pursued on its 
territory.392  This legal fact is attributable to Article 20 of the Draft Articles, which 
specifically enunciates that when valid consent is issued, a wrongful act can no longer be 
regarded as such. It has been argued that this clause can apply to military force as well.393 
As it will be demonstrated later, this is a part of the optimal reasoning for the legality of 
intervention by invitation under the Charter’s system. Treating intervention by invitation 
as an exception to the rule,394 the view holds that the use of force, which would otherwise 
be unlawful for contradicting Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, is validated by the genuine 
consent of the territorial State.395 However, this does not fully diminish the intervenor’s 
responsibility over the use of force, nor does it come without certain complications. 
Under normal circumstances, a victim State should be entitled to seek full reparation 
for the damage caused by the unlawful actions of another sovereign State, which in turn 
is under obligation to repair the injury. 396  However, when the victim has validly 
consented to the illegal act, it will lose its right to invoke the responsibility of the other 
State, as the unlawfulness of the activity is no longer such.397 This clause applies to silent 
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acquiescence as well.398 For intervention by invitation in particular, this principle means 
that as long as the military activities stay within the limits of the host State’s consent, the 
responsibility of the intervening State should be nullified.399 This, however, is only the 
default setting, as exceptions do exist. 
Naturally, whenever an intervention exceeds the limits of the consent, the use of force 
pursued as a result will be a violation of the ban on armed force, as well as the duty of 
non-intervention.400 In such cases, consent as a factor precluding the wrongfulness is 
inapplicable, meaning that the victim State may demand reparation for injury as a result. 
Exceeding the scope of the invitation can happen in many ways. Examples include 
exceeding the timeframe set for the intervention, the number of troops that may be 
deployed and the forms and extents of specific military operations.401 However, the use 
of force that is contained within the scope of the host State’s invitation still retains its 
validity. Of course, depending on the agreement between the States over the use of force, 
the clause permitting the invitation may become void in the face of a breach, which may 
terminate the invitation as a result.402 
In addition, certain actions cannot be validated by host State consent, even if said 
consent is otherwise properly issued: violations of erga omnes and ius cogens norms.403 
These norms are owed to the international community as a whole, and hence an agreement 
between selected States cannot authorise measures that could breach them.404 The consent 
that removes the illegality of the use of force only applies between the contracting States, 
leaving others capable of making claims on the matter.405 Naturally, this also presents 
certain difficulties for authorising armed force: after all, the prohibition on the use of force 
in itself is partially a peremptory rule, begging the question of whether the territorial State 
may unilaterally consent to an armed intervention.406 However, as established earlier, this 
premise will not stop the practice of invited interventions as long as the use of force does 
not pass the threshold of an armed attack or similar activities against the host State.  
Still, this legal fact limits the use of force that the host State may validly consent to; 
special care should be given to ensuring that the use of force does not violate the self-
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determination of the host State’s people.407 Moreover, as mentioned above, the limitations 
imposed by the norms of ius cogens and erga omnes mean that States cannot invite foreign 
intervention with the purpose of executing violations of such rules, such as acts of 
genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.408 In addition, the severest uses of force 
are also exempt from the effects of Article 20. Hence, any intervenor who engages in such 
activities cannot use invitation as a condition that nullifies their responsibility: this 
proposition is well codified in both the ILC Draft Articles,409 and the law concerning 
international agreements.410  
This condition should not pose many difficulties, as one might hope that States would 
desist from knowingly taking part in such atrocious activities. Unfortunately, these 
activities are no oddities in the international community, as even the past few decades 
bear such events.411 What is further, the use of force always bears the risk of horrific 
consequences, including inadvertent ones. In other words, States may find themselves 
face to face with unexpected events, even when great care has been undertaken. For 
instance, airstrikes aimed at taking out terrorists can end up killing civilians or 
humanitarian aid workers instead.412 The responsibility for such acts cannot be erased by 
host State consent, which only covers so much. 
 
3.4. Closing Remarks  
The international responsibility of States for wrongful conduct can be complicated to 
examine. Nevertheless, the work of the ILC on the matter has been regarded as having 
reasonably neatly codified its regulation. In fact, the Draft Articles are considered to be a 
reflection of customary international law, at least in part,413 and thus form a part of 
exhaustible legal regulation. When it comes to specific parts of the report, Article 20 has 
gained significant attention, and its rationale, valid State consent precluding the 
wrongfulness of otherwise unlawful conduct, is accepted among the international 
community and commentators.  
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However, some confusion exists as to how Article 20 relates to the prohibition on the 
use of force, and how much of the norm it can cover. The commentary attached to the 
Draft Articles suggests that Article 20 is indeed applicable in certain military situations, 
including specific operations and stationing armed troops in another State’s territory.414 
Still, the commentary steers clear of setting a definite set of limitations and classifications 
to follow.415 However, with the exception of the gravest military measures, Article 20 is 
indeed applicable in situations in which the use of force is put into practice, including 
intervention by invitation. Nonetheless, the scope of Article 20 is not limitless. It does not 
apply to armed interventions which inter alia threaten or violate the ius cogens aspect of 
the ban on armed force, since territorial consent alone is not sufficient.416 
The proposition has complicated the realisation of State responsibility over invited 
interventions, as a successful application of Article 20 should effectively erase it. And 
indeed, even though consent cannot cover all forms of armed force, it should remove State 
responsibility if the intervention stays within acceptable boundaries. If the boundaries are 
crossed, however, State responsibility remains an opportunity. Still, one final realistic 
mention needs to be made. As we know full well, international law has few enforcement 
methods up its sleeve. In the context of the United Nations, those methods most 
prominently lie in the hands of the Security Council.417 The effectiveness of the Security 
Council depends on its five permanent members, who have the power to veto any 
Resolution adopted by the organ.418 This means that these members, many of whom are 
frequent intervenors, are infinitely capable of evading the responsibility of their wrongful 
conduct, a situation which is realised in practice various times.419 Such a premise provides 
the select few with a de facto impunity against unlawful activities, one so strong that State 
responsibility as a doctrine may be unable to overcome it.  
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Chapter III  
Intervention by Invitation — an Exception to the Rule? 
 
1. The Emergence of Post-1945 Intervention by Invitation 
 
Having established the regulation on armed intervention in the previous section, the 
dissertation will now present analysis of consensual use of force as a legal concept.420 
Some might deem this conceptualisation to be redundant, given the apparent simplicity 
of intervention by invitation. Indeed, in the eras prior to the UN Charter, the use of force 
at the behest of the territorial State was not too controversial from the legal perspective.421 
With few firm legal limits in place, consensual use of force fitted well under the umbrella 
of volenti non fit iniuria; that is, if any use of force was considered unlawful to begin 
with.422 In its contemporary form, however, armed intervention by invitation is in a class 
of its own. Some regard it only as a relic of traditional law which managed to weasel its 
way into the current order on the use of force, whereas others insist that it has gained the 
position of a perfectly legitimate, albeit problematic tool of the post-1945 era.423 In any 
event, intervention by invitation is an international legal doctrine in need of further 
examination, a task left unattended to by the vast majority of sources. 
This premise can be attributed to the way the doctrine emerged following the adoption 
of the Charter. It is not a piece of dedicated law-making as the Charter itself, but rather a 
normatively scattered outcome of policies spearheaded by the most powerful States in the 
world.424 As much as it is a legal doctrine, intervention by invitation could just as easily 
be described as a superpower policy of the Cold War. Furthermore, when put into practice 
by these superpowers, intervention by invitation has often been criticised by less powerful 
States.425 Despite this, the global community has relented and allowed the doctrine to 
exist in modern international law.426 
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This relapse to superpower politics is explained by the reality which quickly eclipsed 
the idealism induced by the adoption of the Charter. By the 1950s, the utopias wistfully 
painted at the San Francisco Conference had begun to crumble. Instead, it had become 
clear that the fears underlying the Charter’s drafting process had reached the surface: the 
world politics began to polarise, prompting difficulties for the new-born United 
Nations.427 This made it both necessary and possible for other forms of armed force to 
rise out of the shadows cast by the Charter. The endless deadlocks created by the 
permanent members of the Security Council also resulted in these very same members 
testing the waters for other military ventures, intervention by invitation included.428 In 
other words, the void caused by the incomplete implementation of collective security has 
provided, and continues to provide, grounds for invited interventions.429 
Moreover, in conjunction with the troubles of the Security Council, intervention by 
invitation appeared as a solution to the various internal crises that began to command 
global attention.430 The United Nations and its Security Council were impeded from 
offering any resolution on such matters due to the aforementioned paralysis caused by the 
polarisation of superpower relations. In addition, it must be remembered that during the 
first few decades of the United Nations, it remained unclear how far the organisation 
could go in reference to internal crises of its member States: for instance, full-scale civil 
wars were apparently meant to stay out of the organisation’s reach.431 As the Security 
Council was unable to function properly, these deliberations were left unanswered until 
the end of the Cold War,432 which further widened the vacuum that intervention by 
invitation exhausted. 
Nevertheless, the deployment of intervention by invitation in these internal 
circumstances was not a completely antagonistic development. In fact, while it 
contributed to the crisis of the Cold War, consensual use of force also kept the polarisation 
of relations manageable. In other words, allowing the superpower States a means to exert 
their power prevented the Cold War from becoming an actual conflict. Hence, 
intervention by invitation not only helped in maintaining the balance of terror, but also 
kept it from tipping in a manner permitting the start of global scale war, possibly one 
involving the use of nuclear weapons. It could even be stated that intervention by 
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invitation was administered as first-aid when collective security faltered due to the Iron 
Curtain dividing the global community, thus making it a necessary evil of the time. 
Consequently, despite being the result of undeniably negative developments, the 
resurgence of intervention by invitation also had a positive, even soothing effect in the 
political context of the Cold War. Still, since the focus of the doctrine was muddled by 
the international politics of the time, States did not bother exploring the precise legal 
justification behind consensual use of force. Even though the concept has continued to 
develop in the subsequent decades, this premise still stands today, which means that its 
exact justification is yet to be conclusively explained.433 Whether this is due to pure 
laziness or the reasoning being too convoluted to decode is debatable. 
Whatever one’s perspective on the matter is, the fact remains that the legal basis of 
intervention by invitation requires thorough examination. This has significance beyond 
the boundaries of this particular doctrine. After all, intervention by invitation is by no 
means the only legal proposition that has impugned the Charter. Other arguments, such 
as unilateral humanitarian intervention and the protection of nationals abroad, have been 
invoked as well, but they have arguably not met comparable success. This is an odd 
position given the unclear basis of intervention by invitation. 
Due to these peculiarities, the focus of this section is on the concept’s justification and 
place in international law. It will begin with discussion about the two main responses to 
the doctrine’s lawfulness in order to resolve its hazy basis. Once the victor between the 
two has been established, the attention will shift to the connection of intervention by 
invitation to the uses of force described in the Charter. Following this, a portion will be 
dedicated to discerning why intervention by invitation has managed to cement its position 
while other ventures challenging the Charter have met more hostile responses. The 
chapter will be closed with final remarks on the reasoning behind intervention by 
invitation and the processes it has underwent since 1945. 
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2. The Major Responses to the Legality of Intervention by 
Invitation 
 
2.1. Preliminary Remarks on the Legal Basis 
The fact that intervention by invitation is legally allowable in today’s international law 
means that it has long since ceased to face meaningful opposition.434 Suggesting that the 
practice is unlawful would clearly contravene not only State practice and opinio iuris, but 
also the stances of the most important UN organs. 435  Despite this premise, many 
complexities concerning the doctrine’s legal position persist, as States and other actors 
alike have been almost unwilling to elaborate on the exact justification behind the 
practice. 
Therefore, the biggest issue concerns the precise legal basis of the doctrine, and how 
it relates to the Charter’s provisions. This rather perplexing situation requires an 
inspection on the exact justification of intervention by invitation and its position in 
international law. However, before moving on to the specific responses to the lawfulness 
of intervention by invitation, we should first make certain preliminary observations about 
the effects of the legal norms which affect this concept. As the doctrine is that of armed 
intervention, two norms must receive attention during this examination: the use of force 
by States and the principle of non-intervention.436 
Of these two principles, we should begin with the duty of non-intervention, as its 
relation to invited interventions is much simpler. Although intervention by invitation 
naturally concerns the duty of non-intervention as well, it has been maintained that the 
concepts are not inevitable adversaries.437 This is due to the premise that when an armed 
intervention is executed truly in accordance with host State’s will, it does not constitute 
a dictatorial interference into that State’s internal matters: in other words, by default the 
legal basis of invited interventions does not violate the duty of non-intervention.438 This 
does not mean that certain problems do not exist. However, these issues can be located in 
the doctrine’s practice — upon which the principle of non-intervention imposes several 
limits — rather than its legal basis. Such limitations range from issuing the invitation to 
the different settings in which the interventions are applied, with perhaps the most 
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important issue being non-international armed conflicts.439 These considerations on the 
practice of invited interventions and the duty of non-intervention will be discussed later 
in this thesis. 
In any event, most of the issues involving the justification of intervention by invitation 
are related to the doctrine’s connection to the use of force, in particular the contents of 
the Charter.440 The fact remains that the Charter only allows armed force in two situations: 
when a State is faced with an armed attack and must resort to self-defence, or when 
international peace is violated or threatened in a manner that activates collective security 
as described in Chapter VII.441 The document makes no mention of the use of force with 
the consent of the territorial State. Therefore, no matter how this legal regulation is spun 
around, the legal basis for invited interventions as such cannot be found from it.442 At the 
same time, the doctrine is clearly allowable in current international law. Given the 
position of the Charter,443 the instrument then must either implicitly allow intervention 
by invitation or have evolved in a manner which enables its usage.444 
To solve this riddle, we should turn our attention to the practice of UN organs. As 
noted earlier, the Charter is an evolving instrument that responds to the development 
orchestrated by its bodies, as well as the member States. Notable practice by UN organs 
does exist on this matter,445 but it is not too helpful in solving the matter at hand. This is 
the case despite all three major bodies — the ICJ, General Assembly and Security Council 
— having taken a stance, in one way or another, on intervention by invitation as an 
applicable doctrine. As it has transpired, none of these bodies has deciphered the concept 
in a thorough manner, having preferred to examine intervention by invitation on a case-
by-case basis instead. 
This sentiment is readily exemplified by the ICJ, the principal organ when it comes to 
decoding intervention by invitation. While the Court has adjudged upon intervention by 
invitation in several cases by now, it has never seized the change to elaborate on the 
doctrine’s exact legal basis in detail. For instance, in the Nicaragua case the Court simply 
found the practice to be ‘allowable’ in today’s international law, but offered little to no 
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explanation for this claim.446 Another ICJ case, DRC v. Uganda, which discussed the 
practical limits of intervention by invitation in a much more detailed fashion, also falls 
short of offering thoughts on the doctrine’s justification.447 This is not a usual position for 
the ICJ to take, as the Court is often unwilling to take a stance on legal matters which are 
not absolutely necessary to solve the case at hand.448 Still, the dilemma concerning invited 
interventions remains intact, as the Court’s findings on the doctrine do not offer clear 
answers on its exact justification under international law.  
Similar observations can be made about the General Assembly’s and Security 
Council’s approaches to invited interventions: although both have expressed their 
acceptance of the doctrine, they have done so either rather ambiguously or in reference to 
specific incidents. 449  While the General Assembly recognised the doctrine in the 
Definition of Aggression (1974), it did so not only very fleetingly but also indirectly.450 
Any subsequent mentions of invited interventions within the Assembly have tended to be 
of a similarly hazy nature,451 which means that the practice of the organ is not the best 
source for examining the legal reasoning behind invited interventions. The Security 
Council has had the opportunity to discuss intervention by invitation many times, as it 
has often been called to deliberate the specific instances in which the doctrine has been 
applied.452 However, in these cases the Council has not discussed the concept and its legal 
basis more generally. Its remarks on the topic are thus limited to individual incidents, and 
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their respective political contexts, from which forging a cohesive picture is considerably 
difficult.453 
Of course, the Charter does not stand as the sole source of norms governing the use of 
force: customary international law on armed activities continues to exist and evolve 
alongside the Charter.454 However, the rules enshrined in customary international law are 
generally similar to the scheme of the Charter,455 and this is partially reflected in the legal 
stance to intervention by invitation. State activities and opinio iuris on intervention by 
invitation mirror the premise of uncertainty to a large extent, which is partially due to the 
doctrine often having been very controversial in practice. 456  As such, both the 
argumentation on and rebuttals to such invited intervention have been laced with elements 
that make their interpretation quite complicated. At times, the claims made on these 
matters lack straight-forwardness to the point of pure evasion.457 This can be attributed to 
political strategy, as drawing definite lines for the doctrine could hinder its use in 
international policies. The ambivalence of intervention by invitation is thus not only a 
legal weakness but also a great political strength, which makes it an alluring option for 
States to exhaust. 
Overall, it appears that although both State and UN practice on intervention by 
invitation is notably rich, neither as such offers conclusive findings on the doctrine’s 
justification. 458  Fortunately, the problems concerning the justification of invited 
interventions have gained attention in the scholarly community, which has debated the 
doctrine and its nuances for several decades. However, consensus is yet to be reached. 
Instead, two main arguments have gained support, with opposing takes.459  
According to one of these responses, intervention by invitation is allowable because 
the prohibition entailed in Article 2(4) does not extend to use of force at the behest of the 
territorial State, denoting that such interventions are not in violation with prohibition to 
begin with.460 In the terms of the other, intervention by invitation has emerged as an 
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exception to Article 2(4), 461  and can be attributed in part to the doctrine of State 
responsibility as codified in the Draft Articles by the ILC.462 According to this argument, 
valid consent from the host State precludes the wrongfulness of the use of force applied 
on its territory, which would otherwise be in violation with the prohibition laid down in 
Article 2(4).463 
While these responses have attained prominence in the work of commentators, none 
has yet been universally accepted as the explanation of the lawfulness of intervention by 
invitation. In fact, the doctrine has been allowed to operate without making a choice 
between the two arguments, resulting perhaps in unnecessary confusion over the matter. 
Given this premise, offering a sustainable answer to this dilemma will be the main 
objective of this section. Both responses will first be examined separately to spell out 
their strengths and weaknesses, and in the end compared with one another with the 
objective of discovering which proves more sustainable. 
 
2.2. Arguing that the UN Charter Never Intended to Ban Intervention by 
Invitation  
The first argument to be analysed is the one which holds that intervention by invitation 
is legally allowable because the UN Charter was not designed to prohibit it.464 In other 
words, this response maintains that the ban detailed in Article 2(4) does not cover armed 
force with the consent of the target State, which means that such practice does not violate 
the normative framework on the use of force.465 Out of the two main approaches to the 
lawfulness of invited interventions, this one is fairly straight-forward, and bound to please 
many lawyers. If one were to accept this argument, it would affirm that any legal norm, 
even one concerning the use of force, exists with clearly-cut limits that can be interpreted 
in an objective manner. Relying on such an interpretation would not require much 
jumping through legal hoops, a chance which many actors and commentators seem to be 
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willing to seize. However, this apparent simplicity is only the thin surface, which hides 
notable issues underneath. 
Still, we should lay out the pros of the response first. Its biggest strength is the apparent 
simplicity: intervention by invitation is allowed because it was never banned in the first 
place.466 Hence, the presence of invited interventions would not suggest that the scheme 
created by the Charter is in any kind of decline. The doctrine is simply a practice that was 
never outlawed, which means that it can be applied while also keeping the Charter’s plan 
whole.467 A quick glance on the practice of invited intervention would suggest that the 
argument has attained some support by certain actors. One such actor appears to have 
been the United Kingdom, which has maintained in its own policies that such 
interventions fall outside the scope of the prohibition, meaning that they do not amount 
to unlawful use of force.468 Nonetheless, this line of argumentation has not been presented 
in a very thorough manner.469 Moreover, universal support for this argument is yet to be 
achieved among States, which have often opted to stay silent on the matter. 
Supporting this approach would also advocate a clear-cut stance on the current use of 
force by States. The regulation banning said force has certain limits, and armed 
intervention by invitation happens to fall outside those restrictions. In other words, the 
concept is not a result of norm-bending developments that have taken place in the 
international community, but rather a case of strict formalism — the go-to approach of 
many lawyers. In fact, it is easy to see why the legal professional would present this 
argument over the lawfulness of intervention by invitation, as it appears to offer a neatly 
defined legal perimeter for the concept. 
Nevertheless, the lawyer-appeasing straight-forwardness of this argument may also be 
to its detriment. No matter how one puts it, international law is not a legal system that is 
immediately comparable to national ones, which means that traditional legal 
interpretation offers international lawyers only some of the necessary tools.470 The actions 
and statements of States are not always truly reflective of their true intentions, making 
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their interpretation difficult.471 This applies to armed force in particular, as it would 
simply be naive to claim that States would be unwilling to test the limits of legal 
regulation to meet their own political goals.472 Hence, formalistic outlooks on the Charter 
and its scope will inevitably only scratch the surface, leaving any legal findings 
superficial. 
It would also appear that the apparent simplicity of this approach is more misleading 
than it initially suggests. If the Charter was never intended to prohibit intervention by 
invitation, why is there still so much confusion about the doctrine and its justification? If 
its legal position was formally as clear-cut as this, such complexity should not exist. 
Logically speaking, the matter should have been settled a long time ago, meaning that no 
debate about the doctrine’s legality should have risen in the first place. Nevertheless, even 
though the lawfulness of consensual use of force is now widely accepted, in the initial 
aftermath of the Charter’s adoption, some uncertainty existed over its legal position.473 It 
was not until the 1960s when questions about the doctrine had shifted to its practical 
qualifications.474 This indicates that the doctrine’s legal position was not set in stone from 
the outset.  
Furthermore, this response denies taking a stance on certain normative aspects of 
armed force in general. As stated before, the Charter makes no mention as such to the use 
of force with the consent of the territorial State.475 This means that the approach examined 
here is heavily focused on the exact wording of the prohibition described in Article 2(4) 
itself, and showing how its scope does not extend to invited interventions.476 However, 
the approach does not appear to consider the overall plan of the Charter and its objective 
to move military activities away from sovereign goals. After all, the Charter’s vision did 
not seek merely to ban the use of force by individual States, as it also aimed for the 
centralisation of such armed measures to the United Nations and its main political organ, 
the Security Council.477  
Given the spectacular failure of this centralisation, it is naturally quite difficult to 
imagine a world in which collective security was deployed in perfect accordance with the 
Charter’s plan. Still, if this scheme had succeeded even somewhat, would the justification 
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of intervention by invitation be quite so simple? In such a world the doctrine would 
inevitably find itself at odds with collective security, especially if the latter was applied 
in its purest form with Article 43 fully implemented. However, as matters currently stand, 
intervention by invitation and collective security do not necessarily contradict one 
another, as both are put into practice by individual States. This tentative compatibility has 
been enacted in practice by the recent military intervention in Mali, which began in 2013 
and has since encompassed both consensual use of force and collective armed 
measures.478 
In addition, the response discussed in this section is inevitably grounded on the more 
limited view of the prohibition of the use of force, as it attempts to show that not all 
unilateral armed force between States was meant to be banned by the Charter.479 As noted 
earlier, such interpretations of Article 2(4) have previously been met with a frosty 
response from actors such as the ICJ.480 This stance can be traced well back into the work 
of the Court. In the Corfu Channel case, the United Kingdom apparently argued that its 
activities in Albania’s territorial waters were inter alia justified because Article 2(4) only 
bans the use of force which violates or threatens the ‘political independence’ or ‘territorial 
integrity’ of the target State.481 This marked one of the first appearances of what is known 
as the limited view to the prohibition.482 The Court did not address this particular claim 
in detail, but it did reject the United Kingdom’s argumentation on its operations, and 
ultimately adjudged that the State had acted in contradiction with its international 
obligations. 483  This has been interpreted as an unwelcoming reaction to the limited 
approach,484 a stance supported by international commentators.485  
One last problem should be addressed in reference to contending that intervention by 
invitation was never prohibited by the Charter. As noted earlier, one cannot deny that the 
Charter itself takes no direct stance on the use of force with the consent of the host State. 
Consequently, readily accepting that the Charter never meant to ban the practice may 
open a Pandora’s Box, which allows other forms of armed force not specifically 
prohibited in the Charter to emerge as valid armed measures, solely on the basis that the 
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Charter does not explicitly ban them. Means to combat such options do exist, inter alia 
by arguing that if those forms were allowable, they should have emerged either 
immediately or soon after the adoption of the Charter. Nonetheless, accepting that the 
lawfulness of intervention by invitation is based on the Charter not expressly prohibiting 
it does open unappealing opportunities, slim as they might be in practice. 
For these reasons, it is unlikely that the approach discussed here offers sustainable 
answers on the lawfulness of intervention by invitation. The claim that the Charter never 
banned intervention by invitation seems simple enough on the surface, but a closer 
inspection shows many flaws. Hence, we need to look deeper into the functioning of the 
international legal system, a matter tackled by the second response to the basis of 
intervention by invitation. 
 
2.3. The Exception Argument Based upon State Responsibility 
Another major approach to the lawfulness of intervention by invitation is the exception 
route. It acknowledges that the doctrine was intended to be covered by Article 2(4) of the 
Charter, and asserts that it has emerged as an exception to this prohibition.486 The legal 
basis of this exception has been further connected with the doctrine of State responsibility, 
which offers the valid consent of the victim State as a circumstance that negates 
wrongfulness.487 It has been argued that this position is applicable when it comes to the 
use of force as well, thus enabling the practice of invited interventions.488  
This approach would also appear to rely on the flexible outlook of the Charter, 
according to which the norms on use of force evolve when enough evidence suggests they 
should do so. 489  With intervention by invitation, this evolution has not only been 
manifested in the actions and opinions of sovereign States, but also the decisions adopted 
by the most important UN organs.490 Thus, the exception argument can be described as 
entailing a process, during which intervention by invitation has resurged due to the 
sponsorship of the most prominent participants of the international community. Such an 
approach is unmistakably multifaceted, even unpleasant, which may be vital due to the 
realities of international law itself. 
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However, this multi-layered outlook seems problematic from the perspective of a 
lawyer, as it suggests that new exceptions to Article 2(4) may appear outside the Charter’s 
perimeter if the policies of States demand it. Beyond the surface, then, lies the suggestion 
that the prohibition on the use of force by States, which should be the cornerstone of 
international law, may be challenged by constant practice that contradicts the established 
norms on the matter.491 In addition, it has been noted that the persistent practice on invited 
interventions in the UN period appears to violate the international law codified in the 
Charter, which has led to certain scholars being wary about the concept’s lawfulness 
altogether.492  
In any event, the exception approach admits that the Charter’s plan is not functioning 
properly, and that therefore there is a need to re-awaken other forms of armed force, ones 
that should have been made redundant with the adoption of the instrument. This argument 
hence lacks the clear-cut lines of the first claim on the lawfulness of intervention by 
invitation, given that instead it is based on the unpredictable currents of the global 
community. This type of argumentation requires venturing outside a lawyer’s traditional 
toolkit of strict formalism and accepting a certain type of anarchy which affects the 
international community and the norms that govern it.493 
However, such an excursion may be inevitable given the nature of the international 
legal system or the lack thereof.494 Whatever one’s perspective on international law is, no 
one can convincingly argue that the discipline is a sturdy take on what law is supposed to 
be. 495  The lack of proper central structures, hierarchies and effective enforcement 
measures are problems which only scratch the surface.496 Hence, despite the world’s best 
efforts, international society is yet to achieve the status of a true community. Rather, it is 
an assembly of various actors with different and often contradicting goals, held together 
by the common values497 shared by all. Consequently, the international legal norms are 
of a unique nature. The exception approach to intervention by invitation is based on an 
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understanding of these circumstances and an admission that this does not present a good 
image of international law and the use of force. 
Nevertheless, one major legal hurdle must still be cleared with the exception approach, 
and it concerns the legal dimensions of Article 2(4). 498  As discussed earlier, 499  the 
prohibition on the use of force is in part a rule of ius cogens, a peremptory norm which 
takes normative primacy in international law. 500  Moreover, rules of ius cogens 
automatically bear the element of erga omnes, which means that they are rules owed 
towards all members of the international community.501 In other words, any State is 
entitled to make claims about the breaches of these rules.502 This poses a dilemma to 
intervention by invitation in particular: if any member of the international community 
holds interest in violations of the non-use of force, host State consent alone may not be 
enough to validate a military intervention.503 
However, as discussed in Chapter II,504 the range of the peremptory dimension of the 
ban is smaller than its ‘normal’ limits. This means that only the gravest forms of armed 
force, such as hostile acquisition of territory or armed attacks, belong to the ius cogens 
and erga omnes aspects of the prohibition.505 As long as armed intervention is not used 
to reach such ends, host State consent precludes the wrongfulness of the use of force, 
making it a valid basis for intervention by invitation.506 Thus, the exception approach 
based in State responsibility is a plausible argument, even with the effect of the 
peremptory dimension of the ban on the use of force. 
Overall, the exception approach may offer a more multi-faceted answer to the legality 
of intervention by invitation, but it takes a winding path to get there. Whether this is 
desirable is open to interpretation. For quite a few lawyers and those who prefer the 
approach detailed in Section 2.2 of this chapter, this fact is bound to be unappealing. 
However, for those who seek to explore international law beyond its superficial and often 
sugar-coated surface, this response to the lawfulness of intervention by invitation may 
appear more sustainable. This is because the approach is partially founded on the 
conflicting nature of international law, and thus requires deep understanding of the 
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functioning of the global legal system. Instead of deriding intervention by invitation for 
being the product of such circumstances, it accepts them as an inevitable and 
acknowledges that the doctrine cannot be discarded solely because of this context. 
 
2.4. Comparing the Two Responses: Which Prevails? 
We have now inspected the two major responses to the lawfulness of intervention by 
invitation. Both outlooks have their pros and cons. The argument which holds that invited 
interventions were never banned by the UN Charter is seemingly straight-forward and 
bound to please regular lawyers. 507  However, it does not attend to the fact that 
international law is no ordinary field of law, or the peculiarities of the use of force. The 
exception approach, although at first glance more complicated, considers these 
complexities and may thus offer more sustainable answers in the long run.  
Accordingly, it is asserted that the exception approach provides the more solid 
explanation for the legality of intervention by invitation. This conclusion has been 
reached because the apparent clarity of claiming that the Charter never intended to ban 
invited interventions is riddled with issues. The argument is too focused upon the wording 
and scope of Article 2(4) alone,508 and thus fails to take into account the bigger scheme 
of the Charter.509 In addition, it is inevitably grounded on a more limited view on the 
scope of the prohibition, which has been rejected in past practice.510 Moreover, relying 
on this type of argumentation presents only a superficial look into the functioning of the 
international community: it does not give enough consideration to the political contexts 
in which legal claims are formulated. 
Conversely, the exception approach appears to be more multifaceted from the outset, 
yet it ultimately succeeds in creating a thorough legal explanation for intervention by 
invitation. When acknowledging that the doctrine has emerged as an exception to Article 
2(4)511 courtesy of the regime of State responsibility,512 the approach is an acceptance of 
the widely championed flexibility of the Charter and its power to yield to changes when 
the situation in practice does not match that of legal regulation. 513  Moreover, this 
approach recognises that such changes are often brought forward by the most powerful 
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States in the international community, and that this was also definitely the case with 
intervention by invitation. Its appearance can be attributed to the failure of collective 
security at the hands of the Security Council’s permanent members, which also took to 
staging unilateral armed interventions upon request as an alternative.514 The argument 
does not endorse this premise as an ideal situation, but relents and accepts its presence 
due the inescapable nature of the international law, which allows some States to get away 
with their actions more easily than others. 
Reaching this conclusion may seem unpleasant, as it reverts to the sphere of stone-cold 
realism by which international law is little more than a tool wielded by the most powerful. 
This should not bode well with many observers of the discipline. After all, such observers 
often have a clear bias towards global values.515 They may hope to see international law 
emerge as a beacon of justice among endless wrongdoings, especially when the use of 
force is concerned.516 Nevertheless, the finding follows the ‘regular’ lines of intervention, 
making it a measure exhausted by the most powerful, whereas the smaller countries stay 
inactive. This has been the status quo for as long as the concept of intervention itself has 
existed, as noted by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case.517 Concluding that this premise 
has also resulted in modern intervention by invitation is hence not surprising at all. 
Instead, it is a realistic, if not even a dejected resolution to an issue which affects the use 
of force by States on a larger scale as well. 
Despite this conclusion, one last issue persists: the relevance of this finding. 
Intervention by invitation in its current incarnation has existed for decades, with little 
regard given to its justification. Those who exhaust the doctrine also appear to be least 
interested in formulating its exact legal basis. It is therefore pertinent to examine this 
situation more thoroughly to discover why such a setting has come about. 
 
2.5. Of Intervention by Invitation and Its Fleeting Legal Justification 
The conclusion of this section is that intervention by invitation of the UN era has 
emerged due to the failure to enact the Charter fully, which launched additional decision-
making processes within the international community. The concept’s success can in 
particular be attributed to the still-faltering position of collective security, which is yet to 
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take its place in a manner laid down in the Charter.518 Thus, intervention by invitation 
must be regarded as an exception to the prohibition on the use of force, rather than being 
a concept which was left untouched by the Charter’s regulation on armed force.519 At the 
same time, the global community has undeniably allowed the doctrine to function in 
practice with a hazy legal basis.520 This could be explained by simply arguing that since 
States have not been forced to offer an explanation on the matter, they have chosen to 
take the easy route and remain silent. Ending the deliberations with this conclusion would 
suggest that exploring the legal basis of invited interventions in more detail is a mere 
curiosity with little actual relevance. 
 Being satisfied with such a finding would be short-sighted and, quite frankly, very 
lazy. Instead, we should concentrate on asking more questions about this premise. Why 
is this the case with State responses to invited interventions? Would it not be beneficial 
to elaborate fully upon intervention by invitation, so that the confusions about its various 
aspects would disperse? After all, the aim of any given piece of legal regulation should 
be clarity, so that the subjects have a clear idea of what is legally allowable and what is 
not. This premise should be of importance for armed force, which has shaped the world 
as we know it.521 
However, based upon the practice of States, clearing confusion is not in their interests. 
In fact, the normative haziness and bendable limits of invited interventions are what 
makes the doctrine so alluring for States to exhaust, as they allow for much leeway. In 
other words, the mystery surrounding the justification of intervention by invitation is 
reflected in its scope in practice, keeping it not only very dynamic but also applicable in 
many different situations. Taking a stern stance on the doctrine’s legal basis could impose 
too many restrictions on the future argumentation and application of invited interventions.  
This finding does not mean that militarily-active States would endorse the consensual 
use of force becoming unlimited, for they have understood that the concept cannot be as 
legally unconstrained as collective security. If this were the case, even the most powerful 
could be in danger of unpredictable foreign armed interventions, a risk that they are 
capable of blocking when it comes to collective military measures.522 However, retaining 
the possible flexibility of invited interventions remains on their agenda as well, meaning 
that silence has proved to be the best answer to questions concerning the lawfulness of 
intervention by invitation. 
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As will be demonstrated later, States have often drastically changed their opinions on 
intervention by invitation and its boundaries in practice, sometimes to the point of pure 
hypocrisy.523 While such hypocrisy is not usually lost on international commentators, the 
often-confusing limits of invited interventions have allowed States to get away with such 
two-faced activities. The ambivalence concerning the doctrine’s precise justification is 
what makes it so flexible in practice, which in turn caters to the needs of those who are 
willing to stage foreign armed interventions.524 
In addition, the haziness surrounding intervention by invitation also influences other 
uses of force falling beyond the scope of the Charter. As this thesis will soon show, these 
propositions are yet to find success comparable to intervention by invitation. Rather, their 
lawfulness remains contested, keeping argumentation on the matter in a limbo. If the legal 
basis of intervention by invitation was well-defined with no room for debate, it would 
influence the conversation concerning the legal position of these other ventures. 
And, as it has turned out, drawing clear lines on such argumentation may be an 
impossible task. For legal commentators this can be incredibly frustrating, but for States 
it allows some much-needed leeway to pursue their policies. For the militarily powerful, 
this is the attribute that makes intervention by invitation so particularly appealing. It is an 
unfortunate situation in many aspects, that much cannot be denied. Nevertheless, it also 
an immediate reflection of the global community that has been shaped over the centuries. 
Furthermore, intervention by invitation is not the lone wolf in this sense, since many 
international doctrines have been the results of similar developments. Unpredictability is 
the status quo of international law, and the norms on the use of force, including 
intervention by invitation, are no exceptions to this.525 
One last remark needs to be made on the unattractive appearance of invited 
interventions. Whereas the UN regulation on the use of force was built upon ideals,526 the 
need to revive intervention by invitation has been based in stone-cold political realities.527 
As such, when broken down to its basic components, the rebirth of the doctrine does not 
paint a pretty picture about the legal status of available armed measures or the States 
which resort to them. This has undoubtedly increased the desire of States to remain coy 
about the doctrine in general, its legal justification included. States have found it better to 
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apply liberal amounts of different coatings to the doctrine instead, so that the overall 
picture becomes more abstract and subject to interpretation.  
Nonetheless, underneath the antagonistic coating lies a doctrine that has done its part 
in upholding order within the global community as well. In fact, the concept was 
reinvigorated to substitute for the faltering Charter during the Cold War. Thus, for all the 
apparent instability it has caused, intervention by invitation has also helped in sustaining 
the damage caused by the unravelling of the Charter’s system, which has allowed the 
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3. Intervention by Invitation and the Uses of Force Entailed in 
the UN Charter 
 
3.1. Introduction  
The current incarnation of invited interventions has not appeared in a streamlined 
manner. Instead, it has circumvented the UN system on the use of force and was forced 
to take a non-linear path in order to reach its goal of re-emerging as a legal doctrine. This 
suggests the concept does not sit comfortably with the initially planned regulation on 
armed force, at least by default.528 Indeed, this appears to be the case. One can discern 
that intervention by invitation directly opposes and challenges the regulation envisioned 
in the UN Charter,529 the core gist of which was collective security with little room for 
unilateral measures.530 The earlier finding explains this contradiction: intervention by 
invitation is a form of armed force reborn outside the context of the Charter and despite 
its initial restrictions on the use of force.531 This means that intervention by invitation is 
a recognised exception to Article 2(4) of the Charter, one attributable to the regime of 
State responsibility,532 rather than a matter meant to be uncovered by the ban on the use 
of force.533 
Thus, intervention by invitation can be linked with the partial dissolution of the 
Charter’s plan for the use of force.534 After the centralisation of armed force collapsed, 
the resulting shambles has enabled traditional forms to make appearances in the post-
1945 era.535 In addition, the failure to implement fully collective security has had an 
inevitable effect on the one form of unilateral armed force allowed by the Charter: self-
defence.536 After all, self-defence should only be allowable until the Security Council 
decides to act.537 Given this non-implementation, one can question how self-defence 
functions in current international law. Such questions are not without merit, as practice 
has shown that the letter of the Charter is certainly not how the scheme currently works.538 
This means that the instrument remains in a slight state of disarray, which inevitably 
affects intervention by invitation as well. 
                                                 
528 Cassese, International Law, pp. 369-370. 
529 Ibid. 
530 UN Charter, Preamble and Articles 1(1), 2(4), 24, 39, 41-42, 51 and 53. 
531 de Wet, ‘Modern Practice of Intervention by Invitation’, pp. 980 and 998. 
532 Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention, pp. 13-19. 
533 de Wet, ‘Modern Practice of Intervention by Invitation’, pp. 980 and 998; Fox, ‘Intervention 
by Invitation’, pp. 816 and 818-819. 
534 de Wet, ‘Modern Practice of Intervention by Invitation’, p. 998. 
535 Ibid. 
536 Gazzini, Changing Rules, p. 127. 
537 UN Charter, Article 51. 
538 Franck, Recourse to Force, p. 21; Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, pp. 124-125. 
 
  84 
 
 
Hence, examining the relationship intervention by invitation has with both collective 
security and self-defence is pertinent: the doctrine has re-emerged due to the evolution 
and mishaps of the Charter’s system, and hence its future position will depend on these 
two concepts as well. This examination, while focusing on the UN era, will also observe 
the concepts before 1945 to fully discover their historical correlation. Although the 
connections of intervention by invitation and the two uses of force allowed by the Charter 
will be observed separately, the final conclusions on the matter will offer general findings 
on how all three concepts connect with one another. 
 
3.2. The Winding Road of Collective Security and Its Implications on 
Intervention by Invitation  
No doctrine is an island in international law. The rules often overlap, entwine and 
unravel in quickly-shifting patterns, which makes any international legal concept privy to 
various influences and even perplexing changes. Armed intervention by invitation is no 
different, which its practice never fails to exemplify. While consensual use of force dates 
to the pre-UN era, its relationship with the Charter’s system has been shrouded in doubt 
as its convoluted legal basis so amply showcases. 539  However, given that it is an 
applicable form of armed force, intervention by invitation must have such a relationship, 
strenuous though it may be, with the uses of force explicitly entailed in the Charter. 
The doctrine’s connection to collective security is particularly perplexing, as history 
shows us that the two concepts are in fact interrelated. This relationship can be traced 
back to the birth of intervention as measure exhausted by sovereign States, marking a 
centuries-long connection.540 It could even be argued that the concepts are mirror images 
of each other, and that consequently their respective evolutions will always bear mutual 
reflections. Hence, comparing these two concepts is important if one wishes to determine 
the future legal position of intervention by invitation: is it merely a bandage used well 
past its expiration date to make up for the shortcomings of the Charter’s scheme? Or does 
it have long-standing potential beyond this premise, which could allow it to exist should 
the initial plan on armed force come closer to fruition? 
We should begin this examination in eras which preceded that of the Charter. This 
takes us to the 1700s and 1800s, which are largely regarded as the centuries during which 
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the concept of armed intervention first emerged in full.541 During this time, the aspirations 
of different nation-States were beginning to impact the formation of Europe, and existing 
international borders were constantly threatened due to a range of wars.542 In addition to 
external threats, those centuries also saw the rise of internal rebellions which resulted in 
various regime challenges across the old continent, the French Revolution and the 
subsequent regime of Napoleon Bonaparte being a famous example.543 Such uncertainties 
did not sit well with the leaders of many powerful countries, who then took to seeking 
means with which they could better ensure their security.544 
One of the outcomes was the Holy Alliance, established by Austria, Prussia and Russia 
in 1815.545 The Alliance inter alia entailed security guarantees between the contracting 
States, and thus allowed parties of the Alliance to intervene militarily if another signatory 
to the treaty was in duress.546 This proved to be a fundamental development both during 
its time and beyond. During its functioning, the objectives of the Holy Alliance were 
echoed in other European coalitions, such as the Quadruple Alliance (1815) and 
subsequently the Quintuple Alliance (1818), and in bilateral treaties between the biggest 
monarchies of the continent.547 In retrospect, the Holy Alliance and its counterparts have 
been regarded perhaps most prominently as one of the first instances of collective 
security, in particular since their establishment was partly inspired by the will to maintain 
balance and stability in Europe following the conquest-rich regime of Napoleon.548  
However, the treaty had multiple elements which can also be attributed to intervention 
by invitation.549 One such qualification was another partial goal of forming an alliance 
with other countries: controlling the possible internal unrest developing in the contracting 
States. 550  Internal unrest has been the usual context for inviting a foreign armed 
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intervention, whereas the notion of collective security has first and foremost appeared to 
combat external threats via the use of security guarantees.551 Thus, given that it obeyed 
the aims of maintaining internal order, one can appreciate that the movement facilitated 
by the Holy Alliance served objectives often linked to invited interventions. 
When compared to modern collective security, one also ought to note that the treaty 
was composed of few States, the Great Powers at the time, rather than the international 
community in a wider sense.552 This is naturally a qualification that is partly present in 
modern collective security as well: after all, select States hold much better cards in their 
hands when compared to the vast majority. However, collective security as we understand 
it today at least purports to be a system which preserves peace on a global scale and in a 
manner that benefits the international community.553  
It thus appears that the first appearances of intervention by invitation and collective 
security were interlinked, at least to a certain extent. Nevertheless, tracing the doctrines’ 
connection during the inter-War era of the 1900s presents a bigger challenge. This can be 
attributed to several factors. This era only lasted 20 years, from the formal conclusion of 
World War I in 1919 to the commencement of the second in 1939. This only provides a 
short span of time and few major legal instruments, albeit including the Pact of Paris and 
the League of Nations Covenant, for evaluation. For these reasons, even the general scope 
of the norms purporting to limit the use of force was left unclear.554 Still, this did not stop 
the use of unilateral interventions in particular internal armed conflicts, including the 
Spanish Civil War.555 Collective security, however, never really came to be outside the 
tentative hopes within the framework of the League of Nations.556 Hence, the concepts 
never had a chance to establish a relationship of either conflicting or cooperative nature. 
All in all, the duration of the inter-War period did not prove long enough to offer fertile 
ground for inspecting the correlation between invited interventions and collective 
security. 
Of course, the UN era provides much bigger points of fascination. Although the 
League of Nations merely suggested the concept, the United Nations chose to make the 
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implementation of collective security into one of its main pillars.557 This meant limiting 
unilateral uses of force in favour of a system of collective use of force, applied at the 
discretion of the Security Council, whose decisions would be put into practice by an army 
under the direct command chain of the UN itself.558 Invited interventions appeared to 
have no place in this context, an assumption which soon turned out to be quite false. Both 
a functioning Security Council and armed forces under UN control were soon exiled to 
exist in theory only,559 which has allowed intervention by invitation to reclaim a place in 
legal argumentation, in an effort to bridge this gap.560 
Thus, the connection between the concepts was vital during the re-emergence of 
invited interventions in the Cold War and beyond. Ever since realising that collective 
security under the United Nations would remain in the realm of theory, the practice has 
called for the return of intervention by invitation.561 Furthermore, the re-emergence was 
initiated by the same atmosphere, and individual States, that had stalled the 
implementation of the UN system for centralised armed force.562 One might even claim 
that the grounds for intervention by invitation were laid by the same States which then 
took to re-enforcing the doctrine in practice. Of course, certain other elements have been 
in play as well, and they have paved the way for the return of invited interventions. 
Perhaps the most important of these elements was the rising number of internal conflicts 
over international ones.563 Since the UN was born out of the carnage of the Second World 
War, the organisation was built with the specific target of preventing such inter-State 
conflicts from ever rising again.564 The increased number of internal conflicts was thus 
not fully anticipated by the drafters of the Charter.565 This brought forth a vacuum in both 
the legal and practical sense, one which further fuelled the return of intervention by 
invitation. 
This development concerning the lack of Security Council activity and internal strife 
also served the purposes of the Cold War itself. The superpowers of the time were 
adamantly avoiding direct conflict with one another in accordance with the power 
balance, but still wished to assert their influence in geopolitically important locations, 
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even at the apparent cost of common values.566 Civil unrest and even full-scale non-
international armed conflicts provided fertile ground for this goal.567 On such occasions, 
the powerful States were able to execute their foreign policies by attaining and helping 
allied governments across the globe, all the while preventing their mutual tension from 
developing into a direct conflict.568   
However, would intervention by invitation have proved so useful had collective 
security been even remotely successful from the outset? Where, if anywhere, would 
intervention by invitation have fallen in such a case? Answering these questions is not 
easy, as imagining a post-1945 international community with a clearly functioning 
collective security is difficult: so magnificently has the system envisioned in the San 
Francisco conference stumbled. Still, if collective security had been at least present in the 
years that followed 1945, in one form or another, would intervention by invitation have 
been able to reappear as it did? 
It is difficult to see how invited interventions could have gained their current position 
if collective security had found moderate success following the adoption of the UN 
Charter. Even without the implementation of the system in its fullest extent, just the 
plausible presence of collective security in practice would have had an immediate effect 
on the emergence of intervention by invitation. After all, as the crown jewel of the 
Charter’s plan, collective security would have held primacy, 569  forcing invited 
interventions to fall back in the case of a collision. 
 Moreover, part of the acceptance that invited interventions gained during the Cold 
War stemmed from recognising the facts: international politics was deeply polarised, 
meaning that all hopes of collective measures should be left waiting in the wings while 
the superpowers flexed their muscles on stage.570 In other words, the mere presence of 
Cold War politics neutralised collective security, as the two could not function in 
conjunction. Conversely, the reintroduction of intervention by invitation was necessary 
due their incompatibility, meaning that it is a direct result of the era’s political 
circumstances. The lack of such circumstances would have impacted both intervention by 
invitation and collective security, which would have made their positions quite different 
from what they are today. 
However, these observations do not mean that the emergence of invited interventions 
would have been utterly doomed even with the presence of collective security. In fact, the 
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way collective security currently relies on consensual use of force suggests that the 
doctrines do not necessarily contradict one other in practice. Moreover, even today 
collective use of force is deployed by coalitions of the willing instead of an actual UN 
army, suggesting that its collectivity is not completely such. Collective security thus 
appears to be aligning with invited interventions to an extent, which highlights their 
continuing relationship.571 
 
3.3. Self-Defence and Intervention by Invitation: What Is the Difference?  
We cannot limit the analysis in this section to the sphere of collective security, as the 
relationship between intervention by invitation and self-defence contains many 
interesting factors as well. This connection is more complex and important than the first 
glance might suggest. As keen observers of international law know, the concept of self-
defence has undergone many changes since 1945, making the doctrine vastly different 
from what was initially envisioned by those who drafted the Charter.572 Although self-
defence should be used sparingly and only in the absence of Security Council action,573 
the concept has arguably widened its scope from what is detailed in the Charter.574 
 Given this rapid development, one might wonder if and how self-defence has affected 
modern invited interventions. In fact, a quick glance at State practice shows that the two 
concepts appear to have been invoked side by side, to point where it may be difficult to 
distinguish one from another.575 This does not necessarily mean anything major: after all, 
applying the entire spectrum of arguments to justify armed interventions is quite common. 
This is pure strategy, as invoking the full radius of claims ensured that at least one of them 
could find success. Still, a certain connection between self-defence and intervention by 
invitation does exist, and it can be traced back to the beginning of the United Nations. 
Still, this link has not been one of pure co-application, due to the legal spectrum of 
self-defence. Unlike intervention by invitation, self-defence has a well-codified position 
in current international law as a unilateral exception to the ban entailed in Article 2(4), as 
well as existing in the sphere of customary international law.576 Thus, although the ban 
on the use of force was intended to be strict, it always left room for armed measures which 
States may exhaust when their sovereignty and even core existence are threatened by 
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various external threats.577 Hence, when a State is subjected to an armed attack, it may 
revert to the use of force in self-defence to repel the attack.578 Although this provision 
was drafted with inter-State relations in mind, it can now also be pertinent when a State 
is attacked by a terrorist organisation.579  
As expected in the context of the Charter’s vision, the right to self-defence is not 
limitless. Use of force based on this principle must be proportionate to the armed attack 
the State has suffered, and also be necessary in order to counter it.580 Furthermore, self-
defence must be applied within a proper time limit once the attack has first occurred: in 
other words, the concept ought to be enacted with the element of immediacy.581 Finally, 
any armed activities undertaken under self-defence must be aimed at militarily-important 
targets,582 be reported to the Security Council, and cease when the organ decides to act 
on the matter.583 
As long as these requirements are met, the victim State can both apply armed force 
itself and also ask other States for similar measures: this notion is known as collective 
self-defence.584 Hence, when a State is subjected to an armed attack, it may lawfully 
request others to assist it in its application of self-defence. Measures allowed by collective 
self-defence include the use of force on the victim State’s territory, if necessary. Hence, 
if the host State asks for foreign military measures to be deployed on its territory due to 
circumstances described in Article 51 of the Charter, the concept of intervention by 
invitation would be eclipsed by collective self-defence.585 In other words, the matter 
would solely belong to the legal perimeters allowed by the concept of self-defence, not 
intervention upon request. 
However, the general evolution of the use of force — particularly that concerning 
measures against terrorist threats — might force the concepts to operate alongside one 
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another, which will distort this previously-held premise.586 As armed force is no longer 
strictly applied between States, actions pursued against terrorist organisations which have 
committed armed attacks are now allowable under international law, certain conditions 
permitting.587  However, the way some States have exhausted this extension of self-
defence seems to contradict its legal limits. For instance, the continuous targeted killings 
and other counter-terrorism operations by the United States seem to lack the element of 
immediacy, at least in the traditional sense. 588  In such situations the doctrine of 
intervention by invitation could be needed as a separate doctrine to bridge the legal gap; 
this issue will be elaborated in Chapter V. 
In addition, once again we must turn to the fading line between internal and 
international conflicts, which has made separating the two doctrines even more 
difficult.589 For instance, a seemingly internal rebel faction may factually be militarily 
supported by a third State: according to the Nicaragua case (1986), such support to the 
opposition is not allowed under international law, as it violates the principles of non-use 
of force and non-intervention. 590  However, it has previously been held that if the 
government was ousted by rebels aided by other States,591 said government could still 
invite a foreign intervention to reinstate its position.592 Assuming that this premise is still 
applicable and combining it with the internationalisation of internal conflicts, would 
inviting such a foreign intervention be considered collective self-defence? Or would it 
simply be intervention by invitation, albeit in response to the use of force by another 
State? 
Generally, the gravity of the use of force by the third State is the determining factor 
for this issue. As long as the use of force can be categorised as an armed attack, the 
measures pursued in response, either unilateral or collective, fit under the notion of self-
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defence.593 However, as established in Nicaragua, militarily supporting rebels — while 
amounting to the use of force — has not traditionally been considered to be an armed 
attack.594 Instead, for the threshold of an armed attack to be crossed, the intervenor’s own 
armed forces, or groups acting on its behalf, must be sent to another State’s territory.595 
Hence, if the intervenor does not use force directly, collective self-defence cannot by 
default be enacted,596 which makes intervention by invitation the only option between the 
two.597  
It can be questioned if this position has shifted to accommodate the changes in modern 
warfare, which, by championing more surgical operations and the use of modern 
technology, has distanced possible intervenors even further away from the battlefields. 
Still, given the current confusion on the matter, it is safer to assume that the standards 
established in Nicaragua continue to stay in effect, meaning that direct military measures 
are still required for a third State to have committed an armed attack. What can be more 
difficult is establishing when an armed activity by a third State becomes a direct one, 
particularly with the evolving standards on State responsibility and de facto groups.598 
In any event, one can see that the changing circumstances concerning the use of force 
have repainted the lines between its acceptable unilateral forms. Thus, it may now be 
more difficult to decipher when host State invitation denotes consensual use of force or 
self-defence. The modified, more muddled distinctions have come into play in various 
modern military interventions, most notably when combatting international terrorism 
around the globe.599 It goes on to show that akin to collective security, self-defence as a 
concept has been able to broker peace with intervention by invitation, making their co-
application possible. 
 
3.4. Final Remarks on the Relation  
The modern version of armed intervention by invitation has reappeared due to the 
partial failure of the Charter’s system, but the doctrine has still been able to find some 
common ground with both collective security and self-defence. This development can be 
based on the evolution of the concepts over the UN era and even beyond. As the reality 
of international relations has set in, the forms of armed force described in the Charter 
have undergone major changes from those presented in San Francisco in 1945. Collective 
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security has been forced to yield its globalist position, resulting in the concept emulating 
certain elements of unilateral armed measures. Self-defence, however, has been subjected 
to a change which has appeared to widen the concept’s boundaries. Moreover, both 
concepts have begun to thread the needle in relation to internal crises, which puts them 
directly in the same sphere of application as intervention by invitation.600 
The concepts have managed to strike a delicate balance, but the relation between them 
in the future remains reliant on a range of factors. Much depends on which course 
collective security will take, and if widening of self-defence to apply to international 
terrorism will persist in the decades to come. If these developments take unexpected turns, 
as they often do in international law, the relationship between the Charter’s provisions 
and intervention by invitation could become more strained, perhaps even conflicted. Still, 
for now the concepts appear to be at relative peace with one another, showcasing that the 
process on intervention by invitation has managed accommodate the Charter’s needs as 
well.  
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4. Invitation by Invitation and Other Controversial Forms of 
Armed Force  
 
4.1. Other Armed Interventions Beyond the Scope of the UN Charter  
Intervention by invitation is peculiar in many ways. In fact, it is a type of armed 
intervention that is not completely comparable to any other armed measure. Its 
relationship with the UN Charter remains strained, but at the same time its legal validity 
is widely accepted.601 Hence, it is a doctrine which lies beyond the scope of the Charter 
itself, which means that it cannot be lumped together with the concepts of self-defence 
and collective security. However, the doctrine also cannot fully be categorised with other 
justifications that impugn the Charter, including the protection of nationals abroad and 
unilateral humanitarian intervention, because the reasoning behind these ventures have 
faced significant opposition. This has left their legal position as undecided at best, and at 
worst steadfastly rejected.602  
Hence, this portion will delve deeper into the uses of force outside the context of the 
Charter, to analyse why certain forms have been allowed to exist in the legal sphere, when 
others have been exiled to political rhetoric. This dissonance will be the focus of the 
analysis, which will uncover how intervention by invitation has steadily managed to 
secure its position, whereas the other ventures face much more opposition. Furthermore, 
the section will explain why invited interventions have been allowed to remain so hazy, 
while simultaneously so much is demanded of other ventures which wish to crystallise 
into applicable legal norms.  
After all, the premise for all of these propositions is the same. They must circumvent 
the Charter’s prohibition and establish that a derogation has emerged which allows for 
their application. This means clearing the hurdles from not only the Charter and 
customary international law, but also the ius cogens aspect of the prohibition on the use 
of force. Thus far, only intervention by invitation has succeeded in this, which is an 
enigma in itself. 
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4.2. How Have the Other Ventures Fared in Comparison to Invited 
Interventions?  
As noted above, in addition to consensual use of force, various attempts have 
challenged the scheme invented by the Charter. However, the exact responses to these 
arguments vary, meaning that their connections to intervention by invitation should be 
examined separately. The need for this is reflected in the outline of this section, which 
maps out the major arguments which have aimed to modify the regulation on the use of 
force. Nevertheless, the examination on intervention by invitation and other uses of force 
will be closed with general observations. In addition, the closing remarks will seek to 
explain why intervention by invitation has been able to gather support within the 
international community, whereas other controversial ventures have met much frostier 
responses. 
 
4.2.1. Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention  
Of the ventures on use of force which fall beyond the Charter, the idea of unilateral 
humanitarian intervention has arguably been the most controversial and polarising.603 
Any conversation on the topic is bound to get heated, and often in a manner that does not 
endorse the strengths of legal argumentation. In recent decades, there have been numerous 
attempts by certain States and other actors to endorse the adoption of this type of a legal 
standard.604 The responses have varied from negative to mixed, leaving the concept in an 
undefined place, at least in the current atmosphere.605 
The main concept of humanitarian intervention can be traced back to the 1700s and 
1800s, much like invited interventions and collective security. Given that the name of the 
idea includes the term ‘intervention’, this should not be too shocking. During this time, 
many conflicts and periods of unrest saw the use of more morally based argumentation, 
begging for armed intervention for humanitarian purposes.606 The roots of humanitarian 
intervention can therefore be placed in same bundle which saw the first appearance of 
both intervention by invitation and collective security. Since this is the case, why has 
humanitarian intervention fared so poorly, whereas invited interventions and collective 
security have generally held their place, despite notable difficulties? 
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The answer may lie with the reasoning behind humanitarian intervention, which tends 
to be more focused on argumentation that cannot exactly be labelled as legal. As the 
concept’s name already suggests, the claims in its favour have focused on humanitarian 
matters rather than the perimeter of the ban on armed force.607 This is problematic given 
the status quo, the supposedly robust legal limitations imposed by the UN Charter,608 that 
unilateral humanitarian intervention should be challenging instead. In recent decades, for 
instance, the humane questions behind the doctrine have become one of the most 
controversial topics among legal discussions,609 which has caused the concept to drift 
away from the radius of invited interventions. Many of the claims behind the applicability 
of humanitarian intervention have been laced with the notions of ethics and morals, 
something which the carefully calculated and often technical intervention by invitation 
has generally avoided. 
The moral flourish of humanitarian intervention has faced notable resistance among 
international observers, who have felt that its good intentions may actually be paving the 
road to hell.610 In fact, the term ‘humanitarian intervention’ has become so unappealing 
that the newest venture aimed at allowing armed intervention to prevent catastrophes has 
dropped the name altogether.611 The focus has now moved to ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
(R2P), a budding doctrine of which what was formerly known as humanitarian 
intervention forms only one part.612 R2P consists of three ‘pillars’, with only the third 
pillar concerning the option of using armed force, as the last resort, to protect people in 
great need.613 Notably, R2P first and foremost attempts to establish a framework for 
collective armed measures: the project only refers to unilateral armed interventions in a 
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stage whisper, leading it to shy away from directly advocating the adoption of such a legal 
doctrine.614  
Thus, it would appear that in the best-case scenario, R2P has managed to promote the 
authorisation of collective armed measures for humanitarian purposes. Still, this is a 
proposition which the Charter (which gives the Security Council practically unfettered 
discretion when it comes to determining threats or violations of international peace) 
already allows, meaning that few new legal developments have taken place.615 Although 
R2P has generally fared better than the earlier project of humanitarian intervention, the 
matter of using unilateral force for humanitarian purposes has faced, at best, an 
unenthusiastic response.616 As any aspiring form of armed force must show that is has 
managed to circumvent the prohibition in Article 2(4), it must be concluded that unilateral 
armed interventions for humanitarian reasons remain unlawful under international law. 
Given that unilateral humanitarian intervention has been controversial in practically all 
its aspects, the argument has been used sparingly in the international community. As such, 
it has had few chances to ever come into contact with intervention by invitation, meaning 
that the two concepts have not been invoked in instantaneous manner. The scenario which 
comes closest is the on-going Ukrainian crisis, during which Russia has invoked a wide 
spectrum of arguments, from explicit intervention by invitation to even a tentative cry for 
measures due to humanitarian needs.617 The reason for the lack of co-application is not 
only the rarity of humanitarian intervention as an actual argument, but also a fundamental 
incompatibility. The need for humanitarian intervention often arises from either a 
territorial State’s failure to protect its people properly or even said State taking proactive 
illegal measures itself.618 Intervention by invitation, however, is based on the consent of 
the host State,619 which means that bringing these concepts together in the form of co-
application can be difficult. 
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4.2.2. The Protection of Nationals Abroad 
Asserting that a State may lawfully use force in another country when its nationals are 
threatened is a legal argument that bears many peculiarities. First, its categorisation has 
proved to be problematic. Some have argued that the protection of nationals abroad has 
emerged as a new sphere to self-defence rather than as a separate doctrine: however, this 
assertion is hindered by the fact that in many cases where the protection of nationals has 
been invoked, the qualifications attributed to self-defence have been nowhere to be 
found. 620  Secondly, safe from the controversial end to the Entebbe incident, 621  the 
doctrine has arguably never been used as a stand-alone claim or as the clear-cut primary 
argument. 622  Instead, it has often been invoked alongside other justifications, most 
prominently self-defence and intervention by invitation.623 For these reasons, the concept 
has had a difficult time in emerging as a solid legal doctrine, which need not rely on other 
legal bases. 
In any event, at this stage the protection of nationals abroad has been a controversial 
argument at best, and it appears that the members of the international community are 
polarised when it comes its applicability.624 Not surprisingly, the militarily powerful have 
been the concept’s biggest proponents, which starkly contrasts with the negative opinions 
of smaller States. If we speak of pure numbers, most States appear to be resisting the 
emergence of the concept.625 However, the smaller pool of States who support protection 
of nationals abroad consists of the influential ones, those usually in charge of flexing and 
testing the limits on the use of force.626 
As with the concept of unilateral humanitarian intervention, the failure of the 
protection of nationals abroad to emerge as a valid doctrine relates to the threat it poses 
to the sovereignty of the target States. In its purest form, the rationale behind the 
protection of nationals abroad rests upon the assumption that the territorial States has 
somehow failed, and that as a result, an intervention is necessary. If this supposed failure 
is paired with the valid consent of the host State, as has been done various times in the 
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past,627 the outcome should not be too controversial. However, if armed force is pursued 
without such consent, or due to thinly disguised political objectives, the activities can 
easily be regarded as hostile.628 
It would therefore appear that the protection of nationals abroad has found most 
success as a political side argument to intervention by invitation. In such circumstances, 
the consent of the host State acts as the main justification for the intervention, whereas 
the protection of nationals abroad explains why the intervening State is best suited for the 
task. As a standalone argument, however, the concept is bound to be insufficient, for it 
could result in aggressive measures against the territorial State, which is most likely why 
States have avoided doing so in the past.629 Hence, even the notable proponents of the 
concept have deemed it pertinent to chiefly rely on it only in conjunction with other 
justifications for armed force, including intervention by invitation.630 
 
4.2.3. Other Notable Challenges to the UN Charter’s System: The Use of Force to 
Enforce External Self-Determination  
Besides intervention by invitation, the protection of nationals abroad and humanitarian 
intervention have been the most longstanding challenges to the UN Charter. While other 
claims have appeared, they are less-known and more concentrated on specific time 
periods: their effect may thus be limited to certain occasions or timeframes only. Hence, 
it would not be pertinent to examine many of these concepts, as they bear little relevance 
in present day. Still, one argument may command attention. 
Of these more short-lived ventures, the one concerning use of force and the self-
determination of peoples still has a certain curiosity in today’s international law.631 The 
idea first emerged during the decolonisation of 1960s and 1970s, when the international 
community discussed measures which could be exhausted to realise the process in full.632 
The prospect of using armed force was brought up inter alia during the drafting process 
of the Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970.633 However, the concept was quickly 
debunked due to the resistance of Western States, who were unwilling to go to such 
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lengths to advance external self-determination. 634  As a result, the Declaration was 
finalised with no mention to available military measures in reference to self-
determination:635 in fact, many have interpreted the document as endorsing restraint and 
non-intervention for third States in such situations.636 Notably, the debate over the use of 
force to realise secession quickly subsided after the completion of the decolonisation 
process, and by the 1980s the matter had lost most of its relevance in the international 
community.637 
The initial, quickly diffused attempt to allow the use of force to advance secession 
differs from other ventures in a major way: any hope of its success was quashed by the 
Western States, many of whom have often advocated new forms of armed intervention.638 
This partially explains why the attempt was tied to a specific timespan and circumstances. 
With almost no consistent military powers to advance it, the venture’s changes of 
reaching long-time support were very slim. This also mirrors the Western dominance over 
the world order: legal ventures unapproved by these States have a much harder time 
gaining enough traction to emerge as valid doctrines. 
Nevertheless, issues over secession and external force are unfinished, as the 
independence ventures of various regions have risen to the forefront of international legal 
debate.639 It was discussed following the NATO intervention in Kosovo in the late 1990s: 
however, this use of force cannot be interpreted as a direct attempt to reawaken the 
venture concerning armed measures and secession. The intervening coalition carefully 
argued that it did not intend to advance the region’s separation from Serbia, and instead 
claimed to have preserved the safety of the people living in the area, thus focusing on 
humanitarian aspects.640 However, Kosovo’s independence declaration did take place less 
than a decade later, and the past armed intervention must have had some effect on it.641 
Still, it would appear that use of force to realise secession has not gained new momentum 
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as such, despite the current debate on the limits of external self-determination. 
Conversely, and very interestingly from the perspective of this study, some attempts have 
linked secession with armed intervention by invitation. These attempts will be discussed 
later in the thesis.642 
 
4.3. The Rationale Behind the Relative Success of Invited Interventions 
No matter how one perceives the current situation, it remains clear that other outlier 
uses of force have not met success comparable to that of intervention by invitation.643 
Their legal positions remain mixed at best and refuted at worst. As such, none of the 
ventures discussed above can be regarded as having been fully crystallised as an 
applicable legal norm, even though they periodically appear in argumentation. 
Nonetheless, in the end these propositions have failed to attain widespread support from 
the international community, as their application has been advanced by the select few.644 
Certain reasons for this outcome can be unearthed when the decision-making processes 
of these ventures are compared to that of intervention by invitation. Not surprisingly, the 
most prominent proponents of the concepts that fall beyond the scope of the Charter are 
the great military powers.645 In contrast, the States which have tended to oppose new 
military ventures have been the smaller ones, which did in fact accept the application of 
invited interventions— albeit reluctantly. This should not be too shocking. Intervention 
by invitation, while in many respects problematic, also has pros for smaller States, as it 
optimally allows inviting more powerful allies to restore order. In other words, 
intervention by invitation, at least on paper, can be executed in accordance with the 
inviting State’s will, and thus protect that State’s sovereignty. Moreover, as noted earlier, 
intervention by invitation has subtly served a wider, community-driven purpose, at least 
during its initial renaissance over the course of the Cold War.646  
These opportunities, however, appear to be much less likely with the other forms 
discussed in this section. These concepts are ideas which inevitably threaten the 
sovereignty of the territorial State. All notions are in one way or another based on the 
assumption that the territorial State has somehow failed, which justifies the foreign armed 
intervention on its soil. If these movements were to gain momentum, it would inevitably 
lead to tarnishing the sovereignty of smaller States at the expense of the powerful ones, 
                                                 
642 See Chapter V, Section 3.2. 
643 Tanca, Foreign Armed Intervention, pp. 111-125; Gazzini, Changing Rules, pp. 170-179; 
Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, pp. 35, 52, 61 and 65-66; Franck, Recourse to 
Force, p. 109-112 and 135. 
644 Green, ‘Editorial Comment’. pp. 3-4; Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, pp. 34-35 
and 88-92. 
645 Corfu Channel, p. 35; Nicaragua, paras. 207-208. 
646 See Section 1. of this chapter. 
 
  102 
 
 
which is already the worst-case scenario of military intervention. Furthermore, the 
ventures have thus far failed to set values which are commonly agreed upon. This is well 
exemplified by humanitarian intervention: despite its noble motives, many States 
continue to voice doubts over the concept’s true intentions, indicating that little mutual 
ground exists. In other words, each of these budding doctrines must strive for a purpose 
which benefits the international community as a whole, either explicitly or implicitly.  
Although these arguments are yet to find success, the emergence of new, valid 
exceptions to the prohibition of armed force is possible in the future. After all, 
international law on the matter is flexible by nature. In fact, the birth of modern invited 
interventions can be attributed to such a premise. Nevertheless, in order for this to happen, 
the ventures discussed here may have to follow the routine of invited interventions. By 
doing this, they may be able to appeal to the entire global community. Although the 
powerful States are certainly the ones who push for new forms of armed intervention, 
these propositions must also gain the support of other members of the international 
community: in other words, sporadic practice is not enough.647 
However, it is highly unlikely that these concepts could follow a path identical to that 
of invited interventions. As noted earlier, even in the most generous of terms, intervention 
by invitation is a flimsy legal doctrine that is prone to frequent abuse. It has been allowed 
to remain as such because it is of benefit to the powerful States. Still, this premise is also 
due to the doctrine not diametrically and absolutely threatening the notion of State 
sovereignty. This allows smaller States to find intervention by invitation usable as well, 
even if its contents remain muddled. However, this is not the case with the other ventures 
discussed here. Allowing these concepts to exist with similarly hazy and debatable limits 
would easily prove undesirable for many, if not most, States. Of course, these concerns 
can become futile in the long run, as international norms may form in unforeseeable 
patterns. This allows openings for new forms of armed force as well. But for now, 
intervention by invitation remains the single biggest success outside the context of the 
Charter.  
                                                 
647 Corfu Channel, pp. 35-36; Nicaragua, paras. 185-187 and 206-207. 
 
  103 
 
 
5. Final Remarks on the Normative Process of Intervention by 
Invitation 
 
The uneven re-emergence of intervention by invitation has made the concept’s legal 
basis unclear and subject to interpretation. Despite these convolutions, the doctrine has 
been able to reclaim a position in international law despite the limitations of the Charter. 
It should therefore be regarded as an out-of-bounds exception to the prohibition enshrined 
in Article 2(4), reinvigorated by the doctrine of State responsibility, rather than being a 
concept which was always meant to be acceptable under the Charter. It is a concept born 
out of decision-making process involving both sovereign States and the bodies of the 
United Nations, which accepted the reinstallation of the doctrine. This development was 
necessary to patch up the damage sustained by the Charter’s regulation during the political 
crises that engulfed the international community following 1945. 
Indeed, intervention by invitation was able to facilitate the process due to the Cold 
War, for the politics of the era left collective security paralysed while numerous internal 
conflicts began to command the attention of individual States. When put together, these 
ingredients paved the way for invited interventions and permitted the concept to become 
a prominent practice. This persistent application, although in many respects troubling, 
subsequently led to an amendment which reinstated invited interventions in international 
law. While this is far from an ideal situation, the flexible legal framework of the Charter 
does make such developments possible. This possibility is precisely what occurred with 
intervention by invitation post-1945, resulting in its reintroduction. 
Despite this conclusion, intervention by invitation has been allowed to exist without a 
full explanation of its precise legal justification. This has made the doctrine hazy and 
prone to abuse. The premise is confusing, but it makes sense for States who wish to apply 
the doctrine in practice: the flimsy limits allow the doctrine some much needed flexibility, 
which makes its invocation possible under many circumstances. To state it differently, 
the ambivalence serves the policies of the States that often intervene upon request, a 
finding which further cements the doctrine’s position as a political measure. 
Of course, this premise clearly creates many concerns for smaller States, who are much 
more likely to be the targets of armed interventions. Still, the fact that intervention by 
invitation ultimately relies on the host State’s sovereignty offers some assurance. 
Moreover, despite its antagonistic surface, intervention by invitation also functioned as a 
stabilising force during the decades of the Cold War. In the absence of collective security, 
it offered the superpowers of the time a method with which they could impose their 
influence upon others. While this practice did little to diminish the Cold War, it also kept 
the crisis at a sustainable level, thus attending to the damage caused to the Charter’s 
regulation. 
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In fact, that intervention by invitation was born out of the misgivings of the 
implementation of the Charter, in particular collective security, is evident. The outcome 
and the correlation of the concepts in this sense is not surprising. Their historical 
connection goes well beyond the UN era, all the way into the first appearances of armed 
interventions themselves. Furthermore, invited interventions are much more entwined 
with the concept of self-defence than would immediately seem to be. Even though self-
defence did not play as a big a part in the resurrection of invited interventions as collective 
security, the two doctrines are becoming more interlinked by the minute and have often 
been invoked side by side in various armed interventions. 
Given how intervention by invitation has reappeared, an opening for the emergence of 
other forms of armed intervention does exist. However, since invited interventions had to 
circumvent the prohibition on the use of force, such forms will have to clear the same 
hurdle first. Many ventures have attempted to achieve this goal, but none of them have 
yet reached similar success. The state of matters has come about because these 
propositions, including unilateral humanitarian intervention and the protection of 
nationals abroad, in their purest forms depend on the failure of the territorial State. This 
means that such arguments are forwarded despite the sovereignty of the target States. 
Such a premise opposes the gist of intervention by invitation, which is legally based upon 
the sovereign capacity of the host State, despite its many flaws. As such, its re-emergence 
was less complicated, which is exemplified by the frostier responses towards the other 
ventures.  
Still, one can appreciate that the re-awakening of intervention by invitation is far from 
a simple affair. While traceable, the justification behind intervention by invitation 
remains ambivalent, which in turn distorts the general picture of the regulation on the use 
of force. Consequently, intervention by invitation, while being the product of decision-
making by international subjects, can hardly be described as a flawless display of 
international law-making. Rather, it is multi-layered yet ultimately community-driven, 
and it has been allowed to operate despite causing complications. 
What is further, this unmistakable convolution is immediately mirrored in the 
doctrine’s application in practice, which has been remarkably eventful and often non-
linear. This should come as no surprise. After all, any legal concept sets the context for 
their application, and if the concept fails to definite itself properly, one can expect similar 
surges of identity crisis from its appearances in practice. In other words, intervention by 
invitation has faltered in producing sturdy legal limits as to how it should be applied. As 
a result, the same ambivalence which surrounds the concept’s justification also impedes 
its application, as the next chapter will showcase. 
  
 




A Delicate Concept in Practice — What Is Intervention 
by Invitation For? 
 
1. Computing the Practice of a Shadowy Concept 
 
1.1. The General Practical Framework of Intervention by Invitation 
If the legal nuances behind intervention by invitation are difficult to grasp, then the 
concept’s practice does not offer much relief, either. Due to how it resurged during the 
UN era, the doctrine’s practice has been laced with difficulties, which has resulted in its 
requirements being wide-ranging and complicated. This convolution is reflective of the 
confusion over justification of the doctrine. After all, the rebirth of invited interventions 
is immediately linked to the practice of States, since the doctrine re-emerged as an outlier 
exception to the prohibition on the use of force due to the persistent activities by States.648 
If such practices were clear-cut, the legal reasoning would follow suit. But alas, this is 
not the case, which can only mean that the practice on intervention by invitation must 
deal with several issues, and on various levels at that. 
Given its challenging premise, detailing the doctrine’s practical requirements and 
limits is not easy. Should one need to rattle off the conditions for intervention by 
invitation in a single take, it could very well be this: intervention upon invitation is 
allowable when the host State issues a genuine request in its sovereign capacity, as long 
as the military activities stay within the boundaries of the consent and other pertinent 
norms of international law.649 This sentence is far from self-explanatory, and leaves much 
room for interpretation. Moreover, the situation also enables misuse, which has 
unfortunately presented itself in practice. 
As a result, the doctrine’s practice is best described as fractured. States and 
commentators alike have disagreed over the identification of the legal representative of 
the host State, how the invitation must be issued and withdrawn, as well as if and how the 
intervention may be practiced under different circumstances.650 Hence, due to the lack of 
clear requirements and frameworks, putting invited interventions into practice has proved 
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immensely difficult.651 In fact, the most immediate controversies concerning the doctrine 
stem from the conditions of its application and how it should pan out in various 
contexts.652 State activities exemplify this well: often when States have opposed certain 
invited interventions, they have done so because of a perceived breach of practical 
requirements, not because they view the whole concept as being unlawful.653 To put it 
differently, States themselves appear to consider the practical matters the most important 
issue concerning intervention by invitation, as they desperately attempt to rein in the 
concept while still keeping it applicable. 
 
1.2. Building the Context Further: A Quick Recap of Applying Intervention 
by Invitation since 1945 
Given the erratic practice of invited interventions, drawing definite lines is a difficult 
task. However, it is possible to examine the State practice after the adoption of the Charter 
and note the widely identified issues. With these issues in hand, solutions may be 
discovered, which helps in forming more lucid conditions and limitations for intervention 
by invitation. Hence, before moving to these specific conditions, we will first discuss the 
general evolution of the practical issues of intervention by invitation, decade by decade.  
Skipping over the 1940s is pertinent, as this decade was largely marked by the Second 
World War and its aftermath. Instead, as the practice on consensual use of force began to 
resurge in the 1950s, we should begin our evaluation there. Still, while invited 
interventions began to gain momentum during this decade,654 the general response to such 
military activities was cautious at best.655 Of course, this feedback could in part have been 
facilitated by the controversy of particular interventions, such as Soviet Union’s armed 
activities in Hungary in 1956.656 Nonetheless, some dissenting voices actually questioned 
the entire legality of the practice. Such opinions were expressed inter alia in 1957, when 
Iraq, amongst various other Middle Eastern States, claimed that the United Kingdom had 
no right to intervene on the request in the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman.657 Moreover, 
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the invitation of the host State was at times regarded as an unstable legal argument. An 
example can be found in the United Kingdom’s intervention in Jordan the following year, 
when States mostly focused on debating whether the self-defence exception applied, 
leaving intervention by invitation on the back-burner. 658  When put together, these 
responses seem to suggest that the doctrine had not yet fully regained its footing, even if 
it made appearances in practice. 
 By the 1960s, however, such concerns about the doctrine’s status had largely 
vanished. With the Cold War politics now in full gear, intervention by invitation had 
become a frequently exhausted asset, leaving little room for doubt over its lawfulness.659 
Instead, attention had turned to the manner in which invited interventions were applied, 
bringing the practical requirements of the concept to the forefront of debate, despite the 
clear legal vacuum.660 As it transpired, many invited interventions were challenged due 
to supposedly breached conditions, with objections inter alia made about the inviting 
authority and whether the invitation was actually genuine.661 Moreover, the matter of 
intervening in the midst of a civil war raised particular concerns, and was consequently 
codified in the work of the General Assembly.662 In practice, perhaps the most infamous 
of the many questionable invited interventions is the Soviet-led intervention in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, which resulted in predominantly negative opinions within the 
international community.663  
The 1970s and 80s followed suit: invited interventions were applied consistently, with 
some finding more success than others. Notably, the first of these decades provided 
certain limitations for the concept’s application, courtesy of the General Assembly. 
During this time, the organ passed two important Resolutions, the Friendly Relations 
Declaration (1970) and the Definition of Aggression (1974). The former inter alia 
denounced foreign use of force aimed at denying the self-determination of the territorial 
State’s people, while the latter noted that when an invited intervention exceeds its limits, 
it may amount to aggression against the host State.664 These remarks, while brief, do 
showcase attempts to define the limits of intervention by invitation. 
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The 1980s proved to be particularly important for the concept as well, as a case 
touching upon it was at last brought before the ICJ. The Nicaragua case (1986) finally 
confirmed that intervention by invitation is indeed ‘allowable' upon the request of the 
lawful government.665 However, the Court did not adjudge upon the doctrine in much 
detail, leaving vague the matters concerning its practice. 666  This vagueness was 
manifested in practice several times over the decade, for example in the controversial US 
interventions in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989), which inter alia brought into 
question the qualifications concerning the inviting authority.667 
The 1990s, however, provided yet another gear change for invited interventions. As 
the power relations between the East and West changed at the turn of the decade, the 
partial revitalisation of the Security Council, which began to tackle internal conflicts, 
placed the organ in the same field as invited interventions.668 The evolution has continued 
well into the new millennium, for two general issues have become particularly important. 
As the definitions of internal and international conflicts have become more blurred, 
invited interventions have been consistently applied during non-international armed 
conflicts — despite the rule that any foreign intervention in such circumstances violates 
the duty of non-intervention. 669  Furthermore, the increased interventions in non-
international armed conflicts have brought up the question of the legitimate representative 
of a State and how one should determine it. In multiple cases, a foreign State has pledged 
its military support to what would traditionally be labelled as a rebelling factor, bringing 
forth conflicting accounts on the purported legitimate authority.670  
To sum up, even though the practice first faced some doubts, attention quickly turned 
to the specific conditions and circumstances of invited interventions. This finding again 
reaffirms that while the doctrine’s applicability is accepted, its practice is still a source of 
controversy. The issues that have persisted throughout the decades concern the inviting 
authority, its legitimacy and situations in which it may lose this legitimacy.671 Of specific 
concern have been invited interventions during non-international armed conflicts and 
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internal unrests that have resulted in the denial of the self-determination of the host State’s 
people. 672  Moreover, it remains slightly unclear how the application of invited 
interventions relate to other forms of armed force, most notably collective use of force. 
Under more modern circumstances, intervention by invitation has also aimed to serve the 
fight against international terrorism, especially when countermeasures are undertaken in 
the context of non-international armed conflicts.673 
To address these issues, the analytic sections of this chapter have been structured 
thusly. The first topic will concern the invitation itself, to determine how it must be issued 
and retracted, with the additional objective of discerning why these conditions have come 
about (2). The chapter will then move on to the aspect of intervention itself by examining 
the circumstances in which invited interventions tend to be applied (3). The section will 
attempt to discover an underlying, common purpose for States practicing invited 
interventions in different contexts. Finally, the analysis will be closed with overall 
conclusions on the application of invited interventions, which will immediately lead to 
the next chapter of the thesis (4). 
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2. The Invitation to Intervene: What Is Required and Why? 
 
As the name of the doctrine already suggests, intervention by invitation can be divided 
into two parts: the intervention and the invitation. For the purposes of analysis, it is 
pertinent to begin with the invitation, since it legitimises the armed intervention itself. 
Issuing an invitation has been divided in two major categories: substantive and procedural 
conditions.674 Substantive conditions, which concern the matter of who may consent to 
the intervention,675 will be dealt first. Procedural requirements, which entail the form and 
manner of the invitation itself,676 will be discussed afterwards. Once these thresholds for 
issuing an invitation have been established, attention will turn to the withdrawal of an 
invitation. This specific issue will be addressed to discover if the withdrawal must be 
conducted in a certain manner for it to be considered effective. 
In addition, the section seeks to explain why these requirements come in so many 
numbers, and what processes they have been subjected to over the decades. Of specific 
interest is discovering whether the practical qualifications of intervention by invitation 
have been affected by global values, despite the doctrine’s apparent advocation of 
sovereign interests. 
 
2.1. Substantive Conditions for Consent: Identifying the Legitimate 
Representative 
2.1.1. Drawing the Line Between the Government and the Opposition  
The whole legality of intervention by invitation is based on the premise that the consent 
of the host State validates the use of force which would otherwise be unlawful.677 It is 
therefore of utmost importance that this consent is given by an actor that can properly 
manifest the sovereign will of the host State: if the consent cannot be internationally 
attributed to the State, the intervention remains in violation with international law.678 For 
this reason, much thought has been dedicated to deciphering who has the authority to 
speak for the State and invite a foreign armed intervention.679 Some might say that this 
dilemma was effectively solved by the ICJ in Nicaragua, when it was stated that only the 
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government of the host State may issue a valid invitation to intervene, whereas the 
opposing forces hold no such right.680  
The core justification of this finding lies in the principle of non-intervention, according 
to which one State cannot forcibly intervene in the affairs of another.681 However, no 
unlawful intervention can occur if the action is pursued in accordance with the will of a 
State,682 which can be expressed by its legitimate representative.683 The government, as 
such a representative, may validly request outside help in the capacity accorded to it by 
the country and its subjects. Militarily supporting the opposition, which has no such 
mandate, could result in the disassembly of the principle of non-intervention altogether, 
as such activities may aim to support a political coup within the host State: a matter in 
which other States should have no involvement.684 
This appears simple enough, but it has been noted that the findings in Nicaragua were 
based on certain utopian or even false assumptions.685 For instance, presuming that the 
government is the very embodiment of the singular will of a State and its people is simply 
short-sighted.686 This is obviously the case in countries led by dictators, but it also holds 
true for nations that uphold the democratic values and structures traditionally endorsed 
by Western societies.687 One of the core ideas of democracy is that people are allowed to 
have different stances about political and societal matters: this will inevitably lead to 
division in opinions. Such division is considered to be a sign of democratic success.  
Hence, it is admitted that no people living in a democracy can speak with a completely 
unified voice. While this is accepted, it can lead to difficulties when applying to armed 
interventions by invitation. If no government is fully backed its subjects, no military 
action pursued at the consent of such government can truly be in accordance with the will 
of the people and thus the host State itself. 688  This position becomes even more 
problematic since foreign intervention by invitation is likely to, if not be directly aimed 
at, at least affect the health and safety of these people. 
Perhaps because of these reasons, the Nicaragua principle, despite its apparent 
simplicity, has proven difficult in practice. States have not impugned the outlook that only 
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governments or similar actors may invite foreign interventions, but they have argued over 
their qualifications. 689  In particularly turbulent situations, such as internal strife and 
rebellions, some States have argued that the status of the legitimate representative of the 
host State has shifted from the previously recognised government to another factor.690 
Although much rarer, similar comments have been made by the international community 
at large: a famous example is recognising the interim Libyan government as the State’s 
legitimate representative during the 2011 military intervention.691  
Hence, although a line has been drawn between the government and the opposition of 
any given State, this line has recently become finer. States and scholars alike have 
differing opinions on how one qualifies as a valid government — or a government that 
has lost its authority for that matter. The Nicaragua case does not offer any solutions, as 
the Court did not take the time to define the qualifications for the valid government.692 
While the Court did return to similar issues concerning the use of force in DRC v. Uganda 
in 2005, it did not clarify the matter of the legitimate government, either.693 This has left 
much room for debate, and the task has been taken up by various different actors over 
multiple decades. 
Two main arguments have been established in these debates: effective control and 
democratic legitimacy. The primary candidate between the two has been that of effective 
control, an argument according to which the legitimate government is the one exercising 
effective control over the territory of the State. 694  As long as effective control is 
maintained, the government may speak for the State: this premise cannot be wavered by 
the manner in which the government gained its position. 695  The effective control 
argument, while unyielding in certain aspects, has been favoured by many observers due 
to its non-interfering nature, as it does not require inquiry into the internal matters of the 
host State.696 However, it has been challenged by the outlook that emphasises democratic 
legitimacy as the primary qualification for the lawful government.697 This argument 
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inevitably draws justification from the recognition of governments, a practice that has 
been controversial in international relations for quite some time, in particular where 
formally recognising rebels is concerned.698 Nevertheless, some States have been willing 
to exhaust this justification, even though the international reactions to interventions 
enacted on such a basis have tended to be frosty.699 
Since these responses have gained a following, it is important to study both in this 
section. However, one should remain cautious during this examination; after all, when it 
comes to armed interventions, States tend to change their opinions in accordance with 
political tides.700 This premise applies to intervention by invitation as well, including the 
debate over effective control and democratic legitimacy. 701  Thus, it is pertinent to 
evaluate the effective control test and the democratic legitimacy qualification separately 
at first, and only afterwards pit them against each other to see which prevails. 
 
2.1.2. The Effective Control Argument: The Premise of Evaluation 
While the matter is debated, thus far the logical starting point for any evaluation of the 
valid representative of the host State has been the effective control test.702 According to 
this argument, simply identifying the de jure government of the host State is not enough 
when examining its power to invite a foreign military intervention.703 Conversely, the 
legitimate government must still be effective (capable of governing the country) in order 
to act on behalf of the host State, especially to invite a foreign intervention to its soil.704 
This stance has persisted due to the finding that commentators have traditionally arrived 
at: the loss of effectiveness has been coupled with the loss of control over the host State 
itself.705 Hence, if control is not maintained, the government can no longer speak on 
behalf of the territorial State, especially if its position has been challenged by another 
faction. 706  And indeed, many arguments for interventions by invitation have been 
debunked due to the government’s purported loss of effective control: this loss can be 
realised even without rivalling factions.707 
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At its simplest, the effective control test is as follows: the government holds its validity 
as long as it exercises effective control over the host State and its territory.708 This 
approach has a neutral nature that takes little to no stance on the internal democratic order 
of the host State: it merely examines certain technical qualifications of control over the 
State’s territory. 709  In fact, in its purest form the effective control test requires no 
observations on how the host State’s government gained and maintained its position.710 
This neutral outlook has helped the argument gain a prevalent place amongst scholars and 
various States. 
However, the test is not without problems, as there are opposing opinions on what 
‘effective control’ means. One could claim that it simply denotes the percentage of 
territory still under the government’s control: as long as a certain amount of soil is 
covered, effective control is remains intact as well.711 Still, it could also be held that other 
factors need to be taken into consideration, including the population, major cities or 
otherwise important locations.712 Only stressing the amount of territory would naturally 
be the most straight-forward response, but it may fail to take into account the individual 
circumstances of each particular case.  
After all, given that States are constructed so differently, it may be hard to draw up 
definite guidelines for the effective control test. Some States have little territory but a 
large population, others are the exact opposite, and the rest fall somewhere in between. 
Consequently, saying that the amount of territory, population or important locations 
should always have the same value when assessing effective control might be 
counterintuitive. Perhaps the best rule of thumb in this situation would be that as long as 
an entity can effectively act as the government of the host State, while still holding a 
sufficient percentage of the territory and political apparatus, effective control is intact.713 
This rule is undeniably vague, but so is intervention by invitation as a doctrine. 
The vagueness is also present in practice, as States have had wildly varying opinions 
on when a government has lost its legitimacy. On one hand, military support has been 
given to an actor that faced a belligerent factor in the host State. Such was the situation 
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in Sri Lanka between 1987 and 1990, when India militarily inserted itself in a conflict 
taking place in the country, basing its intervention upon an agreement conducted with the 
government.714 By certain standards, the circumstances in Sri Lanka were considered to 
have reached the point of a civil war, and the government had even lost control of 
significant portions of its territory to other factions.715 However, as the Security Council 
— or the United Nations in general — did not tackle the issue, India’s intervention did 
not face too much criticism on a global scale.716  
Likewise, the US military intervention in Lebanon in 1958 was accepted by many 
Western States — but heavily criticised by the Soviet Union — although the host State’s 
territory had already been partially overrun by government-opposing militias.717 Another 
US intervention, this time in the Dominican Republic in 1965, faced backlash from the 
Soviet Union and several other States. It was inter alia argued that given the situation, no 
authority could have effectively invited the US intervention, which in turn resulted in 
violations of the ban on the use of force and the duty of non-intervention.718 Still, the 
general response was much more mixed, and no Security Council Resolution refuting the 
US intervention was adopted.719 
This State practice leads us to the next issue over the effective control test: the amount 
of time that needs to pass for control to be lost. After all, only momentary loss of control 
does not necessarily mean that the government has been ousted: in fact, during the Second 
World War, many European governments even spent years in exile while still being 
considered to be the representatives of their respective States. 720  When invited 
interventions were applied during the Cold War, it was generally accepted that effective 
control was not immediately lost if parts of the host State’s territory were seized by actors 
other than the government.721 This can be reflected in the aforementioned Sri Lanka case. 
Still, it appears that maintaining the ability to invite a foreign intervention warranted that 
the loss of effective control was brief.722 Once a notable amount of time had passed since 
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the position of the government had been questioned, justifying an armed intervention with 
the consent of such authority became more difficult.723 
Nonetheless, the modern stance on this issue has questioned the Cold War frameworks. 
Recent invited interventions have been applied even when the formerly internationally 
recognised government has had diminished or no control over parts of its territory for 
months, in some cases even for years.724 In addition, intervention by invitation has been 
invoked during civil wars which, by their mere name, signal a significant loss of territory 
by the government to rebelling factions.725 The French intervention in Mali, which first 
began in early 2013 and continues today, is a good example of this.726 Mali has been in 
turmoil for many years, and by the end of 2012 the circumstances had escalated to the 
point of an internal armed conflict. During this time, the situation was under discussion 
by the Security Council, which ultimately decided to apply collective security on the 
matter.727 Despite this, Mali issued a direct plea to France and asked it to stage a unilateral 
armed intervention to stabilise the situation in the country.728 The French intervention 
was widely accepted in the international community, including the Security Council 
itself,729 despite the fact that the rebelling forces had gained a notable of amount of 
territory and withheld it from the government for a long period of time.730 
Finally, the effective control argument has been criticised for being much too stiff to 
serve the purposes of invited interventions, as its point-blank neutral stance might lead to 
undesirable outcomes. Although the strength of the effective control test does lie in its 
neutrality towards the host State’s internal order, this same neutrality can result in foreign 
military support being delivered to oppressing or otherwise dictatorial actors.731 Installing 
such governments to power would hardly serve the values of the international community, 
a task that intervention by invitation subtly aims to fulfil. Furthermore, it negates the 
option of offering support to democratic movements or even secessionist aspirations, 
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which often claim to champion global values. This has led to seeking alternative methods 
to recognise the representative of the host State. 
 
2.1.3. The Challenger: The Qualification of Democratic Legitimacy 
Due to the rigidness of the effective control test, some States have challenged it with 
an argument that stresses the democratic position of the inviting authority. This approach, 
which has managed to obtain some momentum, essentially proposes that democratic 
legitimacy should be used as the qualifying factor when determining the valid government 
of the host State.732 Such arguments have been adopted by several militarily-prominent 
actors, most notably the United States.733 The very first hints of this strategy can be traced 
back to the Cold War and beyond, even the late 1800s, although the oldest of these US 
military operations tended be covert and carefully kept out the public eye.734 Still, in a 
more contemporary context, the country has continued to push for this argumentation, for 
example by trumping democratic legitimacy in its long-lasting ‘War on Terror’.735  
However, the condition of democratic legitimacy is not without controversy. As 
opposed to the effective control test, its successful application inevitably requires the 
intervenor to pronounce upon the internal order of the host State.736 This can lead to 
governmental recognition, a practice that has been denounced by many members of the 
international community.737 Traditionally, States only recognise other States and leave 
their internal order at their own discretion.738 As this is the premise, adopting democratic 
legitimacy as the primary means of qualification would be a huge step, one that requires 
much State practice in order to be considered plausible. 
Some practice does exist on the matter, but not in the form of strictly unilateral 
interventions. For instance, democratic legitimacy was successfully presented as a 
justification for a military intervention in 1994, when the Security Council decided to 
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deploy collective armed measures over the situation in Haiti.739 The intervention came 
about after serious unrest in the country, which in 1991 had resulted in the ousting of 
President Aristide, who had been elected in an internationally monitored vote. 740 
Following his ousting by a military group, Aristide issued a plea for the international 
community to use any means, armed ones included, to restore order in Haiti.741 At its 
meeting, various members of the Security Council deemed Aristide’s ousting to be an 
outcome of an unlawful coup, which — they argued — still made him the legitimate 
representative of the State.742 The Council hence authorised the use of force in Haiti to 
support Aristide’s request, regardless of his de facto position and the observation that he 
had been ousted several years earlier.743 
A partially similar situation later took place in Sierra Leone, when the elected President 
of the country was overthrown by an armed coup in 1997.744 Although he had fled the 
country, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) responded to 
President Kabbah’s plea to intervene in the matter, attending to the opposing military 
forces and re-establishing the former order in early 1998.745 The Security Council, which 
had condemned the initial coup and deemed it a threat to international peace and 
security,746 welcomed this turn of events.747 The approval of the intervention was given 
even though Kabbah arguably no longer held effective control over Sierra Leone when 
he issued the invitation to intervene.748 This would again seem to suggest that effective 
control is not always the only criterion to identify the legitimate representative of the host 
State. In fact, the threshold appears to receive little to no attention in some cases. 
The aforementioned military intervention in Mali has also shown signs of democratic 
legitimacy gaining more footing. As noted before, upon issuing the invitation, the Malian 
government had factually lost effective control over substantive portions of its territory.749 
Hence, if the effective control argument was to be applied in its strictest form, the 
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government would have also lost its ability to invite foreign intervention.750 However, the 
French intervention was met with a positive reaction, especially from the Security 
Council which had been monitoring the Malian conflict since 2012.751 Of course, the 
rebelling factions have been regarded as a terrorist organisation, which made support to 
the government the only plausible option.752 
The international responses to democratic legitimacy have thus been ambiguous. On 
one hand, some interventions staged pursuant to this qualification have been accepted, 
even applauded.753 On the other hand, when it comes to pure intervention by invitation, 
there does not seem to be sufficient evidence on State practice that would suggest that 
democratic legitimacy has overthrown the effective control test as the primary mean of 
assessment.754 Moreover, the celebrated interventions in which democratic legitimacy 
was invoked had international elements in them, as in the military action in Haiti, Côte 
D’Ivoire and Sierra Leone.755 In all these cases it was the Security Council that took a 
stance on the internal orders of the aforementioned States: if individual States alone had 
decided on such matters, the response would have likely been more tense.756 The same 
premise applies to the current situation in Mali, which is being overseen inter alia by 
France and the Security Council.757 Without global observation such situations could 
result in one State deciding upon the internal political order of another, which would not 
be a sustainable outcome by international legal standards.758  
Of course, the Security Council remains a political body, and has thus accordingly 
been inflicted with political issues: many of these problems concern the fact that the 
Council’s powers have hardly been distributed evenly between the UN member States.759 
In other words, the stamp of approval by the Council may be reassuring, but it does not 
automatically mean that the armed intervention and its purposes are free of the dubious 
elements often associated with unilateral governmental recognition. While this is true, the 
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Council’s active role in such matters is at least an attempt to follow the scheme initially 
intended by the Charter. Hence, the Security Council’s involvement in recognising 
legitimate representatives is preferable but should not be viewed through rose-coloured 
glasses. 
In any event, it would seem pertinent to conclude that the condition of democratic 
legitimacy may have found its way to military interventions, but only when an 
international element is involved.760 This denotes that either the United Nations or a 
regional organisation has taken a stance on the host State’s legitimate representative, and 
has at least expressed its acceptance of the subsequent military intervention. 761 
Conversely, using democratic legitimacy in an invited intervention between two 
individual States, with no collective involvement whatsoever, is much more 
problematic.762 
Even without a collective element, the democratic legitimacy outlook could act as a 
healthy counterweight to the unbending effective control test. It would give the 
intervening States more flexibility when deciding upon an intervention: whether this is 
desirable is a matter of perspective. Still, this proposition sounds noble in theory, but its 
application in practice is hindered by several obstacles. Firstly, and perhaps most 
importantly, the outlook would require the intervening State to comment on the domestic 
politics of the host State, to probable dismay from the international community. As stated 
before, taking such stances could result in explicitly recognising governments, which is 
controversial amongst various States.763 Secondly, there is a high chance of third States 
recognising and aiding foreign governments that suit their own interests, a scenario which 
has already presented itself in practice.764  
Despite these concerns, some members of the international community have continued 
to use democratic legitimacy as a legal justification during military interventions in which 
the United Nations or regional organisations have not taken a direct stance.765 In fact, the 
failures of these organisations have provided fertile ground for the use of the democratic 
legitimacy qualification.766 These activities have included the use of force in modern 
contexts, including but not limited to the fight against terrorism.767 In the most recent 
                                                 
760 Fox, ‘Intervention by Invitation’, p. 837. 
761 Ibid. 
762 Ibid. 
763 le Mon, ‘Unilateral Intervention by Invitation’, pp. 744-746; P.K Menon, ‘Some Thoughts 
About the Law of Recognition’ (1991) 87 Sri Lanka Journal of International Law 3, p. 94. 
764 Inter alia Record of the Security Council’s 2902nd Meeting, pp. 7-8 and Record of the Security 
Council’s 7125th Meeting, pp. 3-4. 
765 de Wet, ‘Modern Practice of Intervention by Invitation’, p. 983. 
766 Fox, ‘Intervention by Invitation’, p. 838. 
767 Ibid.; Henderson, ‘Editorial Comment’, pp. 212-213. 
 
  121 
 
 
years this scenario has been put to use in Iraq and Syria,768 where the terrorist organisation 
ISIS has been gaining territory over other factions engaged in the civil wars of these 
countries.  
Syria in particular has become the centre of attention from many perspectives, 
including intervention by invitation and democratic legitimacy. 769  As the Security 
Council has continued to fail in finding a suitable response to the crisis, individual States 
have taken up the mantle and decided to intervene unilaterally in favour of one of the 
many factions. The United States and Russia have both now publicly pledged their 
support to a portion of the rebels and al-Assad’s government respectively,770 which once 
again highlights how differently countries might view the very same situation. Given the 
sheer chaos that has engulfed Syria at this point, using the effective control test to identify 
the legitimate representative would be rather futile. It seems that the States intervening in 
the conflict have recognised this and have resorted to rhetoric more reminiscent of the 
democratic legitimacy qualification.771  
As this matter chiefly concerns non-international armed conflicts, it will be further 
analysed later in the thesis.772 However, it can be noted that as in the Syrian crisis, the 
threshold of democratic legitimacy may offer a way out of certain impasses created by 
the limitations of the effective control test. This is particularly true if the situation in 
question concerns commonly held values and interests. Still, this strength does not 
immediately denote that it ultimately prevails as the qualification for the inviting 
government, especially since the matter is multifaceted in nature. 
 
2.1.4. Effective Control Versus Democratic Legitimacy: The Current Struggle 
Although the qualification of democratic legitimacy has thus far found most of its 
success in interventions either authorised or approved by the Security Council, the criteria 
could perhaps prevail outside this context as well. After all, international law is an ever-
evolving set of rules. This holds true for democratic legitimacy, too: some States have 
already used it in unilateral interventions, which has been interpreted as an attempt to 
challenge the effective control test. However, making sense of State practice on this 
matter is difficult, as the members of the international community seem to change their 
opinions frequently. 
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This dilemma has been recently put into practice in the Ukraine crisis, which began to 
gain major international attention in 2013 as internal unrest.773 By 2014 the situation had 
escalated fast, leading to the de facto ousting of then-President Yanukovych, who would 
flee to Russia following the regime change in Ukraine.774 However, the ousted President 
refused to go quietly. In March 2014 he purportedly issued a plea for military intervention 
to Russia, which quickly responded to the invitation and publicly sent its troops to the 
Crimean Peninsula.775 Russia would then go on to present Yanukovych’s invitation as the 
partial justification for its military activities before the Security Council, to predominantly 
negative reactions from its fellow member States.776 
The status of Yanukovych as the legitimate representative of Ukraine sparked debate 
between Russia and various Western States during the Security Council meeting. The 
United States in particular argued that since Yanukovych had fled the Ukrainian territory 
and the power in the country had been allocated to a new government, his status was no 
longer such that he could issue a valid invitation for a military intervention.777 Several 
other States echoed these statements, either explicitly or by noting that Russia had no 
grounds for its use of force.778 Russia refuted the argument by claiming that despite his 
loss of control over the Ukrainian territory, Yanukovych was still the democratically 
elected representative of the State.779  
Furthermore, Russia asserted that Yanukovych’s ousting had been unlawful, 
describing the new government in Kiev as the result of an illegitimate coup. 780 
Consequently, it held that the President’s invitation for a military invitation was still valid 
under international law.781 Although most members of the Security Council rebutted 
Russia’s arguments, the organ was unable to adopt a Resolution on the matter due to 
Russia’s veto. Soon after the Security Council meeting, Russia forcefully annexed Crimea 
from Ukraine, an act derided by most of the international community.782 
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Although the Security Council was unable to reach a decision on the matter, only a 
handful of States have recognised the Russian intervention as legitimate.783 This would 
seem to suggest that the effective control argument still holds its position as the mean of 
assessing the legitimate representative of a State. Nevertheless, one cannot forget the 
political implications and their effect on the responses discussed here. For example, the 
United States itself has justified its own military activities on a doctrine that heavily relies 
on democratic legitimacy instead of effective control.784 Russia seemed to retreat from its 
previous statements as well, since in the past it has discarded invitations from the 
supposedly democratically legitimate representative of the host State.785 This standoff 
once again proves the two-faced nature of international relations, as States change their 
opinions on legal norms to follow purely political motives. 
This situation is even further highlighted by another major invited intervention, 
initiated in Yemen in early 2015. Following a rebel takeover that had been building for 
months,786 Yemen issued a plea for foreign intervention on its territory.787 A Saudi-led 
coalition responded in kind, having now intervened in the on-going Yemen Civil War.788 
As noted by commentators, the invitation came from the Yemeni President, a potentially 
legitimate representative of the host State;789 however, at that time he had fled from 
Yemen to Saudi Arabia, a situation reminiscent of the one in Ukraine. 790  Unlike 
Yanukovych and Ukraine, the intervening States had no trouble with this fact. It would 
appear that at least the United States has argued that the situations of Yemen and Ukraine 
are different.791 This could indicate that the US does not contest the effective control test 
in favour of democratic legitimacy — at least in this case — but rather argues that the 
particular contexts differ.792 And indeed, the case of Yemen does bear a component of 
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collectivity, for the Security Council has previously denounced the actions of the 
insurgents.793 Still, given the United States’ past support for the democratic legitimacy 
principle,794 its stance on the matter should be taken with a grain of salt. 
These developments, which essentially took place over the course of one year, show 
that examining State practice on intervention by invitation can quickly lead to impasses. 
If one takes the actions and opinions of States without consideration of the political 
circumstances and agendas behind them, no definite conclusions can be drawn. This 
premise affects both the effective control test and the qualification of democratic 
legitimacy. In any event, given the sporadic and contradicting practice, it can be argued 
that the qualification of democratic legitimacy has not yet gained enough momentum to 
have emerged as an equal to the effective control test, let alone completely overthrow 
it.795 As effective control has been the premise for evaluation thus far, it must continue in 
this position given the lack of coherent evidence proving otherwise.796  
However, while democratic legitimacy may not be an ideal stand-alone mean of 
assessing the legitimacy of the inviting authority, it may find its place among other 
conditions of intervention by invitation. It may also find success in invited interventions 
which are applied side by side with collective measures or intent.797 One such possibility 
concerns the deployment of consensual use of force in order to combat terrorist 
organisations, rather than to attend to purely internal matters of the host State. 798 
Consequently, the element of collectivity may soothe the concerns over possible 
interference into the host State’s internal matters, making the use of the democratic 
legitimacy requirement at least slightly smoother.799 
 
2.1.5. Final Remarks: Balancing Effective Control and Democratic Legitimacy 
While far from being completely uncontested, the effective control test still holds its 
position in today’s international law. Although the test has many notable shortcomings, 
its application allows for a neutral means of assessment, which is appreciated by the 
majority of the international community and commentators. Still, the condition of 
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democratic legitimacy has gained sporadic momentum, especially when interventions are 
successfully applied in civil wars. This can be attributed to the more prominent status of 
the right to self-determination, which stresses the right of people to take part and choose 
their political representatives. However, democratic legitimacy is a notion that should be 
put into practice with caution, and therefore it cannot be the stand-alone qualification to 
determining the effective government of the host State.  
Perhaps the most sustainable outlook would be to combine the principle of self-
determination with the effective control test. This way the evaluation of the valid 
government would still have the neutral conditions presented in effective control but 
would also require upholding of the self-determination of the peoples. Another option is 
simply to refrain from intervening if doing so may result in the violation of the principle. 
In any event, democratic legitimacy alone cannot act as the mean of examining the 
authority of the inviting establishment: doing so would inevitably lead to frequently 
recognising governments, which would contravene the current State practice. 
Consequently, thus far successful applications of the democratic legitimacy principle 
have required international assurances. 800  In these cases the legal representative’s 
position has been recognised either by the majority of States or in conjunction with action 
authorised by the Security Council. 801  The qualification’s application in a situation 
without such flavours seems unlikely to receive an enthusiastic response, at least at this 
stage. Furthermore, democratic legitimacy is a qualification that has only been enacted in 
particular situations only and is thus yet to receive universal following. 
This lack of universal following might be due to conflicting opinions as to the exact 
meaning of democratic legitimacy. In other words, there is no clear definition of the 
notion. Since the only discernible condition is that a representative must somehow 
encompass the democratic will of the State, establishing common and immediately 
applicable values on the matter appears difficult. After all, a healthy democracy depends 
on the existence of different opinions, not universal consensus. Thus, the process on 
crystallising the notion of democratic legitimacy appears to be in a loop, where 
juxtaposing takes are presented without the hope of reaching a conclusion. 
In contrast, the effective control test, through its mechanical measures, offers the 
participants of the global community some much needed mutual ground. It does not solve, 
or even seek to solve, the conundrums created by opposing opinions, since it allows States 
to keep their stances on the target State’s internal democratic order. Overall, this position 
continues to be a positive one, despite containing certain drawbacks. 
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2.2. Procedural Conditions for the Invitation: Issuing the Invitation to 
Intervene 
2.2.1. General Procedural Matters Concerning the Invitation 
Simply identifying the government is not enough when assessing an invitation to 
intervene. One must also make sure that the invitation follows procedural conditions, 
which safeguard the legitimacy of the consent given by the host State.802 As the name 
suggests, they aim to ensure that the consent is given procedurally in accordance with 
international law. The consent must thus be issued in a sufficient form, which reflects the 
sovereign will of the host State while staying within the boundaries set by international 
law.803 In particular, the procedural conditions determine if the consent has been issued 
clearly enough to validate a military intervention: given the frequent use of coercion in 
interventions by invitation, this is of particular importance.804 
This is where once again we encounter the flexibility of invited interventions and the 
problems it can cause. The use of force at the request of the host State can take many 
forms, from barely noticeable operations to full-scale armed interventions.805 The variety 
of options is also reflected in the way the host State may issue its consent: the most 
noteworthy condition is that few definite ones exist. This means that consent to 
intervention in most cases may be issued without having to follow a particular procedure. 
As a result, invitation may be given either ad hoc or via a treaty, and both procedures are 
perfectly valid. 806  Still, two main requirements apply to all invited interventions, 
regardless of the manner in which the consent was given. Every intervention by invitation, 
whether pursued ad hoc or in response to a treaty, must fulfil these requirements to be 
considered valid. In addition, certain technical considerations come into play and the 
failure to follow them may render the intervention unlawful. 
First and foremost, as with any agreement, the host State must be allowed to give its 
consent freely.807 The invitation cannot be a result of coercion, fraud or duress of any 
kind: if this is the case, it cannot be regarded as an actual expression of the State’s real 
will.808 In turn, the lack of real will renders compliance with other procedural conditions 
irrelevant, as the use of force remains illegal. In other words, the invitation of the host 
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State must be genuine, and if any foul play is suspected, it deprives the validity of the 
subsequent intervention.809  
This matter, although obvious, has not been without significance in past practice. 
Many invited interventions, especially those executed during the Cold War, were marked 
with doubt over whether the intervention was pursuing the genuine consent of the host 
State’s government. This was notably the case with USSR intervention in Afghanistan 
(1979), which factually resulted in the deposal and execution of the supposed inviter, 
evoking doubts that the military measures were forced upon the Afghan government 
instead.810 However, the issue of contestable consent is not limited to Cold War rhetoric. 
Even the contemporary practice of intervention by invitation — the targeted killings by 
the United States in particular, as well as its presence in Iraq following the 2003 invasion 
— steadily showcase similar problems.811 
Second, the genuineness of the consent can be linked to the following condition, which 
requires the invitation to be issued clearly.812 Clarity acts as the element which cleanses 
the armed intervention of the presumption of ill intent, therefore making the invitation 
effectively valid.813 The base of this condition is the base framework of international 
relations itself. No limitation on a State’s sovereignty, in particular over its territory, can 
be assumed,814 a premise which holds true for intervention by invitation as well.815 Thus, 
the intervening State must ensure that the invitation is clearly expressed before an 
intervention can commence. However, if the consent is freely and clearly given, either 
the host State or the intervenor can initiate the negotiations on the intervention. Of course, 
since the concept is called intervention by invitation, the preferable option would be an 
active host State, in particular due to the political conundrums that tend to come along. 
The two core requirements of genuine consent and clarity lead us to the technical 
matters concerning the invitation. In reflection with the ability to choose between ad hoc 
and treaty-based interventions, there are no specific requirements for the technical form 
of the invitation, leaving States with considerable leeway. This means that the invitation 
may be given in written or oral form; obviously, should the invitation be treaty-based, 
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written consent is required.816 Of the two options, one might prefer a written invitation 
since it is more easily evidenced. Nevertheless, as long as the consent is clearly expressed, 
either form is valid. Furthermore, it has been suggested that the host State may issue the 
invitation either explicitly or tacitly.817 However, tacit consent is problematic from the 
viewpoint of clarity, as it may not sufficiently manifest the sovereign will of the host State 
to invite foreign intervention: instead, it may have simply decided to adhere to an 
intervention under duress.818 
The conditions concerning timeframes have traditionally been more strict, for the 
invitation must be issued before or at latest during the intervention.819 Retroactively 
retrieved consent is invalid, and will not legitimise the armed intervention it was sought 
for.820 However, an invitation issued during the intervention itself is not without issues: 
in such a case, the host State may be under duress to accept the intervention, not to 
mention that in any event, the beginning of the intervention will have lacked proper 
consent. Hence, the best approach would be to give the invitation before the intervention, 
unless the situation is exceptional: an example could be circumstances similar to hot 
pursuit, when an armed intervention must cross into another State’s territory quickly and 
unexpectedly. 
Certain conditions concerning the scope of the invitation must be fulfilled as well. 
While the host State’s government is allowed to invite foreign military intervention, it 
may only consent to armed measures that are within the scope of its powers.821 In other 
words, the government may only act according to the capacity given to it by the 
constitutional order of the host State: hence it may not legitimise military actions that 
could inter alia lead to the occupation or annexation of the State’s territory, or acts that 
deter the human rights or self-determination of its people.822 This naturally poses some 
problematic limitations, since the use of military force is always bound to have 
undesirable consequences.823 Furthermore, the mere need to invite armed intervention 
always signals the presence of a crisis, perhaps even a full-scale breakdown of societal 
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order.824 Invited intervention is thus always laced with danger, in particular from the 
perspective of the right to self-determination.825 
These findings immediately correspond to the position of peremptory rules during 
invited interventions. No matter what the mode of the invitation is, it must always leave 
the norms of ius cogens and erga omnes intact.826 This is due to the legal constraints on 
the consent of the host State: the invitation only validates the use of force between the 
host State and the intervenor,827 whereas the rules of ius cogens and erga omnes are pieces 
of international law that are owed towards all members of the international community.828 
The violations of these norms concern all States: in other words, they cannot be 
effectively forfeited in an invitation to intervene militarily, or in any treaty or agreement 
for that matter.829 In addition, ius cogens rules take normative primacy under international 
law, making any agreement in their contradiction void.830 
The conditions entailed above, varied as they may be, should apply to all invitations 
which result in an armed intervention on the host State’s territory. They are pertinent 
regardless of the manner in which the invitation to intervene is sought. However, 
invitations given ad hoc or via a long-standing treaty can include certain special elements, 
which will be discussed next. 
 
2.2.2. The Preferred Premise of Ad Hoc Interventions  
When intervening upon request, the consent of the host State can be retrieved in many 
manners. Since few firm legal limitations exist in this field, such a stance has been 
regarded as permissible. However, even though the general requirements regarding form 
have been quite lenient, it has still been suggested that an invitation to intervene is best 
issued on an ad hoc basis.831  
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Several reasons support this preference of ad hoc invitations. Firstly, retrieving the 
consent  in such manner is the most fool-proof method of ensuring that the host State 
agrees to the intervention, and that the invitation truly reflects the sovereign will of the 
State.832 Secondly, when an invitation is given ad hoc, it can be modified to accommodate 
the needs of the specific intervention, meaning that political circumstances and other 
pertinent matters can be taken into account more effectively.833 Thirdly, consenting to 
interventions on an ad hoc basis minimises the element of surprise: as will later be 
explained, treaty-based interventions can be put into practice in previously unimaginable 
and unexpected circumstances, which makes foreseeing their actual effects very 
difficult.834  
The claims detailed here do not mean that ad hoc intervention by invitation is 
perpetually free of unprecedented events. No form of armed force can never be planned 
perfectly, meaning that initial plans and actual practice may collide. Still, ad hoc 
interventions tend to be slightly easier to predict as opposed to treaty-based consent, 
which is often given more generally and thus more vaguely. As a result, many 
commentators have held that invited interventions should be at least partially ad hoc in 
nature.835 This stance has been reflected in State practice as well, to a certain extent at 
least. For instance, even some invited interventions that could legally have been based 
upon treaties alone have also had ad hoc consent on the side for safekeeping.836  
Still, completely treaty-based interventions are no oddity in international relations, 
since at times it may be impossible or otherwise unwise to seek ad hoc consent. Certain 
military operations may require a long-term presence of the intervening State and may 
therefore have to be regulated through a treaty rather than through ad hoc intervention. 
This was the case with the presence of the United States and its coalition forces in Iraq 
following the initial war in 2003.837 If the War on Iraq was complex in a legal sense, the 
same can be said of the manner in which the subsequent presence of multinational troops 
on Iraqi soil was regulated.838 The measures exhausted included actions under Chapter 
VII of the Charter and continuously revised invitations from the Iraqi authorities, thus 
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dragging along an ad hoc element.839 However, towards the end of the US military 
presence, the stationing and functioning of said troops was regulated via a specific treaty 
between Iraq and the United States, which included clear provisions on the scope and 
length of the military activities.840 In this case, a treaty was important, since the military 
presence in the host State’s territory spanned over several years, necessitating a long-
standing legal instrument which the States involved could consult.841 In other words, pure 
ad hoc consent could have proved insufficient given the circumstances involved.842 
Certain additional issues concerning ad hoc consent exist as well. Sometimes the 
conditions of ad hoc interventions are not very well-defined: such a scenario may be 
realised when the intervention has been called upon very quickly and unexpectedly. If 
consent is only given during the situation’s escalation, the intervenor and host State may 
be unable to regulate the armed intervention at hand effectively. Hence, some States have 
opted to set out legal frameworks for invited interventions beforehand by negotiating 
upon treaties, which may then be invoked in the face of a crisis. 
 
2.2.3. Conditions in Treaty-based Interventions  
Although some prefer invitations to be given ad hoc, many interventions based on 
consent have at least partly been pursued on the basis of a prior treaty.843 In purely legal 
terms, this premise is perfectly acceptable: the invitation to intervene is not subject to 
follow a particular technical procedure, leaving room for treaty-based interventions as 
well.844 Moreover, treaties allowing the deployment of foreign troops do not violate the 
sovereignty of the host State, as in their sovereign capacity any State is entitled to ratify 
a treaty that allows such use of force.845 This is based upon the findings of the S.S. 
Wimbledon case (1923): the ability to enter into international agreements is in itself a 
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manifestation of State sovereignty.846 The commitments that arise from those agreements 
cannot hence be interpreted as violations of the contracting party’s sovereignty, either.847 
The same principle applies to treaties regulating the use of force in a State’s territory.848 
This has led to several agreements of this kind being adopted, with examples including 
the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty and the 1987 Indo—Sri Lanka Accord.849 
However, it is well-acknowledged that these types of treaties are special in nature and 
may thus require equally special interpretation and limitations.850 For one, no treaty, be it 
bilateral or multilateral, may violate norms of ius cogens or contradict the UN Charter.851 
This premise does not entirely make a treaty allowing the use of force on another State’s 
territory void: as long as the treaty is a result of the host State’s genuine sovereign will, 
the agreement can be invoked as a legal basis for military measures. However, it has been 
held that such a treaty cannot act as an irrevocable blanket of authorisation that lasts 
indefinitely: the host State, in its sovereign capacity, must always be able to retract its 
consent.852 As soon as the real-time consent of the territorial State ceases to exist, so does 
the legitimation of the use of force in its territory: any use of force against another State 
will inevitably lead to violations of both the norms of ius cogens and Article 2(4) of the 
Charter.853 Hence, real-time State consent will always overcome the consent presented in 
a prior treaty, even if the treaty is otherwise valid.854 
This right of retraction is important, since when States negotiate treaties, they 
obviously cannot do so with a crystal ball. This means that some clauses of treaties are 
realised in completely different circumstances than imagined during the finalisation of 
the treaty. And indeed, here the forward-looking nature of treaty-based intervention 
presents a problem. Any foreign military intrusion is best executed on a case-by-case 
basis, since this is the most secure method when it comes to effectively honouring the 
host State’s sovereignty:855 as history has shown us, a long-standing military presence 
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can lead to problems, in the worst case even occupation.856 The threat of this scenario 
definitely holds true for invited interventions as well. Moreover, treaties are completed 
with long-term goals in mind. This means that the provisions of such agreements may 
affect the future governments of the contracting parties and therefore limit their 
competence to carve out the political path of their own.857 This issue is present in all 
international agreements, but it is more prominent in treaties that allow the use of force 
on a State’s territory: such agreements are peculiar in nature, and thus they might bind 
the future governments of the contracting States too tightly.858 
The United States intervention in Panama in 1989 is an often-cited example of a treaty-
based intervention gone wrong. The two States had concluded the aforementioned 1977 
Panama Canal Treaty, which contained a provision enabling the US use of force on 
Panama’s territory in the event of certain threats in the Canal or other similar violations.859 
Although Panama had previously accepted the provisions of the treaty, it later denounced 
the clause permitting the use of force on its territory, claiming that any military activities 
could only be executed upon specific request.860 Nevertheless, in December 1989 the 
United States began its military intervention in Panama, with one of its goals being the 
capture and arrest of General Noriega, who was globally viewed as the dictator of 
Panama.861  
The intervention was partially based upon the consent of the host State,862 of both ad 
hoc and treaty-based nature.863 In addition to the 1977 Treaty, the United States held that 
it had extracted consent from what it called the legitimate representative of Panama, a 
new alternative government which had assumed its position at a US military base mere 
moments before the commencement of the intervention.864 Although the Security Council 
Resolution on the matter was blocked due to the use of veto by three permanent member 
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States,865 the General Assembly condemned the intervention.866 However, it has been 
noted that the General Assembly Resolution on the matter shows deep division between 
Western States and the rest of the world: while many Western nations disagreed with 
certain judicial aspects of the US military activities, they still valued the ousting of 
dictatorial rule that resulted from the intervention.867 
Another example can be found from the Treaty of Guarantee of Cyprus (1960), an 
agreement between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.868 The treaty was 
designed to ensure the status of Cyprus and was officially adopted on its independence 
from the United Kingdom. However, the treaty’s provisions, including an Article that 
arguably allowed Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom the right to intervene militarily 
in Cyprus to defend the purposes of the agreement,869 were negotiated before Cyprus had 
officially gained sovereignty.870 This fact was brought into question years later by the 
new government of Cyprus, which held that not only had the treaty been concluded well 
before the proper formation of political community in the country, but that it had also 
been signed by unelected representatives.871 It was hence suggested that the treaty’s 
provisions, especially the ones on the use of force on Cyprus’ territory, could not 
immediately bind the State and should therefore be re-evaluated.872 One can question if 
these ventures were seriously noted within the international community: when Turkey 
militarily intervened in Cyprus in 1974, partially in legal reference to the 1960 Treaty, its 
actions were met with little opposition from other States.873 
For a current example of treaty-based issues, one can turn to the on-going military 
crisis in Ukraine. Although Russia has largely based its intervention in Eastern Ukraine 
upon the ad hoc consent given by the ousted President Yanukovych,874 a treaty allowing 
the former to deploy a certain number of troops on the latter’s territory is in fact in effect 
between these two States.875 With Russia’s increasing military presence and activities in 
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Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea, it has become clear that the scope of the consent 
provided in the treaty has been exceeded, which  — according to the perimeter of the 
Definition of Aggression (1974) — may amount to aggression.876  
In any event, the military activities raise the question of the status of the agreement. 
At this point, most of the international community seems to agree that Russia has violated 
the prohibition on use of force, the principle of non-intervention and territorial 
sovereignty of another State with its actions in Ukraine.877 It has annexed a region of 
Ukraine and according to many accounts, it offers direct military support to the separatists 
involved in the Ukrainian Civil War.878 The situation is grave and in many aspects 
unprecedented in current international relations: under these circumstances, could any 
treaty previously conducted between Ukraine and Russia, in particular one concerning 
the use of force, still be valid? 
This question connects to the last issue concerning interventions based on treaties, the 
situations wherein the previously legitimate government is effectively overthrown in the 
host State. Under such circumstances, the host State is obviously in the midst of internal 
turmoil: however, could a third State still invoke the previously ratified treaty as a basis 
for an invited intervention in favour of the ousted government? By default, the answer is 
no. It has been submitted that in dubious cases, the current will of the host State should 
prevail over the previous one, even if the earlier consent had been issued in the form of a 
forward-looking treaty.879 To put it differently, even a properly conducted treaty should 
become nullified as soon as the territorial State so decides, for whatever reason.880 This 
is obviously an enormous shortcoming of treaty-based interventions, and showcases that 
such agreements have their limitations. 
Of course, in some limited instances an ousted government has been allowed to invite 
foreign intervention to restore its position, even if an opposing faction has taken up the 
power.881 The condition has been that the government’s ousting is due to a third State 
militarily supporting the rivalling faction, thus making the faction’s rise to power a result 
of a foreign armed intervention.882 This scenario remains, at the very least, possible for 
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treaty-based interventions as well, and is no doubt a claim that many States would put 
forward in such situations. However, the inherent limitations of interventions based on 
treaties apply here as well, resulting in ad hoc consent being an indefinitely better option 
in most cases. 
 
2.2.4. Final Remarks on Procedural Requirements 
The procedure on issuing an invitation should have a clear goal: it ought to make sure 
that the consent for the use of force reflects the sovereign will of the host State. While 
this procedure does not include many definite requirements regarding the form of the 
invitation, certain realities must be addressed. These realities are predominantly found in 
truly treaty-based interventions which include no ad hoc consent at all. In such 
circumstances the intervenor must take particular care to conserve the genuine will of the 
host State, especially if the subsequent intervention is executed well after the treaty’s 
conclusion. If this is not achieved, there may be a conflict between former host State 
consent and the current sovereign will. After all, governments are rotated continuously, 
which may create political dissonance over matters concerning the use of force. Such 
dissonance, or even a chance of it, will obviously complicate the possible armed 
intervention tremendously. In fact, it might be best to accompany an invited intervention 
with real-time consent, even if an effective treaty technically allows for it. 
At a more general level, although few conditions concerning the formalities of the 
invitation exist, the matter is not completely free of issues. Most importantly, whether an 
invitation has been given genuinely and free of duress remains a persistent problem, 
regardless of the form of the consent. However, even if States developed sturdier 
requirements for the invitation to intervene, they would be unlikely to eradicate the 
problem. This is one of the issues which falls beyond the reach of international law, as its 
subjects tend to engage in conduct relating to coercion behind closed doors. In other 
words, one would find it practically impossible to impose a legal test which would 
faultlessly determine if the consent is given in accordance with the host State’s actual 
intent. This finding brings us back to one of the core legal issues of contemporary 
intervention by invitation: even though it supposed to reflect the territorial State’s will, it 
is actually often enforced to strengthen the sovereign interests of the intervenor.  
Of course, the procedural conditions detailed here also mirror certain common 
values883 which intervention by invitation serves, albeit often implicitly. For instance, the 
preference for ad hoc interventions can be interpreted as acknowledging that intervention 
by invitation is not a planned feature of the Charter’s framework. Rather, the concept is 
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being put into practice to compensate for the incomplete implementation of collective 
security, making it a form of impromptu first-aid. 
 
2.3. Withdrawing the Invitation: What Procedures Should Be Followed? 
2.3.1. The General Consequences of Withdrawing an Invitation 
Once the objectives of an armed intervention have been reached, the military activities 
by the intervenor should cease. However, this is easier said than done, as bringing the 
military action to an end is one of the most persistent problems of invited interventions. 
This seems counterintuitive, as from the legal perspective, ending an invited intervention 
should be simple enough. As soon as the host State’s consent is extinguished, so should 
the armed intervention.884 This is due to the legal basis that the host State’s consent 
validates the use of force by the intervening State: when the consent no longer exists, the 
use of force becomes unlawful as described in Article 2(4) of the Charter.885 The best way 
of ending the intervention is thus quite straight-forward: the inviting authority retracts the 
invitation, which is then followed by a timely and otherwise appropriate withdrawal of 
any foreign troops on the host State’s territory.886 Failure to comply with this arrangement 
may result in aggression towards the territorial State.887 
But as practice has shown, the matter is more complicated. There have been deep 
disagreements about the manner in which the host State should withdraw its invitation, 
creating an almost ironic juxtaposition with the legal and political leniency given towards 
issuing one.888 It has been argued that the consent may have to be retracted in a particular 
manner for it to be effective: this argument is most often invoked in treaty-based 
interventions. As a result, multiple invited interventions have been dragged out well past 
their initial deadlines, sometimes leading to a de facto occupation of the host State.889 
The key case concerning this matter is DRC v. Uganda, which was adjudged by the 
ICJ in 2005. The case, which was a result of the difficult history of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, partially dealt with the issues over withdrawing the invitation to 
intervene. During the Congolese conflicts, many of its neighbouring States interfered 
militarily: Uganda was one of the States invited to intervene by the Congo, but the two 
States could not find consensus on how and when Uganda’s intervention should have 
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ended.890 More specifically, there was a legal disagreement between the parties over the 
procedure of the invitation’s withdrawal.  
The Applicant held that although it had initially submitted an invitation for Uganda’s 
intervention, this invitation had since been withdrawn, resulting in Uganda’s forces 
failing to fall back in a timely manner.891 Uganda refuted this argument by claiming that 
since the two States had regulated the invited intervention through a written agreement, 
revoking the Congo’s consent should have been done in accordance with that treaty, and 
with a specific mention of Uganda’s troops.892 In other words, Uganda held that the 
withdrawal of the consent was subject to particular conditions unfollowed by the Congo, 
which resulted in the invitation still being valid.893 
In the end, the Court held that in this particular case the withdrawal of consent was not 
subject to any specific conditions.894 It was adjudged that while the Congo and Uganda 
did in fact decide on the terms of the latter’s military intervention in their Agreement, the 
proper invitation to intervene had actually been submitted earlier.895 As it turned out, the 
entire intervention was a result of multiple agreements, some of which were formal while 
others were not.896 As the Congo had given the consent to intervene informally, revoking 
it could not be subject to any conditions, either. 897  In other words, the Agreement, 
although in other respects valid, could not attach any requirements to the invitation’s 
retraction. As often happens, the ICJ’s judgment did not take a definite, more general 
stance on the matter, meaning that it may be difficult to immediately apply the findings 
of the case in other situations. Au contraire, some interpretation is necessary.  
One might approach the Court’s judgment and its general impact on invited 
interventions in many ways. It could be argued that if an invitation to intervene is 
submitted in a particular manner, the withdrawal of the consent must be done similarly. 
This could assume that if the Agreement between the Congo and Uganda had entailed the 
initial invitation to intervene, the consent should have been withdrawn according to its 
conditions. After all, the Court did stress the fact that the invitation to intervene had been 
issued free of any form, and that thus other conditions had to follow suit.898 However, 
certain scholars have been unwilling to accept this conclusion, as ad hoc consent has been 
                                                 
890 DRC v. Uganda, paras. 49-50. 
891 Ibid. 
892 Ibid., para. 50. 
893 Ibid. 
894 Ibid., para. 51. 
895 Ibid., para. 47. 
896 Ibid. 
897 Ibid., para. 51. 
898 Ibid. 
 
  139 
 
 
preferred as the primary base for an armed intervention.899 Otherwise the military action 
will become use of force against the host State, perhaps even aggression; consequently, 
the intervention will turn into a violation of both Article 2(4) of the Charter and a norm 
of ius cogens, while not forgetting the sovereignty of the host State.900 In such cases the 
invitation, regardless of its form, must yield to the Charter and peremptory norms, making 
the consent in question an inapplicable basis for an armed intervention.901 
Another point left ambiguous by the ICJ was the matter of open-ended invitations to 
intervene and how such invitations should be revoked. The Court did not take time to 
adjudge upon the lawfulness of such invitations because it was not pertinent to the case: 
the consent issued by the Congo was not meant to be infinite in nature, and thus legal 
evaluation on the matter was not necessary.902 From the legal perspective, it is dubious if 
truly open-ended invitations can exist. The legality of any invited intervention depends 
on the sovereign will of the host State, and thus the span armed measures must follow 
that State’s intentions.903 In other words, the possible scope of an invited intervention 
should always be inherently limited to the host State’s wishes. As a result, certain 
commentators have submitted that real-time consent must trump ones issued previously, 
a stance which reflects the continued preference for ad hoc consent.904 Of course, this 
does not indicate that previously issued invitations must be discarded altogether, as 
situations can exist in which a State’s later revocation of consent does not serve its true 
sovereign will.905 For instance, this can be the case when the host State is experiencing 
heavy political turbulence.906 
 
2.3.2. Ending an Intervention Due to an Ousted Government 
An invited intervention ideally ends as soon as the host State validly retracts its 
consent. 907  However, sometimes an armed intervention must cease even when an 
invitation has not been withdrawn in such a way, for instance when the position of the 
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inviting authority changes. What should then happen if the legitimate representative is 
effectively overthrown or challenged by another factor during the intervention? May the 
intervenor still consider the invitation to be valid, since it was such at the beginning of 
the operation? Or should the intervention cease in conjunction with the inviting 
authority’s status? 
Most importantly, the legality of intervention by invitation rests upon the sovereign 
capacity of the host State, which should be maintained at the time of the military 
operation. By default, it must be held that if the formerly legitimate representative is no 
longer such, it should also lose its ability to invite a foreign intervention into the State.908 
Consequently, any invitation previously issued by that actor should no longer legitimise 
foreign armed interventions, even those currently in progress, since the allocation of 
power within the territorial State has shifted.909 In fact, continuing an armed intervention 
to support the ousted government under such circumstances could possibly violate the 
duty of non-intervention, since any State should be allowed to carve its political path 
without interference from others.910 
Nonetheless, in past practice certain ousted governments have not immediately lost 
their right to consent to external force.911 In fact, some exiled leaders of internationally 
recognised governments have been allowed to invite foreign interventions quite a 
considerable time after their deposal.912 This could mean that the government being 
ousted may not always result in the nullification of the invitation, at least if the 
government held effective control before.913 Still, these interventions have tended to take 
place with international involvement, thus basing them on commonly agreed goals.914 
Moreover, practice on the matter is far from uniform. For instance, the former Ukrainian 
President Yanukovych was deemed to have lost his position immediately on fleeing his 
homeland in early 2014, which led to the international community condemning the 
                                                 
908 Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force, p. 327. 
909 Ibid. 
910 Friendly Relations, Principle III; Inadmissibility of Intervention, paras. 1-2 and 5; Rights and 
Duties, Articles 1 and 3-4. 
911 de Wet, ‘Modern Practice of Intervention by Invitation’, p. 990. 
912  Fox, ‘Intervention by Invitation’, pp. 385-386; Record of the Security Council’s 3413rd 
Meeting, pp. 4-5, 8, 12-14 and 23; Statement by the President of the Security Council, 26 February 
1998. 
913 de Wet, ‘Modern Practice of Intervention by Invitation’, p. 990. 
914 Fox, ‘Intervention by Invitation’, pp. 385-386; de Wet, ‘Modern Practice of Intervention by 
Invitation’, pp. 996-997; Sierra Leone, SC Res. 1132, paras. 1, 3 and 8; UN Mission in Haiti, SC 
Res. 940, para. 4. 
 
  141 
 
 
Russian intervention based on his invitation.915 Thus, the matter appears to require case-
by-case evaluation, and careful consideration of the political agenda behind any given 
situation.916 
In addition, the main rule may harbour an additional exception that permits the 
intervention to continue even if the inviting authority has been factually deposed. If the 
former government has either been ousted or lost effective control due to a foreign armed 
intervention, its ability to consent to the use of force may have been retained, meaning 
that any current interventions may be allowed to proceed as well. 917  The possible 
application of this exception thus completely depends on the circumstances in which the 
government has had its position wavered, and whether it includes any foreign elements, 
in particular those relating to the use of force. Still, in today’s global community — where 
the line between international correspondence and intervention has become fine— this 
concept may appear too vague. 
Perhaps some support for this argument can be drawn from past remarks over the 
overthrown government’s possibility to invite an armed intervention during a civil war. 
Under this formulation, an ousted government may still consent to a foreign intervention 
in certain situations: that is, when the rebelling forces responsible for the ousting have 
received military support from a third State in a manner that was crucial for its 
advancement.918 In such situations the coup can be deemed a result of the use of force by 
another State, which naturally amounts to a violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter, as 
well as the duty of non-intervention.919 As a consequence, it may be possible for a 
previously invited intervention to continue even in the face of ousting the government, if 
said ousting has happened due to foreign military support. 
This line of argumentation received much support in the past and has also been brought 
up in discussions concerning contemporary invited interventions.920 However, the current 
position of these scenarios may be partially threatened by the trends concerning invited 
interventions. For instance, the rising application of the democratic legitimacy 
requirement may offer complications, as it questions the manner in which the inviting 
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authority should be identified in the first place. 921  This has led certain States to 
recognising opposition forces as the legitimate representative of the host State, denoting 
that they have been willing to deploy force against the traditional government of another 
country.922 The fact that such activity now takes place in the public eye suggests that some 
are willing to bend the definitions on the legitimate representative of the host State: if the 
whole definition is questioned, how could an effectively ousted government continue to 
hold on to its power to invite a foreign intervention? This dilemma may mean that the 
sturdier divisions between governments and oppositions could be in the past, which 
consequently makes the notion of upholding an ousted government’s ability to invite an 
intervention more dubious.  
All in all, the propositions aimed at preserving an ousted government’s position have 
already had their fair share of difficulties before and may face even more in the future. 
When it comes down to it, the current developments may indicate that the application of 
this proposition may be nearly impossible, at least under certain circumstances. This 
mirrors the general development of intervention by invitation. Even though the doctrine 
had its issues during the Cold War, it was still continuously used in fairly predictable 
settings. Conversely, modern invited interventions have not only been applied under 
varying circumstances, but they have also gained many new shades. This has turned the 
doctrine from a steady work horse of Cold War politics into a wild card, which may 
discard the previous confinements instilled upon it by its former owners and find success 
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3. Intervention by Invitation in Different Contexts: Discerning 
the Interests and Goals 
 
The apparently simple intervention by invitation comes with myriad issues, many of 
which relate to the agenda behind it. Accordingly, the doctrine’s practice has been laced 
with varyingly camouflaged individual intents, from which it has been difficult to deduct 
common values. Nonetheless, as discussed earlier, at least the Cold War incarnation of 
intervention by invitation carried a community-serving purpose, albeit not as a starring 
role. Moreover, this tentative connection between apparent unilateralism and de facto 
collectivity in invited interventions does go back several centuries, as evidenced by the 
doctrine’s entwinement with collective security.923 
Thus, intervention by invitation has managed a two-fold part. While the forefront of it 
has touted sovereign interests, the subtext has championed ultimately common goals. In 
other words, the concept simultaneously exhibits internal and international elements, 
which have begun to merge since the conclusion of the Cold War. To examine further the 
interplay between these two sides, we ought to study the concept and its development 
under a range of circumstances. For this purpose, this section will map the practice of 
intervention by invitation in internal unrest, non-international armed conflicts and 
international contexts. 
 
3.1. The Seemingly Unilateral Beginnings: Invited Interventions and Internal 
Unrest 
3.1.1. Internal Unrest as the Premise of Intervention by Invitation Throughout History 
If the frequent and confusing State practice on intervention by invitation has proved 
anything, it is that the concept is most likely applied during internal unrest. After all, the 
host State’s invitation to intervene is only applicable on its own territory: it naturally 
cannot validate armed activities in third States. Moreover, intervention by invitation, at 
least during the loaded atmosphere of the Cold War, has offered the governments of 
various States a powerful and thus lucrative tool in maintaining their political position.924 
This has resulted in the doctrine being applied to help a struggling government to hold on 
to a regime threatened by internal unrest and even attempted coups. 
Historically, the threat of internal unrest has been linked with the very conception of 
intervention by invitation. In traditional international law, this appeared in the efforts that 
occurred in the aftermath of the French Revolution (1789-1799), when many European 
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States began to fear the chance of such uprisings in their own societies.925 The Holy 
Alliance (1815) is regularly cited as perhaps the first attempt to divert such outcomes.926 
The treaty, which was signed by Austria, Prussia and Russia, allowed the contracting 
States the right to intervene to restore order in the face of such adversities.927  The 
Quadruple Alliance, which included these three States in addition to Great Britain, was 
also established during the same year.928 The Quadruple Alliance was later expanded to 
the Quintuple Alliance, when France was allowed to join the fold in 1818.929 
These alliances found certain success in practice, for instance in 1821 when Austrian 
troops intervened in Naples and Turin, and again in 1823 when France put out an attempt 
at independence in Spain.930 Nevertheless, the ultimate success of these alliances was 
hampered by the conflicting views on intervention among the States.931 This was in 
particular manifested in the views of Great Britain, which had officially disassociated 
itself from interventionist alliances by 1823.932 Following this trend, the dissolution of 
the interventionist system began soon after. 933  Eventually, only the Triple Alliance 
comprising Austria, Prussia and Russia, — the founding trio of such interventionist 
treaties — persisted for decades, before ceasing to exist in 1848.934 
When observing these historical developments, one can discern that the treaties did 
not result in long-lasting alliances which would have yielded numerous interventions to 
observe in retrospect. Of course, these collective treaties are not the only examples of 
intervention based on invitation at the time: for instance, the French occupation of Syria 
in 1860-1861 is partially attributed to the consent issued by the territorial State following 
the massacre of thousands of Maronite Christians. 935  Nonetheless, the concept of 
intervention in another State’s affairs was still fairly new at the time. Consequently, the 
interventions of this era can be interpreted as having had ambiguous legacies that do not 
solely affect intervention by invitation: they can also be counted as attempts at collective 
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security and humanitarian intervention, depending on one’s perspective on the matter.936 
Nonetheless, it ought to also be observed that intervention by invitation, while 
superficially invoked to attend to internal matters, already bore a collective element. In 
fact, the alliances discussed above had been born out of the desire to avoid a repeat of 
Napoleon’s wars. 937  To this end, they sought to promote regional peace through 
maintaining internal stability of respective States. 
Following this examination of the 1800s, it is pertinent to skip over to the UN era. 
After all, the most notable invited interventions of the early 1900s took place in the 
contexts of non-international armed conflicts, which will be discussed later in this 
chapter.938 The Cold War, however, was filled with examples of invited interventions 
during internal unrests, which tended to take place in geopolitically strategic States. The 
interventions were often staged in the opposing ‘Blocs’ by the time’s superpowers, the 
United States and the Soviet Union, in an attempt to maintain their status in their mutual 
power struggle.939 As the two States avoided direct conflict with each other, holding as 
many allied governments as possible proved vital for both: they were thus willing to 
intervene militarily if an ally was facing internal difficulties. 940  This led to certain 
troubling restorations of governments in distress, where the continuing legitimacy of the 
inviting authority was questioned. Moreover, at times, third States intervened in order to 
quell uprisings: these rebellions appeared to threaten the political influence of the 
intervening State, making the interventions dubious from the perspective of the right to 
self-determination.941 
A prominent illustration is the Soviet-led intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
During the Cold War, Czechoslovakia was one of the well-acknowledged satellite States 
under the influence of the Soviet Union, also known as the Soviet Bloc.942 This situation 
did not sit wholly well within Czechoslovakia, and hence in the late 1960s, certain 
movements tried to unleash the country from such foreign influence. These movements 
culminated in the Prague Spring of 1968, which aimed at the liberalisation of the 
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country’s internal and external politics.943 The Soviet Union did not respond to these 
developments kindly: throughout 1968 its troops more or less questionably remained in 
Czechoslovakia, while the Soviet leaders expressed concern for the country’s situation.944 
The Soviet troops did eventually leave Czechoslovakia’s territory in early August 1968, 
only to return a couple of weeks later with other Warsaw Pact forces in order to execute 
what turned out to be a wide-scale occupation of the State.945 The intervention was 
partially attributed to a purported consent of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, even 
though various commentators expressed confusion and doubts over who exactly invited 
the intervention.946 The Czechoslovakian government of the time stated that no invitation 
had been supplied, as it instead maintained that the military presence on its territory was 
illegal.947 Hence, it appears that the supposed invitation was fabricated, making the use 
of force against international law.948 
Another textbook example is the US-led military intervention in Grenada in 1983.949 
Formerly a British colony, Grenada attained Statehood in 1974.950 However, due to the 
country’s position as a Commonwealth State, the position of the official — albeit 
ceremonial — Head of State continued to be held by Queen Elizabeth II, who was 
represented in Grenada by a Governor General. 951  The State naturally had its own 
government, which was initially headed by Sir Eric Gairy, considered by some sources 
to be corrupt.952 In March 1979 a left-wing coup was staged in the country, resulting in 
Gairy’s ousting and the establishment of a revolutionary council headed by Maurice 
Bishop.953 The coup stirred internal unrest in the then-new-born country, which struggled 
to find a way between attempts at building democracy and a more radical regime.954 
During this time Sir Paul Scoon, the Governor General of the time, managed to maintain 
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his formal status, but this position was largely considered just as ceremonial as the 
aforementioned Head of State it represented.955 Bishop was later ousted and executed in 
October 1983, and a new revolutionary council led by General Austin took over the 
State.956  
These controversial developments did not sit well with the United States, amongst 
other States in the region. A few days after Bishop’s demise, armed forces consisting of 
both US troops and those of the Organisation of East Caribbean States intervened in 
Grenada.957 The armed forces managed to take control of the island and end the unrest by 
the end of October, with the US military maintaining their presence in Grenada until 
December 1983.958 Akin to many Cold War military interventions, legally the armed 
activities were based on multiple justifications. 959  One of them was the purported 
invitation from the Governor General Scoon, whose position within Grenada was 
doubtful at best. 960  Overall, the international reaction to the intervention was 
predominantly negative.961 When it comes to intervention by invitation in particular, only 
a handful of States bothered to take a direct stance on the matter; however, these responses 
were not in favour of the intervention.962 France — a notable intervener upon request 
itself — stated that the concept was not applicable in this particular case, as no consent 
from the legitimate representative of Grenada had been retrieved.963 
The Cold War bore many similarly questionable invited interventions into cases of 
internal unrest;964 however, for fear of turning this dissertation into a pure case montage, 
it is not advisable to go through all of them. Instead, attention should be turned to the 
position of intervention since the end of this political crisis. Intervention by invitation as 
a concept encountered a change after the Cold War, which can be seen as having reflected 
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its application during internal unrests as well. Since the early 1990s, much of the 
doctrine’s focus has been dedicated to Africa, where consent has been invoked as a legal 
basis for interventions between regional States.965 However, these interventions have 
contained issues which have ranged from the validity of the invitation to the context of a 
civil war.966 In any event, this points towards a trend of having more political balance 
between the intervenor and the host State. Nevertheless, many problems persist in this 
setting, and they will be discussed in the next subsection. 
 
3.1.2. Issues Concerning Intervention by Invitation and Internal Unrest  
Applying intervention by invitation in cases of internal unrest has been natural in both 
the past and present, but this practice does not come without inherent legal issues. Perhaps 
the biggest of these complications is identifying when the unrest escalates into a full-scale 
conflict. This is of particular importance, for intervening by invitation in civil wars has 
been considered unlawful in the past.967 However, even internal unrest short of an armed 
conflict is not completely free of such doubt. The entire legality of intervention by 
invitation rests on the assumption that it occurs at the behest of sovereign consent, which 
has been properly issued by a legitimate authority. However, the mere need to invite 
foreign military intervention may signal that the internal unrest has escalated to a point at 
which the existence of such authority can be questioned.968 In other words, the fact that 
armed intervention is necessary to enforce the political apparatus within the host State 
may already signify the loss of the government’s mandate from the people, perhaps even 
the presence of a civil war.969 
This issue relates to the concept of sovereignty and the government as the embodiment 
the State’s will. Solving the problem can result in different outcomes, depending on one’s 
perspective. If one were to follow the idea of sovereignty endorsed by Thomas Hobbes, 
this matter would not be a big problem: since its power is almost unlimited, a State is 
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accountable to no one, including its own people.970 It is therefore entitled to use measures, 
even the most extreme ones, against them. 971  However, more modern ideas have 
emphasised the validity of the government being based upon the will of its people, in one 
way or another.972 This makes the use of force against the people of the State problematic, 
and eliminating internal unrest with an invited intervention may very well contravene it. 
These concerns have been at least partially addressed by the rise of the right to self-
determination, according to which the people of any given State must be free to decide 
inter alia on their political, cultural and economic matters.973 Since the end of the Cold 
War, it has become increasingly accepted that a State may not validly invite foreign 
intervention with the purpose of containing thoroughly internal insurgencies of the 
population.974 How invited interventions actually pan out is another matter. Still, there 
has been development which affords more power to the people, which makes the political 
prospect of using invited interventions against them less alluring. 
Despite these issues, internal unrest still poses the least problems for intervention by 
invitation. As will be argued later, incidents and conflicts with international elements 
bring forward many issues, as do full-scale internal armed conflicts. It could even be said 
that cases of internal unrest provide the most natural scenario for invited interventions, 
albeit with certain limitations and complications. However, it may currently be difficult 
to draw the line between internal unrest and non-international armed conflict, particularly 
given the transitions the latter has gone through since the Cold War. Examining non-
international conflicts and invited interventions in a separate section is therefore pertinent, 
and this task will be undertaken next. 
 
3.2. Injecting Invited Interventions into Non-International Armed Conflicts 
3.2.1. The Threshold of Non-International Conflict and Invited Interventions 
If putting invited interventions into practice in the context of internal unrest has been 
difficult enough, so have been its appearances in other circumstances. In fact, one of the 
biggest debates over invited interventions has concerned its relationship with non-
international armed conflicts, sometimes also referred to as civil wars.975 While this topic 
is heavily featured in contemporary discussions, its roots date back centuries. 976 
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Consequently, the issue has also received wide-spread attention since the conception of 
the United Nations and its scheme for the use of force.977 
During the first few decades of the UN era, it was held that once the threshold of a 
non-international conflict was crossed, intervention by invitation became inapplicable.978 
It was argued that foreign military intervention in any civil war could result in a violation 
of the principle of non-intervention, as armed activities of other States could affect the 
outcome of the strife.979 The earlier, cynical position was thus that all States should have 
the opportunity to settle their own internal differences, even through the means of war.980 
The participants of the international community, including the United Nations, were 
expected to stay neutral, since the matter concerned a single State’s domestic order rather 
than commonly upheld values.981  
In addition to this general observation, a particular problem persists. Once a situation 
escalates into an internal armed conflict, the host State may no longer have an effective 
government that could legitimately issue a plea for foreign intervention.982 This approach 
goes hand in hand with the effective control argument: once the warring factions in the 
State have gained enough leverage for the situation to be regarded as a civil war, the 
government’s effective control over the territory and population must be deemed to have 
been lost.983 
However, this premise has been challenged by States and scholars alike. Even during 
the Cold War, when such practice was widely considered unlawful, select States would 
regularly intervene in internal conflicts, most often to support the government against 
rebel forces.984 The responses to such actions ranged from mixed to negative, which often 
led to States either denying their involvement or arguing the absence of an internal armed 
conflict, suggesting that the inadmissibility of foreign intervention in civil wars itself was 
not questioned. 985  More recently, there has been a change towards a more lenient 
approach. Especially during the new millennium, States have expressed their acceptance 
of certain interventions into civil wars, a stance that has also been echoed by some 
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scholars.986 Consequently, it has been held that the increasing State practice may point to 
a change in the principle of non-intervention towards non-international armed 
conflicts.987  
Still, one should not rush to conclusions. As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, the 
principle of non-intervention — and consequently the application of invited interventions 
— may not be modified so easily.988 Thorough research on the evolution of internal 
conflicts and unilateral interventions is therefore necessary before making any grander 
statements. Moreover, before moving on to the application of invited interventions in non-
international armed conflicts, we should first define exactly what denotes such a conflict. 
As noted previously, the line between a mere internal unrest and conflict can be thin and 
subject to various interpretations. In its simplest definition, a civil war denotes an armed 
conflict that takes place within a single State,989 where all of the factions engaged in the 
fighting are domestic in nature.990 While this definition is broad, sporadic and isolated 
instances of internal disturbance and tension have been left outside its scope: this means 
that acts such as riots and disorganised violence do not yet denote the presence of a civil 
war.991 
But how does one tell if violence against the State’s government has become organised 
enough to mark the beginning of civil strife? Traditional law on the matter tended to 
concentrate on the status of belligerency: once the government of the State was met with 
an opponent worthy of being labelled as a belligerent, the matter could be called a civil 
war wherein the opposing factions were on an equal footing.992 However, if the opposing 
forces were merely identified as rebels or insurgents, the case was considered to be a 
situation that the government of the State had the agency to handle effectively, meaning 
that no clear internal strife had yet commenced.993 Although this status of belligerency 
may not have the same immediate importance as before, it can be used to determine when 
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an internal disturbance changes from sporadic to organised: if a formidable military 
faction has emerged, it may signify a possible non-international armed conflict.994 
Politically speaking, drawing the line between internal unrest and civil war has been 
difficult for many States. This may not only be due to the two concepts appearing to be 
interchangeable. Rather, it may be the outcome of the general principle of neutrality that 
States have agreed to follow when another country is dealing with civil strife. 
Furthermore, traditionally a civil war has marked the loss of governmental control in the 
host State, which inevitably causes some disruption in international relations between 
countries.995 The conduct of third States in the face of such conflicts has hence been rather 
erratic, from traditional law to modern times. 
 
3.2.2. The Principle of Non-Intervention, Civil Wars and Intervention by Invitation: 
from the Traditional Approach to the First Decades of the UN Era 
The basis of the UN era’s initial position on interventions in civil wars can be traced 
back to traditional law, which felt conflicted over the issue. This was not due to a lack of 
practice: foreign interventions in civil wars were not uncommon in the pre-Charter era. 
However, it does not follow that their legality was free of doubt. Ever since the first 
emergence of current-style interventions during the 1800s, the concept has faced 
contrasting opinions and much criticism, especially when the use of force has been put 
into the mix.996  
It should thus come as no surprise that despite the persistent practice, military 
intervention on invitation in civil wars was considered ultimately undesirable from the 
legal point of view.997 This was partially due to the legal assumptions held at the time. It 
was argued that once a country had been plunged into a civil war, the status and territorial 
control of the government had been challenged by its opponents in the conflict, making 
them belligerents.998 As a result, outside interference, both military and non-military, was 
not encouraged: under certain circumstances such assistance was evidently considered to 
be prohibited.999 However, it was also claimed that once the opposition had gained the 
status of belligerency, both parties to the civil war could be regarded as holding the title 
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of sovereign.1000 Consequently, it was argued, albeit not universally, that such a situation 
could have enabled foreign military assistance upon the invitation of either party.1001 
Practice followed this muddled legal position with matching incoherence: some of this 
dissonance may be attributed the fine line between internal unrest and armed conflict, as 
well as the oft-disputed definitions of belligerency. While many States were reluctant to 
take part in conflicts of other countries, some would occasionally pitch their support for 
both governments and oppositions engaged in armed activities. Such was the case when 
the United Kingdom sent military aid to Portugal in 1826 in order to prevent a budding 
rebellion.1002 The Brits would then intervene again, this time with France and Russia, in 
favour of Greek insurgents during their struggle against the Turkish empire in 1827.1003 
In addition, the American Civil War (1861-1865) saw many European States debating 
their possible position in the conflict, but in the end most Western nations decided to stay 
uninvolved on the matter, deeming it an internal affair of the United States.1004 This stance 
was echoed by the United States itself.1005  
The American Civil has been seen as a starting point for conduct that expected States 
to refrain from military interference,1006 and by the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) States 
had reached a tentative agreement over a principle of neutrality during civil wars in other 
countries.1007 Many European States even concluded the Non-Intervention Agreement of 
August 1936, declaring that they would not intervene in the then on-going civil war in 
Spain.1008 While this should have resulted in no armed support being given to any of the 
belligerents of the Spanish Civil War, many States — including Italy, Germany and an 
array of other countries — decided to provide such assistance.1009 This situation goes on 
to show that States were not fully ready to relinquish the opportunity of intervening in 
non-international armed conflicts, even if a tentative legal framework on the matter had 
been agreed upon. 
Still, the conclusion of the Second World War marked a new beginning for 
international relations, which leads us to civil wars in the UN era. With the adoption of 
the Charter it became evident that States were not only stressing the need for the non-use 
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of force, but also for non-intervention.1010 Although the norm is absent from the Charter, 
the principle of non-intervention is mirrored in Article 2(7), which prohibits the UN from 
interfering in the affairs of its member States.1011 The Article has been interpreted as 
having initially extended to the matter of non-international armed conflicts.1012 This 
shows the will of States to retain a significant amount of control over their own matters 
despite their membership in the organisation. The principle of non-intervention, amongst 
many other factors, was seen to have covered the matter of civil wars as well: it was 
largely held that each State could decide on its own internal order even through an internal 
armed conflict.1013 Other States were expected to stay almost completely uninvolved on 
such issues, leaving little to no room for armed measures of any kind.1014  
As it turned out, internal conflicts soon dethroned international ones as the biggest 
issue concerning the use of armed force, bringing civil wars to the forefront of the 
international community.1015 However, the legal stance that other States should stay out 
of the civil wars of other States remained mostly intact. The General Assembly touched 
upon the matter several times and always maintained that foreign intervention in a civil 
war is against international law.1016 This did not stop select States from intervening in 
such conflicts, however.1017 It should come as no surprise that the most powerful States 
in the world were the most willing to task themselves with intervening in civil wars of 
others. 1018  As these non-international conflicts often held geopolitical interest, the 
superpowers saw them as opportunities — or even unavoidable necessities — in their 
power struggle. Hence, the United States, the Soviet Union, France and the United 
Kingdom, eighty percent of the permanent Security Council members, all played a major 
role in various civil wars. 1019  This yet again reflects the intertwined position of 
intervention by invitation and the short-comings of United Nations’ collective security: 
with the Security Council paralysed due to continuous impasses between its permanent 
members, those same States took to using unilateral armed measures as a de facto 
replacement.1020 
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Still, the unilateral practices of the permanent members were not completely alike. Of 
these four States, the United Kingdom and France focused on intervening in civil wars 
that took place in their former colonies.1021 The position of France particularly became 
prominent, as it not only intervened in various countries, predominantly in Africa, but 
also multiple times.1022 In comparison to this, the activities of the United Kingdom were 
less notable.1023 The United States and the Soviet Union were concentrating on ensuring 
their political affluence in the host States, and thus supported governments or factions 
that strengthened this agenda.1024  The two rivalling States took much care to avoid 
immediate conflict with each other, but they would often seize the opportunity to 
intervene in other conflicts taking place elsewhere in the world.1025 Such activity spared 
the superpowers from direct confrontation, which many feared would have had disastrous 
consequences. Many of these armed measures took place in the form of proxy wars,1026 
but direct measures were by no means unheard of either. 
Still, it ought to be noted that Cold War military interventions in civil wars, either 
directly or via proxy, were often problematic. A famous example is the Soviet armed 
intervention in Afghanistan in late 1979, when the latter had been overcome with internal 
turmoil and continuous coups.1027 The armed intervention, which was partially based 
upon the purported sovereign consent and a pre-existing treaty, resulted in the 
establishment of a new Afghan government, which unsurprisingly was one with a pro-
Soviet stance.1028 The matter of who the Soviets originally claimed to have invited their 
military intervention remained a baffling mystery. 1029  The mere existence of such 
authority is highly unlikely as even if one of the factions in Afghanistan invited the Soviet 
intervention, it was effectively and promptly ousted by the same State that it had asked 
for help. 1030  Hence, the international response to the incident largely dismissed the 
possibility of the intervention by invitation argument, instead stressing that the Soviet 
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military activity violated various norms of international law, including the ban on use of 
force, the duty of non-intervention and the self-determination of peoples.1031 For these 
reasons, the Security Council attempted to condemn the Soviet intervention in one of its 
Resolutions, which was blocked by the veto of the Soviet Union itself.1032  
The Soviet arch nemesis of the time, the United States, responded to and fuelled the 
frequent Soviet interventions in civil wars with similar conduct. Many of its interventions 
were deemed to have spited the on-going civil wars in the target States. For instance, 
during the Nicaraguan internal conflict it offered direct support to the contras, resulting 
in the violations of non-use of force and the principle of non-intervention.1033 Moreover, 
the United States delivered covert support for the Afghan insurgents after the 
aforementioned Soviet measures developed into the Afghanistan War, a move which 
brought the two rivals within the sphere of the same armed conflict.1034 However, since 
the US involvement took place via proxy, the superpowers managed to avoid direct 
confrontation with one another, further proving the raw sensibility that purported 
intervention by invitation provided at the time.1035 
As noted above, the Cold War was also characterised by the military interventions of 
powerful States in the civil wars of their former colonies. France is a famous example, 
and its frequent activity eventually resulted in open mockery of its foreign policy.1036 For 
instance, the State’s frequent military interventions in Chad raised some eyebrows 
between 1966 and 1989, as the view of many was that the country had fallen into a long-
lasting civil war.1037 Throughout the Cold War, France’s position on the conflict was not 
straight-forward. It either denied any military involvement, or defended its right to 
intervene upon the valid request of Chad’s authorities, whichever they were at the 
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time.1038 Moreover, the State sporadically invoked the claims of collective self-defence, 
as during this time, Chad was also engaging in a conflict with Libyan troops who 
supported a faction of the civil war.1039 France’s actions were not condemned, which 
would seem to suggest that other States approved of them;1040 however, this could be due 
to Libya’s involvement in the conflicts, which legally made the matter a question of 
collective self-defence rather than pure intervention by invitation. 
Still, this practice does not necessarily mean that States sought to disband the duty of 
non-intervention in civil wars. Rather, the intervening States would attempt to deny the 
existence of a conflict of such magnitude instead of challenging the legal premise.1041 
They sometimes even refuted intervening in a civil war altogether, in particular when 
support was given to rebelling factions, which further seems to stress the legal assumption 
that such actions were unlawful at the time, even in the mind of the frequent 
intervenors.1042 Moreover, the international response to such interventions was often 
predominantly negative, and not least due to the duty of non-intervention.1043 This seems 
to suggest that the Cold War’s invited interventions in civil wars were a result of pure 
political necessity rather than a focused attempt to modify existing legal rules on the 
matter. Such a statement would conform to the opinion of the ICJ in Nicaragua at least, 
as in its judgment the Court found that the principle of non-intervention appeared to be 
misused rather than developed by certain activities of select States.1044 
Still, as noted in the thesis, there was a legal proposition according to which foreign 
armed support to the government even in civil wars was plausible if the rebels had been 
receiving external support as well.1045 In such situations, the government’s position was 
interpreted to have been destabilised due to foreign use of force. Within the limits of this 
argument, the host State’s government was allowed to invite foreign interventions even 
if it had lost effective control over the country — the condition was that this complete 
loss of control had happened due to the opposition receiving military help from another 
State.1046 However, the position of this proposition was already vague back then, and thus 
its lasting legacies to foreign interventions in civil wars are unclear. 
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3.2.3. The Modern Developments: Extracting Common Interests from Non-
International Armed Conflicts 
The status of civil wars as internal matters of each individual State took a dramatic 
turn at the dawn of the 1990s. With the Security Council revitalised, it took to exercising 
collective use of force much more regularly than previously.1047 Perhaps surprisingly, the 
Council’s focus was firmly set on internal conflicts, even those that had passed the 
threshold of a civil war.1048 Although collective use of force was designed to be applied 
in inter-State conflicts, this new setting became the norm for Security Council action as 
it decided to authorise military action in various civil wars.1049 This means that periods of 
internal unrest and non-international armed conflicts may threaten or breach international 
peace and security as detailed in Chapter VII, and ultimately even warrant collective 
military measures.1050 This extension of collective security has been accepted with the 
international community, and few arguments have been over any purported violations of 
the principle of non-intervention.1051 
Accepting that the Security Council may authorise collective measures in response to 
civil wars indeed affected the relation between such conflicts and the principle of non-
intervention. In other words, civil wars can no longer be seen as purely internal affairs, 
leading to a partial modification of the principle of non-intervention. Hence, determining 
that non-international armed conflicts can infringe international peace and security has 
more far-reaching consequences than immediately imagined. Still, the current practice of 
collective security should not be interpreted as having completely erased the internal 
nature of civil wars. Rather, it means that the term ‘non-international armed conflict’ is 
no longer such a shield of invincibility that it renders all outside interference 
inexhaustible.  
But how has this modification affected intervention by invitation? Very much, some 
may suggest. The past few decades have been filled with military interventions in civil 
wars, and the international community’s responses have been more accepting than during 
the Cold War.1052 It would therefore seem that the extended scope of collective security 
has been extended to unilateral armed interventions at least somewhat, which naturally 
includes invited interventions as well. A current example of this is the US-led armed 
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intervention in Iraq, which started in 2014 after the Iraqi government asked for a military 
assistance in order to combat ISIS.1053 As keen observers would know, Iraq has faced 
much instability, generated by both internal and foreign influences. At the beginning of 
2003, the country was invaded by the United States during the ‘War on Terror’, as the 
latter deemed the former to be a threat to both national and international security.1054 
Although the US intervention was widely deemed to have no basis in international 
law,1055 their forces remained in Iraq until 2011: this military presence was partially based 
upon an agreement between the two countries.1056  
After the United States had left Iraq, the country faced fragmentation and the looming 
threat of extremism, which was soon realised in the form of the terrorist group ISIS.1057 
Iraq was then plunged into what would traditionally be described as a civil war, through 
which ISIS managed to make notable headway by seizing large portions of Iraq’s 
territory.1058 In the summer of 2014, Iraq’s incumbent government issued a direct plea for 
a foreign intervention, which was soon responded to by the United States and a collection 
of other countries.1059 A coalition of States was formed to take active military measures 
against ISIS, which have occurred both in and out of Iraq.1060 The conflict in Iraq could 
be seen as a purely internal one: however, due to ISIS’s status as a terrorist organisation 
and its attempts to build a completely new State, the matter is also international in nature. 
Hence, the US-led intervention in Iraq has not met too much opposition, despite the 
elements of a non-international armed conflict and the arguable loss of effective control 
by the Iraqi government.1061 
It would seem that making a distinction between an internal and international armed 
conflict is getting more difficult by the minute, especially when international terrorist 
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organisations are concerned. This, too, has had an effect on foreign interventions in civil 
wars, as nowadays such actions are often justified with self-defence alongside host State 
consent.1062 One may therefore determine that the definite, all-encompassing ban on 
foreign intervention in civil wars has been lifted; however, this does not mean that third 
States can freely intervene in such conflicts. The duty of non-intervention has not ceased 
to exist but rather has evolved to allow flexibility over foreign involvement in internal 
conflicts. This means that any unilateral intervention directly aimed at matters that solely 
belong to the host State is still not allowable.1063 Instead, foreign armed intervention in a 
civil war may only be permissible when pursuant of global interests, such as matters 
concerning collective security or international terrorism.1064 
This statement sounds difficult to put into practice. However, certain distinguishable 
lines must be drawn, as unwarranted unilateral interventions in civil wars simply cannot 
be a viable option. If individual States are allowed to freely support any faction of any 
internal conflict, it could simultaneously annihilate the principle of non-intervention and 
deeply infringe on the notion of sovereignty.1065 This option had already been examined 
by the ICJ in Nicaragua, and with a negative conclusion at that.1066 The Court famously 
held that the principle of non-intervention would practically cease to exist if a foreign 
armed intervention could be invited by any establishment other than the properly 
distinguished government.1067 Therefore, utterly unilateral interventions by invitation at 
the behest of mere rebels in a civil war must remain inapplicable, at least as long they are 
executed free of commonly accepted goals.1068 
In addition, the finding made by the ICJ leads us to an additional and equally important 
issue that still needs to be resolved: the effective control test, which still stands as the 
primary means to assess the legitimate representative.1069 Hence, even if we are to accept 
that a unilateral foreign armed intervention is allowable in a civil war, the inviting 
authority must still hold an acceptable amount of control over the host State.1070 If the 
situation has escalated into a fully-fledged armed conflict, the mere existence of such an 
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authority might be impossible.1071 This dilemma is referred to as the negative equality 
principle, according to which outsiders to the conflict are in no position to make such 
deliberations, leaving non-involvement the best option. 1072  However, the negative 
equality principle is regarded as quite a flimsy one, as certain States tend to discard it in 
their activities.1073 Still, it might seem pertinent to state that intervention by invitation in 
civil wars is most clearly permissible when the inviting body has been able to maintain 
or claim necessary effective control over the territory of the host State, or it has been 
recognised as legitimate by the international community at large.1074  
However, losing such control does not necessarily denote the inability to invite a 
foreign intervention, at least not immediately.1075 As noted earlier in this thesis, the 
effective control test does allow some flexibility over the loss of control.1076 Even long-
lasting civil wars do not always strip a legitimate representative of its authority, a scenario 
realised in the on-going Malian conflict, as well as the military intervention in Yemen.1077 
It would thus not seem too far-fetched to imagine that if a faction manages to claim 
effective control over the host State, it too could invite a foreign military intervention. 
However, sometimes the emergence of such an amount of control is not plausible. In any 
event, the means exhausted to gain such a position during an armed conflict are bound to 
be questionable and a far cry from the international principles ideally attributed to the 
legitimate representative of any State. Of course, in its purest form the effective control 
argument does not care about such nuances: however, the limitations imposed by the self-
determination of the peoples, for instance, might beg to differ.1078  
With this in mind, we should once again discuss the Syrian Civil War, which began in 
2011 and has seen the recent emergence of ISIS as one of the war’s factions.1079 All in 
all, the situation is complicated: various factions exist, all of them holding a significant 
amount of Syrian territory under their control. As a result, if the effective control test is 
exhausted, the outcome is that of an impasse. Despite this premise, certain States have 
pledged their support to one of the parties of the conflict. Russia has supported the Syrian 
government’s regime throughout the civil war, whereas the United States has — albeit 
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first very carefully — backed a faction of the rebels.1080 For the longest time, it was 
indicated that both States had submitted military support in the conflict; in 2014 the 
United States took a step further when its coalition decided to launch military strikes 
against ISIS in the Syrian territory.1081 In what can only be described as irony, the Syrian 
government seemed to welcome these strikes despite the United States not consulting 
them on the matter.1082  
The situation has now been further complicated by Russia staging a direct military 
intervention at the invitation of al-Assad and with the goal of combatting ISIS.1083 This 
means that the former arch enemies of the Cold War are each supporting what they 
purport to be the legitimate representative of Syria. In addition, both States seem to be 
basing their argumentation on values such as democratic legitimacy, which does not yet 
stand as the sole way to identify the representative of the host State.1084 
It is possible to argue that the effective control test has been fused with the need to 
validate the certain democratic legitimacy of the inviting authority. However, even if this 
qualification is used in the case of Syria, the stalemate is still unavoidable: given the 
situation, it is impossible to detect the democratic will of the Syrian people. Hundreds of 
thousands of people have lost their lives and millions have fled the country to seek 
asylum. In other words, defining the democratic will of the State is a near-impossible 
task, and something that individual States cannot solve by themselves.1085 
Legally speaking, situations such as the Syrian Civil War remind us of the reason 
intervention by invitation still exists. It is a practice that should not be needed anymore 
but it continues to be deployed due to the continued failures to centralise the use of 
force.1086 Hence, intervention by invitation is a controversial backup plan to collective 
use of force. In the legal sense, however, it is much more limited than collective security, 
which has been warranted with practically unlimited boundaries by the Charter.1087 By all 
legal and political measures, the Syrian Civil War is a matter that should belong to the 
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Security Council, but it has been unable to bring the conflict towards a resolution.1088 
Intervention by invitation has been brought up as an alternative, but it is simply unable to 
deal with the matter efficiently, at least in the long term. If anything, the various foreign 
interventions by different States with conflicting goals have made the situation even more 
chaotic and dangerous, as evidenced by the Russian military jet downed by Turkey in 
2015.1089 The military interventions may thus have prolonged the conflict at hand. 
However, the political adaptability of intervention by invitation has made its 
appearance in the Syrian conflict predictable. Although it lacks the practically unlimited 
legal discretion allowed to collective security, its approach complements the political 
interests of individual States. The major powers have been unwilling to find consensus 
on the Syrian Civil War, and intervention by invitation allows them to seek their own 
resolutions. Of course, the developments following the Paris attacks in November 2015 
may have given hope on a more uniform response to the matter. The Security Council has 
already called for the UN member States to take action to combat ISIS, but it has stopped 
short of authorising military action in Syria or elsewhere.1090  
It is still much too early to assess the full effect of these developments. As evidenced 
by the 9/11 attacks and their aftermath, the immediate global sympathy that stems from 
terrorist attacks can easily subside if the victim State resorts to its own idea of justice, one 
which discards the properly established legal norms.1091 In addition, much of the on-going 
argumentation for the necessity of deploying armed force in the Syrian territory does not 
seem to contribute towards new legal criteria on the matter. While necessity is the mother 
of invention, morphing such inventions into new law may not be so simple, as noted by 
the ICJ on multiple occasions.1092 It thus remains to be seen if the development will be 
confined to our time, or if it will contribute towards the formation of new international 
law. 
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3.3. Common Values and Sovereign Interests Entwined: Invited 
Interventions under Internationalised Circumstances 
3.3.1. The Shift Toward More Explicitly Internationalised Invited Interventions 
As noted, intervention by invitation has tended to carry along certain themes 
throughout its existence. While most immediately invoked to serve individual interests, 
the doctrine’s practice has been laced with collective elements too, such as its beginnings 
being connected to the conception of collective security. 1093  Nonetheless, these two 
ingredients have tended to play clearly defined, separate parts, up until the conclusion of 
the Cold War at least. However, this separation may have been surprisingly superficial, 
for intervention by invitation during the UN era has always carried a subtext of 
maintaining a sustainable global balance despite its outward appearance. Of late, this 
subtext may be evolving into an actual context. In fact, consensual use of force has 
recently found itself more immediately bound with external elements and common 
interests, which has challenged its infamous image.  
This change is manifested in the circumstances the concept has been applied in, as 
these contexts have increasingly included elements of explicitly international nature. For 
instance, the French intervention in Mali in 2013 was not only pursued following a 
decision to deploy collective security by the Security Council;1094 the intervention was 
also executed due to the presence of a terrorist organisation in the Malian conflict.1095 
Thus, while the French intervention could be regarded as a throwback to the State’s Cold 
War interventionist policy, it came with new globalised flavours.1096 
Of course, a scenario such as the French intervention in Mali has always been 
allowable within the conceptual sphere of intervention by invitation. Although the more 
traditional landscape for the concept is the internal matters of the host State, it may also 
be exhausted in international situations, perhaps even in certain circumstances involving 
immediate inter-State force. Still, it is subject to many limitations that may make its use 
impractical. The biggest hurdle of using invited interventions in an international conflict 
comes with its core premise: the invitation of the host State may validly legitimise the use 
of force on its own territory only.1097  
This makes the use of invited interventions as a response to external threats a less 
alluring option, as it cannot act as a justification for military activities that take place 
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beyond the host State’s borders.1098 Unilateral use of force on such a spectrum is limited 
to the right of self-defence following an armed attack.1099 Still, despite this limitation, in 
some situations intervention by invitation could be useful in combatting the external use 
of force short of an armed attack, especially since the option of self-defence, at least 
according to the wording of Article 51 of the Charter, should be unavailable during such 
circumstances.1100 After all, the use of force comes in many shades,1101 against which 
intervention by invitation may offer valuable countermeasures.  
In addition to external threats short of armed attacks, the issue of applying intervention 
by invitation in globalised circumstances has become progressively more important due 
to the muddled definitions between internal and international conflicts. Ever since the 
Security Council created the precedent that non-international armed conflicts may 
threaten or violate international peace and security, such strife has often seen international 
military involvement by individual States.1102 Whether this unilateral activity is legally 
allowable is certainly questionable. 1103  However, this uncertainty has not stopped 
persistent State practice on the matter, which seems to confirm that non-international 
armed conflicts may hold global interests as well, in particular those related to 
maintaining international peace and security.1104 Even further, this practice has suggested 
that intervention by invitation may have a role to play in such globalised civil wars, either 
in conjunction with or in the absence of collective security.1105 
Therefore, examining intervention by invitation in situations which include 
international elements is of upmost importance. For this reason, this remainder of this 
section has been categorised into two parts in accordance with the global issues at hand. 
The first portion deals with the uses of force by States that are short of the threshold of 
an armed attack, to see how intervention by invitation may be applicable in such 
circumstances. The second part examines intervention by invitation as a response to 
breaches or threats of international peace and security and studies the completely or 
partially simultaneous application of invited interventions and collective security. 
Scenarios in which the territorial State has undeniably suffered an armed attack and 
chooses to invite foreign military assistance as a response are not discussed here. This is 
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a deliberate decision based upon the earlier findings of the thesis. In such situations, the 
concept of intervention by invitation would be absorbed by the right to self-defence, 
resulting in collective self-defence rather than consensual use of force.1106 
 
3.3.2. Invited Intervention as a Response to Use of Force Short of an Armed Attack 
Armed force may be applied against a sovereign State in several ways. The use of force 
currently prohibited under international law covers a large scope, from fairly small 
activities to a fully-fledged military intervention.1107 Not all of these forms amount to 
armed attacks: they do remain violations of the prohibition on the use of force, but they 
still do not activate the victim State’s inherent right to self-defence.1108 Armed force short 
of armed attack is versatile, from delivering support to the victim State’s military 
opposition groups to situating troops on that State’s territory. Although they may not 
constitute an armed attack, 1109  such activities inevitably infringe the victim State’s 
sovereignty: if self-defence is out of the question, could an invited intervention be an 
option? 
After all, while the injured State may be deprived of the right of self-defence, it does 
retain its sovereignty, which includes the capacity to invite a foreign armed intervention. 
An example is the on-going Ukrainian civil war. It has been well-established that Russia 
intervened in Ukraine in a manner that violated the prohibition on the use of force.1110 
However, it is debatable if the military activities fulfil the strict definition of an armed 
attack. While Russia has inter alia deployed its own military troops on Ukrainian soil in 
2014 at the heights of the Crimean crisis, the actions of these troops arguably did not 
amount to use of force comparable to the concept of an armed attack.1111 The closest call 
has been Russia exceeding the limits of the Black Sea Fleet Partition Treaty, which by 
the virtue of having overstepped an invitation to intervene, may be considered to be 
aggression. 1112  Furthermore, even though Russia has been widely accused of being 
involved in the civil war, most evidence supports the view that its participation has been 
limited to supporting the separatists in Eastern Ukraine, without directly taking part.1113 
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Establishing that the Russian use of force does not amount to an armed attack may 
appear counterproductive from the perspective of international spectators. It was through 
these methods that Russia managed to annex a portion of Ukraine into itself, resulting in 
a deep violation of the latter’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.1114 However, the range 
of activities which signify an armed attack is slim, and the Russian uses of force do not 
unquestionably fall within that spectrum. In any event, this finding diminishes Ukraine’s 
chances to engage in self-defence to repel the Russian military presence on its territory, 
leaving the latter with limited measures at its disposal.  
This scenario appears to create a legal vacuum. How can a State which has lost a part 
of its territory due to unlawful use of force just sit by idly, without taking any 
countermeasures? However, while self-defence may remain unavailable to Ukraine in its 
current situation, other forms of armed intervention may still be legally available. 
Intervention by invitation, if it was to be confined within the borders of Ukraine, could 
be amongst these measures. In fact, consensual use of force might be the most plausible 
option in this case, as collective measures are impossible for political reasons.1115 
To a certain extent, States have discussed this option in reference to the Ukrainian 
crisis as well. As it has turned out, there has been debate about delivering weapons, 
training and other means of armed support to the Ukrainian government, most notably in 
the United States.1116 Some say this type of support is already being delivered: however, 
a more flagrant intervention has not presented itself.1117 Hypothetically speaking, if such 
an intervention was to take place, it would de facto be a response to foreign use of force, 
all the while being a part of an internal conflict. This further exemplifies the entwinement 
of internal and international conflicts, which may open new opportunities for the use of 
armed measures. 
Of course, the not-so-steady continuance of these aspirations may result in them not 
having a long-lasting effect on the development of international law. For instance, just 
the example of the United States possibly supplying direct armed support to Ukraine may 
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face resistance due to the on-going Trump presidency.1118 Given this inescapable premise, 
immediately converting State practice into evidence for new law is short-sighted. 
 
3.3.3. Maintaining International Peace and Security through Intervention by Invitation 
As was noted earlier, the concepts of intervention by invitation and collective security 
can be traced back to the same source, the birth process of intervention itself in 
international relations.1119 Although it may not appear so at first sight, the practices have 
thus been clearly connected for centuries, and they have been influencing and developing 
one another throughout their existence. And indeed, the superficially unilateralist 
intervention by invitation contains collective elements below its surface; the reverse 
applies for collective security, resulting in a hidden but identifiable link between the two 
concepts. 
In a more contemporary context, this connection may lead invited interventions into 
the sphere of international conflicts. The notion of breaching international peace and 
security — the legal threshold demanded to invoke actions under Chapter VII — has 
undergone notable changes. 1120  Since the beginning of the 1990s, it has become 
progressively more accepted that certain traditionally internal matters, be it a full-scale 
civil war or other forms of unrest, can constitute an event which the Security Council 
takes action on.1121 This has meant that collective measures and intervention by invitation 
now function within the same field. With the new premise, can it be further concluded 
that intervention by invitation may become exhaustible in the face of a threat to 
international peace and security, particularly if the Security Council is unable to authorise 
military action? 
The most recent development does suggest that the concepts are at least co-
applicable.1122 It even appears that intervention by invitation can be used as a temporary, 
immediate response to a breach of international peace, at least while the Security Council 
deliberates how best to assemble troops to combat the issue.1123 After all, the United 
Nations has no armed forces of its own at its disposal, and thus it must always take its 
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time to authorise an international coalition of the willing to execute collective security.1124 
This exact scenario has been realised in Mali, where an invited intervention by France 
and collective armed measures authorised by the Security Council have both been 
invoked since 2013.1125  
However, while the Mali matter shows that the two practices do not necessarily 
contradict each other, it is not quite enough to establish that intervention by invitation 
could act as a de jure alternative in the absence of Security Council authorisation. Of 
course, invited interventions did emerge as a factual replacement to collective security 
during the Council’s biggest stalemates in the Cold War era: still, de jure and de facto are 
obviously not synonymous as concepts. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the 
breach or threat of international peace and security can only be determined by the Security 
Council.1126  If the Council is able to reach a decision over the existence of such a 
situation, it is not too far-fetched to imagine that it should be capable of deciding upon 
appropriate measures as well. 
In any event, it would still seem that the concepts of intervention by invitation and 
collective security may be becoming more linked, especially after the military 
enforcement of the latter was bestowed to individual States rather the previously planned 
UN troops. This is reflective of one of the first frameworks of foreign armed 
interventions, such as the Holy Alliance (1815), which has been interpreted to have 
encompassed both early intervention by invitation and collective use of force.1127 What is 
further, the connection acknowledges that attending to internal unrest and even conflicts 
is fundamental to maintain inter-State peace,1128 which is a direct call-back to post-
Napoleon Europe.1129 Intervention by invitation and collective security may therefore, as 
overly poetic as it sounds, be coming full circle wherein historical themes begin to 
resurface on a modern stage. 
Hence, as they stand in contemporary international law, intervention by invitation and 
collective security have had to cooperate in the present, which they may also have to do 
in the future. 1130  This might lead to further internationalisation of intervention by 
invitation, which can cause the concept to become a servant of common values. As 
paradoxical as it may seem, this development may simultaneously move the doctrine 
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towards a more modern position,1131 while also reanimating elements of its distant past. 
Such an evolution appears to have cast intervention by invitation into a state of confusion, 
for the already oxymoronic concept now must juggle additional juxtaposing elements. 
Current intervention by invitation can thus be described as being in a limbo, which will 
be dissected in Chapter V. 
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4. Conclusions: Finding Common Ground 
 
Intervention by invitation is supposed to be based on the sovereign capacity of the host 
State — however, State practice on the matter has not truly reflected this premise. Rather, 
the blurred legal definition of the doctrine immediately affects it in its practical sphere. 
This is a natural outcome, since invited interventions re-emerged out of erratic practice 
which was accepted as evidence of the evolution of the norms on the use of force. In other 
words, the justification and practical aspects of invited interventions could be regarded as 
mirror images of one another, as one could not exist without the other. 
In any event, as long as the doctrine of intervention by invitation allows for various, 
often contrasting interpretations, monitoring such interventions will be difficult. The best 
way to solve this dilemma would be to formulate clearer definitions as to how and when 
invited interventions can be executed. However, given the current State practice on the 
matter, this development appears unlikely. Similar to the justification of intervention by 
invitation, States appear to have opted for wide leeway when it comes to the practicalities 
of the concept. 
As a result, while many general lines regarding the application of intervention by 
invitation have been drawn, there are equally many disputes over more detailed questions. 
This has been inter alia manifested in the questions concerning the identity of the inviter, 
limits of the intervention, and the issuing and retraction of the invitation itself. For the 
qualifications concerning intervention by invitation, the biggest debate has resided in how 
one should determine the legitimate representative of the inviting State. There have been 
undeniable attempts to dethrone the test of effective control and replace it with the 
qualification of democratic legitimacy. However, these ventures have only found success 
when applied in conjunction with collective security or other international elements. 
Ergo, the effective control test remains as the mean of assessing the inviting 
establishment’s authority. 
The circumstances in which invited interventions are enacted have not been immune 
to change. In this respect, the biggest recent development has been the gradual acceptance 
of intervening by invitation in certain non-international armed conflicts. This is possible 
in situations in which an international element exists, either in the form of Security 
Council involvement or the presence of global terrorism. Yet, issues persist even in this 
limited space. One still must identify the proper inviter when intervening upon invitation 
during a civil war. As the mean of doing so lies with the effective control test, a 
conundrum may present itself. Traditionally, the qualification of a civil war has signalled 
a loss of control, which means that determining the legitimate representative of the 
conflict State can be difficult and based upon arbitrary qualifications. Hence, invited 
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interventions and internal conflicts, while more compatible than before, are still far from 
a perfect match. 
The changes in invited interventions do not stop here. The evolution of the doctrine 
has led to it being applied in many new circumstances, of which the most prominent are 
the Crimean secession in 2014 and the various military operations pursued to combat 
international terrorism. Of these two alternatives, the fight against terrorism has thus far 
proved to be the more fertile ground for modern invited interventions. Nevertheless, both 
prospects have certain issues to resolve and opportunities to explore. In one way or 
another, these scenarios will continue to affect the international community: how this 
effect lasts depends on multiple variables, which will be discussed in more detail in the 
next section. 
Nonetheless, an intermediate notion can be made before moving on to these more 
detailed arguments. As of late, the practice of intervention by invitation has appeared to 
cross the line between internal and international, a process which has consequently 
instilled the doctrine with an identity crisis. Intervention by invitation previously 
appeared as the champion of sovereign interests, while more quietly catering to the 
common values of the international community. This position bestowed the concept with 
the role of the necessary evil, making it an unpleasant form of armed force that 
nonetheless served a bigger purpose. However, it now seems that doctrine is being 
harnessed to serve the common values more immediately, resulting in a mixture of 
unilateral and collective interests.  
This development could lead to intervention by invitation becoming a superficially 
more pleasant concept, a positive outcome by some measures. However, it could also 
shake the already delicate balance within the global community. After all, no well-
rounded storyline can be filled only with starry-eyed protagonists, as more antagonist 
parts are also necessary. In any event, the current role of intervention by invitation is 
debatable, as is its future position in international law.  
 




The Current and Future Prospects of Intervention by 
Invitation 
 
1. Consensual Use of Force and Modern Contexts 
 
The previous two sections mapped out the peculiarities of intervention by invitation as 
a legal concept, as well as the riddles it faces in practice. To bring this analysis full circle, 
the present part of the thesis will focus on where these legal and practical aspects of the 
doctrine have led it to. With this objective in mind, this section covers the manner in 
which intervention by invitation currently appears in international law, and where this 
evolution may be headed in the future. The focus will hence be on intervention by 
invitation in the post-Cold War environment, to map out its evolution from the beginning 
of the 1990s to this day and beyond. 
This task is not a leisurely one, for reasons relating to the nature of intervention by 
invitation. The concept portrays itself in an opaque manner which evades definite 
categorisation, very much making it a typical doctrine of international law.1132  It is 
undeniably an applicable legal concept,1133 but at the same time it could be described as 
a mere love child of international politics that has managed to claim legitimacy in the 
eyes of the international community. And indeed, the doctrine was born out of necessity 
rather than focused law-making, which gives it certain much-needed political leeway, 
even if undesirable in many ways. In contrast with the core intent behind the general plan 
on the use of force,1134 on the surface intervention by invitation has few high-flying ideals 
to fulfil, making the doctrine a valuable tool for the willing to exhaust. As such, the 
doctrine has helmed the part of necessary evil, carrying along much political leverage and 
scattered legal validation. 
Due to this premise, the concept has proved to be quite dynamic in the aftermath of 
the Cold War, partly because it had no choice but to be so. With the Cold War finished, 
the concept was no longer hanging on the power balance between the diametrically 
opposed United States and Soviet Union. This meant that the doctrine had ceased to serve 
the purposes of this global polarisation, leaving the concept untethered to the wider 
political context it was constantly forced to stabilise. As a result, the opportunity to 
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experiment with intervention by invitation has opened up, giving the doctrine a chance to 
evolve past its former role.  
And indeed, while the concept’s immediate application since 1945 often followed 
firmly set superpower patterns, in recent times it has shown its adaptability on multiple 
occasions. The mere survival of the doctrine during revitalised Security Council activity 
and changed world politics following the end of the Cold War exemplifies this. In 
addition, it can be discerned that intervention by invitation has become a measure which 
now appears to be more accessible to a wider range of States, as the increased 
interventions in Africa have demonstrated. 1135  These new circumstances have taken 
intervention by invitation into unprecedented situations. As mere cases of internal unrest 
have turned into secessionist movements and the threats of terrorist groups have risen 
from the national level to a global one, intervention by invitation has been invoked as one 
of the responses.1136  
However, the reinvention of intervention by invitation has not emerged flawlessly. 
Many circumstances in which the doctrine has been invoked have been controversial, at 
times even unlawful. 1137  Moreover, even though intervention by invitation has 
unmistakably begun to shun its Cold War role as a maintainer of superpower balance, it 
is yet to complete this transformation to the fullest. For instance, whenever the doctrine’s 
limits are tested, such tests are likely to be conducted by the most powerful States for 
their own political ends, which at times will be narrowly visioned.1138 Therefore, despite 
its new-found appeal, intervention by invitation continues to carry the high likelihood of 
perverting the would-be globalist system on the use of force. 
Hence, the doctrine appears to be in transition, which has caused its appearances in 
these modern circumstances to be debatable for many reasons. Thus, this section seeks to 
find out how intervention by invitation stands the test of evaluation in these contexts. The 
objective is to examine specific situations which may both provide fertile grounds and 
cause problems for intervention by invitation. The scenarios discussed here have been 
chosen because of their current relevance and plausible future importance. These issues 
have both gained much attention within the international community and have also been 
sporadically evolving in nature, which requires extensive research. 
Given the current situation, the contents of the section have been structured thusly. 
Firstly, the section will discuss matters which fall under the theme of unifying unilateral 
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and collective armed activities (Section 2). More specifically, these subtopics comprise 
the relationship between invited interventions and collective security, in addition to using 
consensual armed force to combat global terrorism. The section will hence examine 
whether intervention by invitation has managed to bridge the gap between individual 
State policies and commonly held values, an effort which could upend the concept’s 
position. 
Secondly, the matter of applying intervention by invitation during formerly non-
international armed conflicts will be examined (Section 3). This means assessing not only 
traditional civil wars, but also secessionist conflicts such as the Crimean crisis. The 
objective is to discover if and how intervention by invitation has become applicable under 
such circumstances. 
Thirdly, there will be an evaluation of how these changed circumstances have affected 
the pool of States which engage in consensual use of force as interveners (Section 4). 
While this ensemble has been exclusive in the past, the reinvented forms of intervention 
by invitation may bring the doctrine within the reach smaller countries as well. Such a 
development would move intervention by invitation even further away from its Cold War 
position, thus underlining its increasingly unpredictable status.  
Fourthly, the chapter will close with a reminder from the realm of realism, which 
heavily dictates the likelihood of holding intervenors accountable for armed 
interventions. The likelihood of State responsibility for an invited intervention will thus 
be discussed, especially in light of the recent developments such as the increased 
involvement of smaller States (Section 5). 
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2.  Intervention by Invitation in Aligning Collective and 
Unilateral Armed Activities  
 
2.1. The Re-Emergence of Collective Security and Its Effect on Intervention 
by Invitation  
2.1.1. The Two Concepts since the end of the Cold War 
As a legal doctrine, intervention by invitation has been reinvigorated by the policies 
of the regular intervenors. Consequently, the concept has been tethered to political 
contexts, particularly of the Cold War era. The setting provided the doctrine with the 
grounds on which it built itself, in terms of both a legal and a political doctrine.1139 Given 
this premise, one might wonder where the concept has stood in the decades that have 
followed, in particular given the various and at times non-linear developments. Since 
intervention by invitation was so steadfastly established as a superpower tool in the early 
decades of the United Nations, could the turn in the relationships of the politically 
powerful entail the doctrine’s inevitable downfall?  
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War’s dissolution, some uncertainty did exist 
over the new position of intervention by invitation, amongst other superpower staples.1140 
The need to resort to invited interventions should have wavered in conjunction with the 
bridge-building between the East and the West, especially since the lack of collective 
security has so heavily contributed to the doctrine’s application.1141 The international 
political struggle for allied governments between the United States and the Soviet Union 
appeared to have come to an abrupt end following the latter’s collapse.1142 This derogated 
the importance of intervention by invitation as a tool of superpower policy, begging the 
question: what relevance does the doctrine bear in the new world order? 
The certain post-Cold War practice did indeed suggest that intervention by invitation 
could face severe decline. Such conclusions were inter alia drawn from the statements 
made by France, one the frequent proponents of the doctrine.1143 The State went on to 
claim that the days of the ‘French Policy’ were now in the past, meaning that it intended 
to forego the frequent practice of invited interventions; still, it ought to be noted that the 
State has since intervened in Mali.1144 Nonetheless, this example goes on to show that 
intervention by invitation had become quite a troublesome doctrine for the intervening 
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States, especially given the enhanced focus on the self-determination of the host State’s 
people and the possible consequences that came with violating it.1145 Instead, much hope 
was placed in the United Nations and its revitalised chief political organ, the Security 
Council.1146 
This brings us to the biggest complication faced by invited interventions in practice, 
the re-emergence of collective security.1147 This resurrection bears importance for several 
reasons. Firstly, to a certain extent, it was a manoeuvre towards the initial plan of the 
Charter, wherein the Security Council acts as the maintainer of international peace on the 
behalf of individual States.1148 Ideally, this should have reduced or even seen the end of 
unilateral uses of force altogether. Secondly, the new practice on collective security began 
to assert that internal conflicts could also present a threat or breach of international peace 
as entailed in Article 39 of the Charter.1149 In other words, while the Charter and its 
provisions on the use of force were planned with conflicts between States in mind, the 
Security Council has since deployed collective action in internal crises and conflicts as 
well.1150 
This development has brought collective security close to invited interventions, 
creating a possible overlap or even conflict between the two.1151 It hence appeared as if 
intervention by invitation was in danger of being eclipsed by the revitalised collective 
security, which finally appeared to be on its way to claim its position in international law. 
In the purely legal sense, no competition between the two concepts should exist. After 
all, actions undertaken under Chapter VII should still take precedence, meaning that 
collective security should supersede intervention by invitation under all 
circumstances.1152 However, as it is well known, the norms of international law are not 
always symmetrically reflected in practice. This statement holds true for both intervention 
by invitation and collective security, as evidenced by their connection over the past few 
decades. 
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2.1.2. Establishing a Constructive Relationship: the Current Co-Operation Between 
Invited Interventions and Collective Security 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, collective security was set to become more 
prominent in international relations.1153 However, subsequent practice has not echoed this 
optimism, leaving the concept’s newfound position ambiguous.1154 As a result, while 
collective security has now been awakened from its decades-long slumber, it is yet to be 
applied in the extent allowed by the Charter’s provisions. 1155  Therefore, collective 
security has indeed claimed a position, but not as the unwavering upholder of 
international peace it was first envisioned as during the UN Charter’s drafting process.1156 
This finding can be attributed to two main factors. Firstly, as noted earlier, the idea of 
armed forces under the control of the United Nations has failed, and at this point it seems 
unlikely that such aspirations could ever be achieved.1157 Instead, the Council has had to 
rely on individual States in order to carry out both peacekeeping missions and full-fledged 
interventions, which has partially compromised the idea behind true collective 
security.1158 Ultimately, collective armed measures are both decided and acted on by 
individual States rather than a collective entity, which inevitably waters down the original 
intention of the Charter.1159 
Secondly, the process of improving the relationship between the East and the West has 
suffered several setbacks along the way, weighing down the work of the Security Council 
in the process.1160 While a full relapse into Cold War politics is yet to appear, permanent 
members of the Security Council rarely agree completely when it comes to situations 
demanding the organ’s attention.1161 As a result, military action by the Security Council, 
especially swift action, simply cannot be taken for granted. Many incidents exemplify 
this, including the current situation in the Syrian Civil War, which is yet to be resolved 
by the Council despite containing many elements that truly threaten international peace 
and security.1162 
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For these reasons, collective security has been forced to cooperate with intervention 
by invitation instead of dethroning it. In fact, given the many conundrums that hinder the 
deployment of military activities under Chapter VII, it appears that collective security 
may have to rely on unilateral force upon request, especially in the initial phases of the 
military intervention. 1163  After all, whereas collective security remains difficult to 
enforce, intervention by intervention has retained its political flexibility and easier 
applicability, as seen in the 2013 intervention in Mali.1164 Such flexibility may provide 
vital assistance to collective security, even when armed measures under Chapter VII have 
been successfully authorised by the Security Council. 
 Such developments have inter alia occurred in the current Malian crisis, a conflict in 
which both collective security and intervention by invitation have been invoked.1165 
When the crisis first escalated in late 2012, the Security Council was comparatively quick 
on its feet and decided that a collective armed intervention was necessary to resolve the 
situation.1166  Accordingly, the Council declared the presence of a threat to international 
peace and security, authorised the use of armed measures under Article 42 of the Charter 
and took to forming a special support mission to enact the authorisation to use force.1167 
However, despite the quick consensus on the matter, it also became clear that the armed 
forces working under the umbrella of the Security Council’s authorisation could not be 
deployed fast enough to solve the crisis.1168 For these reasons, the Malian authorities 
chose to issue a direct plea to France in early 2013, asking it to stage an armed 
intervention. France decided to respond to this request and was able to commence the 
intervention immediately, while the AFISMA intervention planned by the Security 
Council followed sometime after.1169  
The Mali intervention aptly showcases the tentatively constructive connection between 
intervention by invitation and collective security. Even though one could state that France 
perhaps blindsided the Security Council by staging an intervention of its own, the Council 
welcomed the unilateral action and saw it as an enhancement rather than a detriment to 
its own mission.1170 This marks an occasion when the Security Council not only expressed 
acceptance towards intervention by invitation, but also saw the concept as an asset that 
could be used to help with its own work. In turn, this suggests that the two concepts can 
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be co-applicable instead of being sworn, formidable enemies.1171 Such a finding is not too 
surprising given the historical overlap between the doctrines: these connections can be 
traced back to the early 1800s, marking a historical link as well as a contemporary one.1172 
 
2.1.3. Comparing Collective Security and Invited Interventions in Practice: the 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Concepts  
While it has been possible to strike a tentative balance between intervention by 
invitation and collective security, their current incarnations are not fully compatible 
soulmates. They are often used to serve very different objectives, meaning that their co-
application, while possible, cannot always be taken for granted. For instance, intervention 
by invitation often appears as an alternative when collective security fails, as illustrated 
by the current Syrian Civil War.1173 Hence, it may be impossible to apply the concepts 
simultaneously in particular circumstances. 
This means that the intervention by invitation and collective security, while not 
diametrically opposed, may still compete for time on the global stage, as States evaluate 
which concept fits their policies better. Upon making such deliberations, one is likely to 
come across a fundamental question: which concept is more durable when it comes to 
resolving issues and unrests around the world? At first glance, one might make a snap 
judgment and declare collective security to be the clear victor, given its intended position 
in the Charter’s regime. However, closer examination allows one to see that the ultimate 
choice is more difficult than immediate appearances might suggest. 
After all, despite differences on the surface, intervention by invitation and collective 
security do share notable underlying common factors. These factors are not completely 
limited to their shared history. In fact, the two concepts currently suffer from similar 
practical issues, many of which relate to the role of international politics.1174 This may 
come as a surprise, as one might think that collective security, the supposed centre piece 
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of the Charter, ought to be much more resistant to such political aspirations. However, as 
long as collective measures are decided upon by the Security Council, a political organ 
and an exclusive club of sovereign States, such challenges are bound to persist.1175 This 
locates collective security adjacent to intervention by invitation, in many respects. 
When comparing the two concepts in a legal sense, collective security generally offers 
a far wider scope of available measures than intervention by invitation.1176 The wording 
of the Charter allows the Security Council nearly unlimited discretion to decide on what 
constitutes a violation of Article 39, and also what measures, military or non-military, 
should be undertaken in response.1177 The only restrictions are that the Council must act 
in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,1178 a statement 
which can only be described as vague. Collective security can thus be applied rather 
indiscriminately in different circumstances, including even non-international armed 
conflicts.1179  
Of course, this flexibility has a downside in relation to ending an armed intervention 
under Chapter VII. Similar to authorising armed measures, the decision to retract such 
authorisation must be conducted via the Security Council.1180 Since no Resolution may 
be opposed by any of the organ’s five permanent members, this can result in the impasse 
known as the reverse veto.1181 The reverse veto is a scenario wherein a permanent member 
blocks the adoption of a Resolution to end a collective armed intervention, possibly 
upholding the mandate to use force indefinitely.1182 Of course, the threat of reverse veto 
is yet to appear outside speculation, leaving the practice on collective security free of such 
issues.1183 
In contrast, intervention by invitation is hindered by various conceptual ambiguities, 
which have resulted in the practice of the doctrine being quite trying.1184 The concept, 
while permissible, should thus have limited grounds for its application.1185 However, 
intervention by invitation does have more political flexibility than collective security, 
which is subjected to the constant whims of the Security Council’s members.1186 This 
denotes that both commencing and ending an invited intervention can be much easier. 
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Still, invited interventions have been riddled with issues relating to the invitation to 
intervene, showing that ending such an intervention can actually be difficult.1187 
In the end, both doctrines come with their batch of issues, some of which are shared 
while others are particular. Thus, rather than simply abstractly comparing the concepts, 
one could benefit from projecting them against the backdrop of actual State practice. 
Unfortunately, the global community does have a recent case which contrasts the use of 
intervention by invitation and collective security: Libya. The State has faced continuous 
upheavals since the commencement of the Arab Spring in 2011, with no end currently in 
sight.1188 As a result of this confusion, the State has also been subject to numerous armed 
interventions ever since, varying both in range and legal justification.  
To begin this examination of Libya, we should return to 2011 and the events which 
started the myriad issues currently engulfing the State. During the first months of this 
year, the escalating unrest and eventual civil war began to attract international attention, 
resulting in the United Nations becoming involved in the matter.1189 Consequently, in 
March 2011, the Security Council famously authorised collective use of force in Libyan 
territory with Resolution 1973.1190 The goal and intention of the Resolution was inter alia 
to protect the population residing in Libya.1191 An international coalition headed by 
NATO was quickly discharged for this purpose; however, the military intervention which 
followed took additional twists and turns, effectively extending or even undermining the 
letter of Resolution 1973.1192  
Ultimately, the Libyan Civil War resulted in the ousting and killing of the dictator 
Gaddafi, bringing forth a regime change in the country, which was acknowledged while 
the initial collective intervention was still on-going.1193 Given the course of the war, one 
would find it very difficult to argue that the intervention had nothing to do with these 
political upheavals within the country.1194 Therefore, the military intervention pursuant 
to Resolution 1973 also undeniably crossed the limitations set by the Security Council, 
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which raised questions about the manner in which the operation was conducted.1195 This 
has resulted in the intervention being regarded rather negatively, as it arguably did not 
serve the objectives of the authorisation.1196 
This is naturally an undesirable outcome. Since the justification of the military 
intervention was based on Chapter VII, its legal basis is unproblematic; one might hope 
that the actual intervention would have panned out similarly. Still, it would be difficult to 
argue that the intervention was successful in retrospect. Although the Security Council 
authorisation did not call for regime change in the target country, the intervention directly 
contributed to such ends.1197  Such results not only did a disservice to the goals of 
Resolution 1973, but also saw activity under a UN mandate potentially dictate the 
political future of one its members. While collective security has been given almost 
unlimited power under the UN Charter,1198 one might question if such developments 
serve the organisation’s purposes. What is further, the newly-installed National Transition 
Council failed to gain a footing in Libya, thus striking the first tunes of yet another 
situation of disarray in the country.1199 
And indeed, the result of the military intervention was not the beacon of hope it was 
paraded as in the immediate light of Gaddafi’s ousting. Libya has faced further 
destabilisation, including the ISIS terror group, which has seized control of various cities 
around the country.1200 In fact, it could be stated that Libya’s situation has become weaker 
in the aftermath of the 2011 military intervention, since the country has been plunged into 
yet another civil war.1201 The position of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya 
(UNSMIL), a political mission established in the wake of the 2011 military intervention, 
has been left in turmoil due to these developments.1202 The crisis has caused UNSMIL to 
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falter in its persisting attempts to control the situation in Libya, as the country has been 
thrust into an ever-deepening chaos, with ISIS as one its factions.1203 
This has led to the Libyan authorities asking for foreign assistance, which by August 
2016 had culminated in blatant intervention by invitation,1204 executed by the United 
States in the form of airstrikes against ISIS.1205 Moreover, it has been reported that during 
this time British and French troops were also placed on Libyan soil, but their presence 
was mostly kept out of the public eye.1206 The United States, however, has continued its 
public military presence, since the country staged notable armed activities in Libya in 
2017, apparently with the continued purpose of countering the threat of ISIS.1207 The 
activities have continued in conjunction with the aforementioned UN efforts to stabilise 
the country,1208 forcing consensual use of force and Security Council action to cooperate 
once more.1209 As an additional curiosity, invited interventions have taken place despite 
the clear power vacuum in Libya, in which the mantle of the country’s legitimate 
representative has been fiercely contested.1210 Of course, it bears reminding that the 
Security Council has continued to pledge its support for the internationally-recognised 
government, which should cause the biggest concerns over the legitimate representative 
to subside.1211 
Overall, the current crisis in Libya concerns numerous legal issues which have become 
entangled over the years. The conundrum truly began after collective use of force was 
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enacted to resolve the humanitarian crisis within the State. The armed intervention 
pursued as a result was not confined to the perimeter set in the authorisation of the 
Security Council, resulting in additional developments within the target State. 1212 
Consequently, Libya failed to stabilise itself in the aftermath of the intervention, which 
led to further armed activities, this time in the form of intervention by invitation.1213 
Notably, in this case, intervention by invitation has been deployed due to previous trial 
and error at the hands of collective security, possibly lacing the doctrines’ relation in this 
matter with a slightly more antagonistic taste. 
Of course, the crisis in Libya is still very much in the making, and rapid changes may 
take place. Further analysis on this case has to wait until the developments have advanced 
further, especially given the chaotic situation in Libya at the moment.1214 Still, certain 
observations can be made at a more general level. Despite its notable difficulties and even 
glaring failures, collective security remains the primary instrument when it comes to 
intervening. This is exemplified not only by the developments in Libya, but also in Syria 
as well. Although the Security Council has been unable to authorise a collective military 
intervention in the latter State, the fact that States continuously bring the matter to the 
Council shows that they consider collective security to be the first alternative. Indeed, 
such statements have been made over unilateral armed activities, invited interventions 
included, undertaken in the absence or alongside collective measures.1215 
Naturally, the primacy of collective security cannot remain on unimplemented level 
forever. After all, the world is constantly confronted by crises demanding military 
attention, and at a certain stage, unilateral measures, such as intervention by invitation, 
may have to concede the role they currently hold. Simply put, the current legal framework 
was not built to allow unilateral measures such leverage, and thus they may eventually 
unravel due to the lack of definite legal structures. 
 
2.2. The International Fight Against Terrorism and Consensual Use of Force  
2.2.1. Intervention by Invitation and Terrorism Post-2001 
Intervention by invitation has often been a manifestation of the world politics and its 
most influential actors. Consequently, the concept has made its way into one of the 
notable current venues of armed force: military actions pursued against international 
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terrorist organisations. From the legal perspective, the international fight against terrorism 
causes multiple complications. The political responses by States to the attacks and threats 
of terrorist organisations have tended to forego the legal conditions on various levels of 
regulation. 1216  This is not only reflected in the use of force, which saw quick and 
debatable expansions of pertinent legal criteria in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks,1217 
but also other norms of international law relating to individual rights and liberties.1218 
This evolution of legal standards — or depending on one’s perspective, dismissal — 
has had its effect on intervention by invitation as well. The doctrine has appeared more 
or less explicitly in arguments over international terrorism, wherein its legal limitations 
have at times been interpreted quite liberally.1219 However, the doctrine’s appearances in 
combating terrorism may be hard to track, as the legal justifications offered by States 
often either overlap with other grounds for armed force or are practically non-existent. 
Nevertheless, some remarks about intervention by invitation in this context can be made, 
which will be the objective of this section. 
 
2.2.2. The First Wave of Invited Interventions: International Terrorism and Targeted 
Killings 
Regardless of one’s views on it, the term ‘War on Terror’ coined by the United States 
has had a massive impact since its introduction in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001. 
However, no matter how much such a term is tossed around in political rhetoric, the fight 
against terrorism is still not a traditional war.1220  It is not a fight that is waged on 
battlefields with clear territorial or time limits and a definite set of enemies.1221 Instead, 
it is a threat which requires constant attention, international co-operation and in some 
cases the use of military force.1222 This has brought about the merging of doctrines of 
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warfare and law enforcement, which has had an effect on various legal ventures 
concerning the use of force.1223 Among other legal doctrines, this setting has also evoked 
the need to exhaust intervention by invitation. 
In the public eye, the frequent application of invited interventions in response to 
terrorism has been prominent in targeted killings, a concept entailing confined military 
operations aimed at neutralising an assigned target.1224 This concept has been put to use 
on the territories of Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia among others.1225 Most often, the 
intervenor has been the United States, although Israel has also staged targeted killings on 
several occasions.1226 Recent additions to this ensemble include the United Kingdom, 
which as of 2015, appears to be executing targeted killings outside the realm of an armed 
conflict.1227 The purpose of these operations has often been to target individuals linked 
with international terrorist organisations such as al-Qaida. 1228  Because of these 
objectives, certain publicised targeted killings have been welcomed by or silently 
consented to by many members of the international community.1229 Still, certain issues of 
this practice have caught the attention of States and international commentators alike, 
leaving the general picture of the concept controversial.  
To examine this controversy further, we should discuss the modern history of the 
practice itself. Not surprisingly, the most public proponent of targeted killings has been 
the United States, which has advocated the concept during and following its quest to finish 
al-Qaida in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s.1230 Due to the risk of heavy losses 
being more immediately felt in the US at the time, deploying troops had become an 
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increasingly undesirable option for the State.1231 Thus, following the negative public 
responses evoked by the Iraq War in particular, the United States sought to combat 
terrorism through the use of surgical operations short of full-scale war.1232 Consequently, 
once the initial assault on al-Qaida was finished, the US took to asserting its military 
presence in various States in the Middle East, but this time in a more confined manner. 
Instead of waging traditional war, the country sought to maintain itself on standby in 
States it perceived to hold terrorists, and then respond accordingly, albeit limitedly, 
should any terrorist threats arise.1233 Very often the appropriate response was deemed to 
be an operation which disposed of the suspected terrorist, a practice commonly known as 
targeted killing.1234 
When these targeted killings began to take place at full steam, the US also began to 
abandon the ‘War on Terror’ rhetoric in its politics: however, the sentiment behind its 
actions remained the same.1235 Still, the State showed much more willingness to cooperate 
with other countries on the matter, and thus some of the US targeted killings have been 
executed with the consent of the territorial States involved: examples vary from Somalia 
to Yemen.1236 However, some States have been unwilling to accept foreign military 
intrusions of any kind. This has led to them renouncing the attempts by the United States 
or retracting invitations issued earlier, riddling these supposed invitations with issues.1237  
Traditionally, such denial of cooperation would have severely hindered the 
opportunities for seeking terrorists residing abroad: however, the advancement of 
technology and military equipment has allowed select States, those which possess such 
assets, an easy access to armed activities in another country without their consent.1238 
This is well exemplified by drones, which have been used by the United States to conduct 
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targeted killings of individuals purportedly involved with terrorist organisations, 
sometimes without clear host State consent.1239 The use of this modern technology has 
enabled quickly executable military operations, stretching the scale of different forms of 
targeted killings.1240 
With the wide scope of targeted killings, the practice has become a common staple in 
the US foreign policy and in various foreign territories at that.1241  Examples of the 
practice range from the execution of Osama bin Laden in 2011 to the continuous drone 
attacks in various States.1242 The US argument about its policy has rested on several 
premises, from self-defence to intervention by invitation, with a bit of humanitarian 
intervention on the side for good measure.1243 In the first stages following the 9/11 
attacks, both the legal and political rhetoric rested on what the country purported its 
inherent right to self-defence to be, even if this meant militarily intervening in States not 
immediately connected to the terrorist organisations it pursued.1244 The US position on 
self-defence has been based on the ‘unwilling or unable’ argument, according to which a 
State bears responsibility for the actions of terrorist groups residing in its territory unless 
it has taken adequate measures against them.1245 However, such an approach can be 
problematic from the viewpoint of State responsibility, which normally demands the 
terrorist organisation to be at least a de facto organ of the State in order to create 
accountability.1246 
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This legal reality has necessitated the consent of the territorial State, upon which the 
United States has more or less frequently relied in recent years.1247 Consent became 
further necessary as the threat of terrorist organisations became less imminent, begging 
the question whether actions against such groups could even politically be labelled as 
appropriate responses to armed attacks.1248 From the legal perspective though, the consent 
of the State hosting the potential terrorists is generally absolutely vital.1249 Unless the said 
State can be held internationally liable for the actions of the groups residing in its territory, 
any foreign use of force would violate Article 2(4) of the Charter.1250 
However, while extracting the consent of the host State is necessary, for many military 
operations it is not enough to fully justify the use of armed force. This is because such 
armed force is often applied with the intention of killing the subjects rather than simply 
aiming to take them into custody.1251 Such deprival of life is only permitted in the context 
of an armed conflict, where lethal force is allowable against combatants in accordance 
with certain restrictions set out in international humanitarian law.1252 Outside this context, 
however, it is the human rights regime that becomes applicable instead.1253 This means 
that a person’s right to life must preserved unless its deprival is absolutely necessary due 
to extreme situations: for instance, sometimes lethal force may have to be used to save 
innocent lives when no other alternative is available.1254  
The use of force with the consent of the host State does not by itself denote the presence 
of an armed conflict, meaning that by default, any targeted killings based on such consent 
take place in the context of normal law enforcement.1255 As this enacts the human rights 
regime, no targeted person can be viewed as a combatant and can only be deprived of 
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their life as the last resort.1256 Given that targeted killings are executed with the specific 
goal of terminating suspected terrorists, one can conclude that this intent does not satisfy 
the legal requirements set forth by the human rights regime.1257 
Thus, it remains apparent that intervention by invitation alone cannot act as a basis for 
the practice of targeted killings, as the regime of law enforcement simply does not allow 
such activities.1258 Instead, the intervention by invitation must rely on other concepts for 
support, preferably notions which may bring about the presence of an armed conflict. 
Thus far, support has been sought from self-defence and non-international armed 
conflicts. Of these candidates, perhaps more prevalent has been self-defence in response 
to an armed attack.1259 This scenario is in part due to the argument structures on targeted 
killings in general: as noted above, the United States in particular has justified its targeted 
attacks on self-defence. 1260  It should be noted that arguing self-defence alongside 
intervention by invitation may result in a certain mixture. If the two concepts were to be 
applied side by side, the host State consent would likely be eclipsed by the concept of 
self-defence, technically making it a matter of collective self-defence.1261 As a result, self-
defence has often appeared as the primary, if not sole, legal justification to targeted 
killings.1262 
However, combining self-defence and intervention by invitation to justify targeted 
killings does not seem sustainable at the moment, as self-defence as a legal justification 
for targeted killings is unstable at best.1263 When examining current practice on the matter, 
it would appear that by the standards of international law, there are insufficient elements 
for a claim of self-defence, which then leaves host State consent as the only proper 
justification.1264 For instance, one can easily argue that continuous targeted killings do 
not actually respond to an ongoing armed attack, at least not in a manner which spells out 
immediacy.1265 Naturally, one could claim that self-defence can now be invoked in the 
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face of an impending attack, but such claims have not gained wide support in the 
international community.1266 Thus, the idea of applying self-defence in conjunction with 
intervention by invitation, while plausible in the legal sense, has resulted in impasses in 
practice. 
Of course, given the prominent practice on external interventions and non-international 
armed conflicts, one might question if the presence of a civil war could justify the use of 
targeted killings. After all, a civil war is undeniably an armed conflict during which lethal 
force can be expected to be deployed when necessary.1267 Still, there is considerable 
dissent over whether the distinction of a combatant is applicable in non-international 
armed conflicts, which — while not definitely prohibiting it — can heavily affect the 
limits of available lethal force.1268 However, the claims that combatants do not exist in 
non-international armed conflicts have been subject to criticism, since reaching such a 
conclusion would denote that even terrorists directly engaging in a civil war should be 
regarded as civilians.1269 Such an argument is clearly unsustainable, particularly since 
many international terrorist organisations are factions in various current civil wars.1270 
In any event, if intervention by invitation is now considered applicable in certain non-
international armed conflicts,1271  perhaps targeted killings with the territorial State’s 
consent could be allowable. In fact, this could be the most conceivable method of basing 
targeted killings on the territorial State’s consent. In such a case the legality of the use of 
force would be covered towards both the host State and the target, effectively solving the 
matter. This is theoretically possible, especially given the fine line1272 between different 
types of armed conflict. 
Still, it would be ill-advised to draw far-reaching conclusions based on the above 
statement. As it will be demonstrated later, the matter of applying invited interventions 
in civil wars still entails multiple issues, and such conundrums would also carry over to 
targeted killings.1273 The problems range from the practical issues of identifying the 
legitimate representative to the matter of upholding the duty of non-intervention.1274 
Moreover, a bigger, more general legal question concerning the entire notion of a non-
                                                 
1266 Ibid., pp. 316-317. 
1267 Melzer, Targeted Killing in International Law, pp. 55-57. 
1268  Colonel Mark Maxwell, ‘Rebutting the Civilian Presumption: Playing Whack-a-Mole 
Without a Mallet?’, in Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin and Andrew Altman (eds), Targeted 
Killings: Law and Morality in an Asymmetrical World (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012), 
pp. 40-41. 
1269 Ibid., p. 59. 
1270 Ibid. 
1271 This notion is more thoroughly discussed in Section 3.1. of this chapter. 
1272 Bannelier and Christakis, ‘Under the UN Security Council’s Watchful Eyes’, p. 864. 
1273 See Section 3.1. of this chapter. 
1274 See Chapter IV, Section 3.2. 
 
  193 
 
 
international armed conflict may present itself.1275 As matters currently stand, applying 
intervention by invitation in a civil war is immediately connected to the increasingly 
difficult distinction between international and non-international matters demanding 
military attention.1276 If this continues to be the case, a non-international conflict could 
not truly be considered such, resulting in possibly dangerous combinations of ingredients. 
To finish this section, one final observation should be made about invited interventions 
and targeted killings: the political context in which such operations often take place. 
While many targeted killings have occurred on the soil of third countries, they have also 
most prominently served the purposes of the intervenor, often the United States.1277 Such 
was undoubtedly the case when the country staged a brief military intervention in Pakistan 
in 2011 that resulted in the death of terrorist leader Osama bin Laden. 1278  This is 
questionable from the legal perspective of invited interventions, as the core legitimacy of 
the doctrine should be the sovereign will of the territorial State:1279 in these cases, the 
ultimately determining factor has been the agenda of the intervening State instead.1280  
Given this glaring political agenda and subsequent distortion in terms of power, it has 
sometimes been difficult to decipher if the host State has given its genuine consent to the 
intervention. The situation with invited interventions and Pakistan manifests this dilemma 
very well. The country has often indicated its disapproval of the military operations 
undertaken on its territory, countering the claims of certain other sources which have 
maintained that the State has in fact consented to such measures.1281 In addition, the 
possibility of other territorial States giving consent under duress cannot be forgotten, 
either.1282 After all, if a superpower State approaches a smaller one with a proposition 
concerning targeted killings on the latter’s territory, one might find it difficult to imagine 
that the States in question hold equal negotiating positions. 
Moreover, such examples show that targeted killings are a unilateral way of tackling 
terrorism, not a collective take.1283 Since the current use of targeted killings has chiefly 
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arisen from individual self-defence, this statement is hardly surprising. However, this 
reality not only makes targeted killings controversial, but also shows that they ultimately 
fail to solve the matter of terrorism effectively. The threats caused by international 
terrorist organisations cannot be properly responded to without international cooperation, 
preferably at a forum which gathers more members of the global community than the 
often bilaterally agreed targeted killings. This fact has been recognised by States as well, 
which has led them to seek a sturdier collective stance on the matter. 
 
2.2.3. The Second Wave: Invited Interventions Pursuant to ISIS in Iraq and Syria after 
2011 
The global fight against terrorism is a matter which combines elements from many 
international legal concepts, including but not limited to self-defence, intervention by 
invitation and collective security. However, the first modern cases of invited interventions 
in response to terrorism have lacked the element of collectivity, as so amply shown by 
the targeted killings discussed above. This is hardly desirable. Although international 
terrorism affects the whole global community, the actions pursued post-9/11 have tended 
to polarise rather than unite nations. For instance, the aforementioned ‘War on Terror’ 
has in retrospect been regarded predominantly negatively, despite the initial sympathy 
and unity in the face of the attacks by al-Qaida.1284 Of course, it is in such circumstances 
that invited interventions thrive, which in part explains its appearances in this context. 
Still, whenever collective actions are politically plausible, the preferred forum for 
authorising military operations should be the Security Council.1285 
However, the element of collectivity does not immediately rule out intervention by 
invitation as a lawful measure, either. As established earlier in this dissertation,1286 given 
the partial dissolution of the initially planned system for collective use of force, the 
simultaneous application of invited interventions and armed measures under Chapter VII 
is possible within both legal and practical frameworks. After all, the application of 
collective use of force is factually under the command chain of the individual States that 
choose to take part in the operation authorised by the Security Council.1287 
Of course, the option of using collective measures in conjunction with unilateral ones 
has not meant that the possibility has been realised in practice. In fact, with the exception 
of the current military intervention in Mali, the Security Council has proved itself 
considerably futile in the face of terrorism of either an international or a national nature. 
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While the organ has steadily been able to adopt Resolutions condemning terror attacks, it 
has not managed to authorise collective military measures to combat such threats.1288 This 
has resulted in individual States resorting to other justifications when arguing in favour 
of military measures, including the notions of self-defence and host State consent.1289 In 
other words, although many States often communicate through the collective forum that 
is the Security Council, they ultimately tend to argue for the use of unilateral armed 
measures.  
In such argumentation for unilateral measures, self-defence and intervention by 
invitation have been particularly important. The two concepts have become increasingly 
entwined, to the point of perhaps becoming a single entity, in combatting international 
terrorism.1290 This can in part be attributed to the evolution of self-defence as a legal 
concept. It has drifted away from strict inter-State conflicts and into a realm where a 
terrorist organisation may execute an armed attack against a State, at least under certain 
conditions.1291 As a result, a terrorist organisation such as ISIS could be regarded as 
making armed attacks against Iraq and Syria, rather than being a faction in their respective 
civil wars.1292 And of course, other States may attempt to invoke the claim of their own 
self-defence as well, given that ISIS has claimed responsibility over several attacks across 
the world.1293 This means that when pursuing terrorist organisations, an intervening State 
may invoke either its own self-defence or that of the territorial State itself, constituting 
collective self-defence.1294 Adding host State consent into this mix establishes quite a 
concoction, from which it is hard to discern all the individual arguments involved. 
In recent years, these arguments have appeared in the policies of States that have 
intervened upon request in Iraq and Syria to combat the threat of ISIS.1295 The need for 
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such use of force occurred in 2014, when the terrorist organisation gained a footing in 
both States, a development which continued in the succeeding years.1296 This wavered the 
already war-torn Iraq, and plunged the Syrian Civil War further into chaos by injecting 
an alarming faction into the conflict.1297 The advance of ISIS aroused the concerns of the 
international community, which began to ponder the appropriate measures — including 
military ones — to counter the group and its presence in the Middle East.1298 
Despite these worries, disruption was evident in stances about intervening in Iraq and 
Syria in 2014.1299 Of these two, the case of Iraq was deemed to be both legally and 
politically clearer. While the situation in the country had escalated to that of a civil war, 
the legal premise of having an internationally recognised government persisted, as did the 
politically pressing matter of ISIS. 1300  Moreover, the Security Council continued to 
monitor the situation consistently, bringing forward an additional element of 
collectivity.1301 
Syria’s case, however, was significantly more complicated. The factor of ISIS was 
present there as well, but the chaotic civil war and the global community’s long-standing 
failure to find a solution made military intervention politically less alluring. 1302 
Furthermore, various States noted that identifying the sovereign authority of Syria was 
nearly impossible at the time, leaving intervention by invitation legally out of the question 
for several potential interveners.1303 To top matters off, the Security Council has been 
infamously futile in the face of the Syrian crisis, which further deepened the rift between 
States willing to get involved in the matter.1304 
Consequently, this situation initially led to the conflicts of Iraq and Syria being dealt 
with very differently. The request for military intervention supplied by the Iraqi 
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government was quickly responded to by a large coalition of States from all over the 
world.1305 When similar airstrikes first began in Syria, the number of participants was 
noticeably smaller and less diverse. 1306  While the United States took part in both 
interventions, many Western States initially opted out of conducting airstrikes in 
Syria.1307 A notable example was the United Kingdom, which in 2014 only took part in 
the armed intervention in Iraq.1308 This stance notably changed following the 2015 attacks 
in Paris, after which the UK not only issued a swift mandate to deploy armed force against 
ISIS in Syria, but also immediately put that authorisation to use in practice.1309 Several 
other States have shown similar initiatives, having expanded their initial interventions 
into the Syrian soil.1310 
The numerous foreign interventions in the current Syrian Civil War have been 
discussed extensively in this thesis: however, this example must be brought up yet again, 
this time from the perspective of combating international terrorism from various frontiers. 
As established earlier, the opinions within the international community have been starkly 
contrasting as far as intervening in the Syrian conflict goes. This has effectively paralysed 
the Security Council and left any chance of authorising collective use of force in Syria to 
the brink of impossible.1311 Although most States initially refrained from intervening 
directly, indirect support was allegedly delivered by both Russia and the United States to 
al-Assad’s regime and the moderate rebels respectively.1312 By 2014 and 2015, these 
indirect actions had led to fully-fledged military interventions, with some Western States 
supporting certain factions of the rebels, whereas Russia staged airstrikes at the request 
of al-Assad.1313 This means that in the absence of collective measures, States have taken 
to individual activities instead, resulting in them supporting opposing sides in a military 
conflict. 
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Initially, this scattered support to the factions of the civil war exemplified the dissent 
over Syria’s internal situation.1314 However, the appearance and increased status of ISIS 
has shifted the political focus on the looming threat of international terrorism. For 
instance, when justifying his country’s military intervention in Syria, President Putin 
emphasised not only the legal premise of host State consent, but also the importance of 
tackling ISIS and hindering its process.1315 Still, this does not erase the fact that having 
various international frontiers in an already fragmented civil war is unlikely to resolve 
the issue — at worst, it can further internationalise the conflict. 
However, following the Paris attacks in November 2015, efforts for more collective 
action, with or without Security Council authorisation, have gained momentum.1316 Thus, 
it appears that even if a uniform coalition cannot be achieved, the intervening States have 
been more willing to cooperate to avoid possible collisions in the battlefield.1317 This may 
open the door for collective security in the future: nevertheless, given how difficult the 
road has been so far, fool-proof predictions cannot be made. For the time being, the 
concepts of self-defence and intervention by invitation, in one form or another, have 
played a bigger part against terrorism, at least when it comes to actual practice and 
definite legal argumentation. This has allowed the participating States to maintain their 
individual political positions, which may be antagonistic and accusing in nature, but still 
work quietly towards a common goal.1318 
In the purely legal sense, this scenario is definitely sketchy but within the realms of 
the possible. As noted earlier, intervention by invitation and self-defence share much 
more common ground than is immediately visible. This common ground has been seen 
in the current cases of Iraq and Syria, and it is by no means surprising. After all, this 
correlation extends to matters concerning international terrorism as well, since the 
concept of self-defence was arguably modified to include responses to terror acts 
following the 9/11 attacks in 2001, at least when such attacks can be sufficiently linked 
to a sovereign State.1319 Consequently, although by no means optimal, one can understand 
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why this combination has thus far been chosen by the proactive States. For these reasons, 
although international terrorism is indeed a threat which requires global cooperation, 
collective measures have been forced to take a backseat, while unilateral ones are enacted 
instead. 
Thus, rather than enabling collective action, the Security Council has acted as a 
political umbrella under which States convene to discuss the appropriate unilateral 
measures against terrorist organisations.1320 The current fight against ISIS is an example: 
while the matter is continuously debated in the Council, the organ has stopped short of 
authorising military measures against the terrorist group.1321 Instead, the Resolutions of 
the Council have provided several States mutual points of interest, such as humanitarian 
matters and afflictions on UN personnel, which consequently have been pursued when 
these States have taken to staging different external measures in other territories such as 
Syria.1322 
Of course, this mixture of tentative collective understanding and unilateral measures 
does not remove the issues of external interventions. For instance, while ISIS is 
undeniably an international terrorist organisation, non-international armed conflicts are 
still present in both Iraq and Syria. In other words, both States are amid respective internal 
crises.1323 External interventions can thus result in violating the duty of non-intervention, 
as foreign activities may influence the outcome of the territorial State’s upheaval. Any 
foreign armed intervention must thus be executed with great care and deliberate goals — 
such as combatting terrorism — in mind, so that the political independence of the 
territorial State is preserved.1324 However, since this form of external intervention is a 
new development, no definite limits mulled over the years have yet been established.  
Moreover, although the current union between self-defence and intervention by 
invitation appears to be the preferable at the moment, only time will show its longevity. 
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After all, while it does the best it can to form a sense of global unity in the absence of 
collective security, the union can only provide first aid when combatting international 
terrorism. Collective security remains the starting point when it comes to international 
peace and security, which international terrorist organisation irrevocably threaten.1325 
This means that other military alternatives act as the de facto replacements of collective 
security. Hence, eventually the role of collective security will have to be cemented, and 
this development will influence the positions of both self-defence and intervention by 
invitation. 
 
2.2.4. Applying Intervention by Invitation to Combat Terrorism: Common Goals or 
Sovereign Interests? 
The international fight against terrorism is currently a changing field of international 
law, wherein new means to combat the threats of fundamentalist groups arise on regular 
basis. Intervention by invitation has appeared as one of these measures in certain 
contexts.1326 Hence, the consent of the host State has become prominent when it comes 
to both targeting individual terrorists and terror groups. In the end, this is not very 
surprising. International terrorism is a field in which the cooperation of States is not just 
possible but also crucial, making intervention by invitation pertinent. Nevertheless, 
intervention by invitation by itself cannot answer to the threat caused by international 
terrorism, resulting in other concepts being deployed as well. 
However, deciphering the exact legal norms States invoke to use armed force is not 
easy, especially when they pursue groups such as ISIS and al-Qaida. As shown by the 
War on Terror, arguments may range from self-defence to even implicit Security Council 
authorisation.1327 The dilemma has further appeared in the on-going pursue of ISIS. While 
tentative consensus on the importance of eliminating ISIS has been reached, the actual 
legal positions taken by different States are still mixed. Furthermore, the context of civil 
wars may amount to further problems. The confusing set of arguments often applies to 
targeted killings and other unilateral armed activities as well, which often tend to be first 
and foremost linked with the self-defence doctrine — at least in public discussion.1328 
Finally, the issue of genuine consent may be present in invited interventions tackling 
terrorism. The imbalance of power is at its heaviest in such operations, as the host States 
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tend to be countries in crisis, whereas the intervenors wield influence.1329 In other words, 
such interventions are often executed pursuant to goals of the intervening States, 
particularly where targeted killings are concerned.1330 Furthermore, when other States 
intervene to combat terrorism in the context of civil wars, the extraction of proper host 
State consent may be an impossible task, due to the lack of a clear legitimate 
representative in the country.1331 This leaves any host State in a vulnerable position, 
causing one to wonder if it actually consented to the use of force on its territory. Such 
issues must be addressed if the international community continues to invoke invited 
interventions in the fight against terrorism. 
 
2.3. Invited Interventions and the Tentative Truce Between Unilateral and 
Collective Armed Activities 
Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has faced upheavals which 
have been sudden yet ultimately traceable. Intervention by invitation’s appearance during 
this fits the doctrine’s earlier position in the international community. Throughout the UN 
era, the concept has appeared like a piece of bandage. Its main function has been to 
contain the wounds sustained by the Charter’s system on the use of force, particularly the 
inability to implement collective security fully.  
Thus, the doctrine has unsurprisingly played its part in the current ensemble cast which 
attempts to cope with the themes present in international relations. However, the members 
of said cast have not succeeded in finding definite roles for themselves. Instead, the 
concepts currently at the forefront appear to have become entangled. Examples of this 
entwinement include the on-going cases in Iraq, Mali and Syria. All incidents showcase 
how intervention by invitation is becoming notably aligned with both collective security 
and self-defence, particularly in the face of international terrorism. However, no matter 
how one views the current outcome, it cannot conceivably be asserted that a true and 
lasting symbiosis between collective and unilateral armed measures has been discovered. 
Rather, an intermediate balance has been established, and it bears the threat of being 
interrupted at any moment. 
Regarding this particular balance, much emphasis has been placed on the evolution of 
collective security. While collective use of force has now emerged from its prolonged 
hibernation, it is still struggling within the international community. Once its footing is 
established, the purported alignment of unilateral and collective armed activities will 
inevitably change. The status of intervention by invitation, situated in the middle of 
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current arguments, would be affected as well. Thus, for now one can assert that the 
tentative union of unilateral and collective measures remains at a shaky level. This means 
that intervention by invitation has been unable to act as a permanent and infallible cure 
to the breakdowns within the Charter’s system. Rather, it continues dutifully to serve its 
earlier position as a form of first-aid, one which may currently be tasked with goals well 
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3. Internationalising the Internal: Consent, Use of Force, and 
Formerly Non-International Armed Conflicts  
 
3.1. Non-International Armed Conflicts: No Longer a Solely Internal 
Matter?  
3.1.1. The Current Practice of Globalising Internal Conflicts 
After examining intervention by invitation in the context of collective matters, we 
should turn our attention to the doctrine and its connection to non-international armed 
conflicts. As noted above, intervention by invitation is currently playing a part in aligning 
unilateral and collective military measures. This venture has not been without flaw, and 
intervention by invitation has faced issues within traditionally internal contexts as well. 
The doctrine is currently facing changes in reference to non-international armed conflicts 
and secessionist conflicts, in which its applicability has been questioned. 
However, such settings are not wholly unnatural for invited interventions. Indeed, as 
noted various times throughout this thesis, internal crises have been the birthplace of the 
concept.1332 Nevertheless, by the UN era, whenever such crises crossed the threshold of 
a civil war, intervention by invitation became inapplicable on paper. 1333  Still, as 
extensively discussed in Chapter IV of this dissertation, this premise has been heavily 
challenged since the conclusion of the Cold War, and certain developments have 
undeniably taken place as a result.1334  
Given the practice concerning non-international armed conflicts, it appears that such 
situations can at times include international elements, 1335  which in turn enable the 
opportunity for external interventions. 1336  This means that civil wars are no longer 
automatically at the sole discretion of the territorial State, as other States or international 
organisations may also hold valid interests in them.1337 Consequently, the circumstance 
of civil wars does not conclusively rule out the use of force, including invited 
interventions.1338 However, this finding does not suggest that armed interventions are 
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always legally available in all non-international armed conflicts.1339 What then remains 
unclear is the exact effect of these changes: have they succeeded in crafting permanent 
modifications to the applicability of intervention by invitation in non-international armed 
conflicts? If so, to what extent? 
After all, modifying the international legal norms on the use of force and non-
intervention does not occur easily.1340 Thus, while invited interventions and civil wars are 
experiencing a watershed moment, turning that watershed moment into long-lasting legal 
regulation is not a given. Without concrete evidence proving otherwise, the current 
practice on invited interventions in civil wars may be confined to our time and its crises 
alone. For this reason, we should dig deeper into the findings the thesis has made on non-
international armed conflicts, and how invited interventions may be applicable to them in 
the future. If the components of persistency, longevity and prevalence can be detected, 
the emergence of new international law would be at hand as well. 
 
3.1.2. Applying Invited Interventions in Non-International Armed Conflicts: The 
Major Problems 
As noted throughout this thesis, the current practice on intervention by invitation and 
civil wars suggests that the duty of non-intervention has been evolving over the past few 
decades. This evolution has tentatively asserted that invited interventions may be applied 
in certain non-international armed conflicts, as long as said conflicts entail international 
flourishes as well, such as the presence of globally active terrorist groups.1341 It can be 
further observed that if a conflict entails international factors, it cannot actually be 
identified as fully non-international to begin with. Thus, if an invited intervention is 
staged in order resolve such international issues, while leaving the internal matters of the 
host State well alone, the practice can be in accordance with international law.1342 
Nevertheless, even if one determines that intervention by invitation may sometimes be 
applicable during civil wars, such a finding does not wholly relieve the legal problems. 
In fact, several issues persist, one of them being the identification of the legitimate 
representative of the territorial State. As extensively discussed earlier, intervention by 
invitation is only allowable when the host State’s legitimate government consents to it.1343 
Deciphering such a representative still begins with the effective control test;1344 however, 
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the qualification of democratic legitimacy has made some headway in interventions 
entailing collective elements.1345 In any event, putting these two tests into practice has 
been difficult enough under circumstances short of a civil war, which means that the 
presence of such a conflict may cause a complete impasse. 
Indeed, if a crisis in any State has crossed the threshold of a non-international armed 
conflict, deciphering the legitimate government may prove impossible due for a range of 
reasons. A civil war denotes a significant loss of control on the government’s part, as well 
as an utter breakdown of democracy within the territorial State.1346 This may result in 
both the effective control and democratic legitimacy qualifications becoming practically 
redundant. Consequently, if the legitimate representative of the host State cannot be 
identified, intervention by invitation remains inapplicable as well.1347 In the end, States 
are but abstract beings which cannot by themselves issue consent, let alone to a matter as 
grave as an armed intervention.1348 In other words, sovereign States always require a 
human representative to speak on their behalf.1349 
Of course, this conundrum may not be present in all non-international armed conflicts. 
As practice has shown us, civil wars come in many shapes and sizes, making their legal 
evaluation a case-by-case matter. An illustrative example is the contrast between the 
current non-international armed conflicts in Syria and Ukraine. While both States are 
undeniably undergoing civil wars, these conflicts differ from each other considerably. 
The conflict in Syria has arguably engulfed the State as an entity, whereas the civil war 
within Ukraine has been confined to certain parts of Ukrainian territory. 1350 
Consequently, the government of Ukraine has faced much less speculation over its 
effectiveness and capacities, a situation which is heavily contrasted by the current 
international scuffle over the legitimate representative of Syria.1351 
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In addition to the issues over the legitimate representative, applying invited 
interventions in non-international armed conflicts contains problems relating to the duty 
of non-intervention. This obligation still stands in today’s international law, and thus 
places several limitations on the applicability of intervention by invitation in civil 
wars.1352 Most of them concern ensuring that third States do not intrude in another’s 
internal matters, a risk which is always realisable during armed interventions.1353 Thus, 
although the newly internationalised nature of civil wars may open opportunities for 
external interventions, the possible effects on the purely internal matters of the host State 
have not vanished. For example, if a third State intervenes in another’s civil war to combat 
terrorism, its intervention may also change the power relations between the war’s 
factions. To state it differently, while the external intervention may have been staged due 
to the international elements of the civil war, it can affect the conflict’s internal aspects 
as well.1354 
Therefore, third States intervening in another’s civil war should only do so in a limited 
manner. Any intervention must be executed with great care and well-defined goals, such 
as combatting terrorist organisations, as only through such efforts can the operation’s 
influence be as limited as possible.1355 Of course, this is easier said than done. Armed 
interventions by nature have the tendency to unravel in unexpected manners, which means 
that it is impossible to plan them perfectly beforehand. In its essence, this sentiment brings 
us back to the core reason for banning armed force by States: the use of force remains 
unpredictable, as even the simplest of measures can lead to full-scale global wars.1356 
Intervention by invitation is no stranger to such escalation, as evidenced by the doctrine’s 
deployment in the early stages of the Second World War, and its subsequent effect on the 
War itself. 1357  Such fears can still be realised when applying invited interventions, 
especially since civil wars now often bear international elements. 
How States should draw the lines on intervening upon request in a civil war is a 
multifaceted question, and the answers are privy to the individual interventions 
themselves. Of course, from the perspective of an international lawyer, the most desirable 
route would be to rely on the Security Council and its possible authorisations on the 
matter. After all, collective security should still be the centrepiece of the regulation under 
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the Charter, even if intervention by invitation has been allowed to frolic about. 1358 
Furthermore, as in the case of Mali, intervention by invitation and collective security can 
work alongside one another, with invited intervention being used as a supporting act in 
the midst of collective measures.1359 In other words, the goals set forth by a Security 
Council authorisation to deploy collective force can also be used to limit the scope of an 
invited intervention as well. However, as Security Council action cannot be taken for 
granted, this route also remains most improbable.  
In this likely absence of Security Council activity, intervening States will have to enact 
individual assessments on preserving the duty of non-intervention. This will inevitably 
lead to erratic results, as States tend to have such contrasting opinions when it comes to 
armed interventions of all sorts. Naturally, since the principle of non-intervention is a 
norm of customary international law, its evolution remains in constant rotation 
anyway. 1360  Thus, in accordance with the apparent flimsiness of the duty of non-
intervention, the application of invited interventions during civil wars is slated for a 
bumpy ride for the near future. Still, all hope should not be cast aside. After all, even in 
Nicaragua the ICJ found that while select States may test its limits, the duty of non-
intervention does not automatically yield to these demands.1361 Instead, the norm aims to 
uphold the general consensus of the international community as a whole,1362 thus working 
towards the same global values that have necessitated the resurge of intervention by 
invitation. 
 
3.1.3. Non-International Armed Conflicts and Foreign Interventions: Finding the Way 
Forward  
Upon examining contemporary State practice, it appears that intervention by invitation 
in the context of a non-international armed conflict has become more accepted, or at least 
tolerated, in the recent decades.1363 However, for now this acceptance seems to be limited 
to situations in which a civil war entails an international aspect, such as a threat of 
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international terrorism or the involvement of the Security Council. 1364  Hence, it is 
currently best to state that the increasing appearances of invited interventions in civil wars 
is at least partly connected to the thinning line between different conflicts, which makes 
the identification of a purely non-international armed conflict more difficult.1365 This 
would also indicate that the practice is not due to the complete dissolution of the duty of 
non-intervention, even if its limits are being tested.1366 
Still, even in this limited context several issues persist, the most important of them 
relating to evaluating the representative of the host State. Since the effective control test 
still stands as the primary mean of evaluation, the presence of a non-international armed 
conflict may cause a stalemate. A civil war in itself signifies a loss of territorial control 
and the presence of two or more warring factions, which means that one may find it 
impossible to fulfil the requirement of effective control. 1367  However, this is not 
necessarily the case in all civil wars, as some such conflicts may be limited to certain 
parts of the host State. The on-going Ukrainian civil war, in which fighting has mostly 
been restricted to the Eastern portions of the country, is an example of this.1368  
Nevertheless, putting invited intervention into use in civil wars — at least as the 
standalone legal element — may still be pushing the doctrine too far. After all, 
intervention by invitation remains a form of armed force which does not function 
effortlessly with the system of the Charter.1369 Given that invited interventions already 
have sketchy lines in practice, applying them during a civil war might be too much for 
the doctrine to withstand. Indeed, this is where the tender position of intervention by 
invitation might not be able to attend to the various issues concerning foreign armed force 
during a civil war. Instead, attention may have to be turned to the Security Council and 
collective security, which has access to a wider variety of legal measures. 
Security Council action is not a fool-proof solution, though. Time after time, the 
Council has proven itself to be incapable of properly enacting collective security, reaching 
a point where such incapacity has become an inherent problem of the organ.1370 The 
                                                 
1364 de Wet, ‘Modern Practice of Intervention by Invitation’, pp. 992-994 and 996-997; Bannelier 
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problem here is the lack of consensus amongst the Permanent Five: if no agreement is 
found, collective security remains dormant.1371 This issue exists in the context of civil 
wars as well, since the Council has often been unable to resolve such conflicts, which 
leaves the door open for unilateral forms of armed force. This is inter alia the case in the 
Syrian Civil War, which — after a Security Council impasse that has spanned over several 
years — now involves multiple foreign interventions.1372 Some of these interventions 
have allegedly been pursued at the consent of the Syrian representative: the question of 
who exactly embodies such a representative remains debated.1373 
As with Syria, invited interventions during civil wars can result in States unilaterally 
taking up the task of intervening and thus supporting opposing factions of the conflict. 
This would inevitably lead to several issues. Firstly, one would have to determine which 
invitation to intervene is legitimate. Secondly, the duty of non-intervention must be 
preserved as well, a task that is difficult to fulfil under these kinds of circumstances. 
Thirdly, it can be questioned if a civil war can be resolved through foreign military 
intervention: in other words, the possible aftermath of the armed activities must be 
addressed. These issues remain largely unattended to by the current intervention by 
invitation. Of course, musings on such matters are perhaps of a political rather than legal 
nature, at least on the surface. However, all law is ultimately political as well, and 
international law manifests this duality thoroughly. Hence, if the success of intervention 
by invitation is the aspiration in the context of non-international armed conflicts, the 
doctrine cannot continue to avoid these issues. 
In addition to its own specific issues, applying invited interventions during civil wars 
has also affected a formerly internal matter of other kind: secessionist conflicts. Civil 
wars and internal conflicts with secessionist aspirations are bound by the same legal 
norms, which means that any development concerning the former will influence the other 
as well. It is thus pertinent to study intervention by invitation and secessionist conflicts 
in more detail. 
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3.2. Intervention by Invitation and Secessionist Movements 
3.2.1. Applying Armed Intervention to Achieve External Self-Determination 
The use of force at the behest of the territorial State is irrevocably linked with internal 
unrest and conflict, connecting it to severe disruption.1374 Such disruption could at times 
be categorised as spurts of the self-determination of peoples, as inter alia exemplified by 
the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia in 1968.1375 Sometimes these problems concerning 
internal self-determination can escalate to a point at which a portion of the territorial State 
wants to emancipate itself to form a new sovereign State of its own.1376 This is obviously 
a controversial proposition from the perspective of international law.1377 Nonetheless, 
such secessionist movements have been capturing the world’s attention in the past couple 
of decades, with the examples of Kosovo, Palestine and most recently Crimea being just 
some amongst the many.1378 The reactions to such movements have ranged from negative 
to positive, to the point where the world community is still very polarised on the 
matter.1379 
While the global opinion on many secessionist movements is experiencing a 
transformative moment, the traditional legal standard banning third States from getting 
involved in such aspirations has stood its ground.1380 In other words, secessionist attempts 
must occur without foreign armed intervention, either directly or indirectly.1381 This 
means that third States cannot militarily intervene in the face of potential territorial break-
up to support the central government resisting the movement or the actor behind the 
dissonance. 1382  This is due to the principle of non-intervention: any secessionist 
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movement remains an internal affair of the respective State, denoting that other members 
of the international community must refrain from intervening in such situations.1383  
In addition, foreign military support to a group seeking to break away from an existing 
State would also result in the violation of the prohibition on the use of force.1384 After all, 
when laying down the ban on the use of force, Article 2(4) of the Charter specifically 
mentions the territorial integrity of States, meaning that internationally recognised 
borders cannot be altered through armed measures.1385 This statement has been reflected 
in subsequent Resolutions and documents of various UN organs and other actors, which 
have stood against recognising territorial changes resulting from the use of force.1386 In 
the scholarly world, few would question this legal standing: however, certain States have 
challenged the notion, as armed interventions in the midst of secessionist movements 
have taken place. 1387  Some of these interventions have allegedly been pursued with 
sovereign consent, which may pertain to either the traditional host State or the new 
aspiring sovereign entity.1388 
However, despite the best efforts of certain States, the relationship between 
intervention by invitation and secession cannot be achieved easily. The two concepts have 
tended to be invoked in quite opposing mindsets, which can mean that their simultaneous 
application may result in direct collisions. Still, given that the idea of applying external 
self-determination outside the context of decolonisation is rather new, exploring its 
connection to intervention by invitation is an interesting prospect. 
 
3.2.2. Invited Interventions and Secession: Current Developments Concerning Crimea 
No comprehensive study on armed intervention by invitation and secession would be 
complete without taking a stance on the Ukrainian crisis and the question of Crimea. The 
crisis first emerged as internal unrest in Ukraine in 2013, but has since escalated into an 
armed conflict with various international elements, including both direct and indirect use 
                                                 
1383 Friendly Relations, Principles III and V; Rights and Duties, Article 4; Inadmissibility of 
Intervention (1981), Principle II (f); Corten, ‘Russian Intervention’, p. 30. 
1384 UN Charter, Article 2(4); Tancredi, ‘A Normative “Due Process”’, pp. 189-190. 
1385 UN Charter, Article 2(4); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall, para. 87. 
1386  Friendly Relations, Principle I; Rights and Duties, Articles 9 and 11; Inadmissibility of 
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of force by foreign actors.1389 The most prominent of these foreign powers has been 
Russia, which has participated in the crisis in various ways, with its actions ranging from 
a fully-fledged armed intervention to providing more subtle support to rebelling 
factions.1390  
From the perspective of secession and intervention by invitation, the most important 
of these activities is the Russian armed intervention in Crimea, staged in March 2014. As 
is now well known, the military intervention was in part based upon the purported consent 
of the territorial State, Ukraine.1391 The consent was argued to have been extracted from 
former Ukrainian President Yanukovych, who at the time had fled his homeland to 
Russia.1392 In addition, Russia eventually relied on a consent supplied by the then-newly 
appointed autonomous government of Crimea.1393  During this time, the autonomous 
authorities decided to hold a referendum over the region’s secession, with the ultimate 
intention of joining Russia. 1394  The referendum ended in a landslide in favour of 
secession, and shortly after the authorities of Crimea and Russia signed an agreement to 
make the peninsula a part of Russia.1395 The annexation has not been accepted by the vast 
majority of the international community, which continues to regard the Crimean region 
as a part of Ukraine instead.1396 
The Crimean question has many peculiarities. The use of invited intervention in 
argumentation was not unexpected, but its combination with the right to self-
determination was. The two concepts have traditionally tended to work towards 
noticeably different goals, making the choice curious. For one, intervention by invitation 
is clearly a concept grounded in the purported sovereignty of the host State and its ability 
to invite a foreign intervention into its own territory.1397 Adversely, the right to self-
determination in its most extreme form can aim for the territorial breakup of a sovereign 
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State, for the purposes of granting certain peoples the right to secession.1398 Putting such 
doctrines together results in an inevitable conflict. 
However, Russia’s argumentation on Crimea, albeit in many respects staggering, has 
not appeared completely unexpectedly. Instead, it has been presented after notable 
developments that have sprawled across numerous decades. This observation naturally 
refers to intervention by invitation becoming at least partially applicable during 
internationalised internal conflicts. 1399  Furthermore, the opportunities afforded by 
external self-determination have been debated extensively during the past few decades, 
with the question of Kosovo being a notable example.1400 Of course, one has to bear in 
mind that both ventures are still in development. In other words, the results of their 
respective evolutions are far from being set in stone, let alone having merged into one, 
immediately applicable notion. 
This tentative finding must be remembered when exploring the connection between 
intervention by invitation and secession. After all, invited interventions and civil wars are 
not yet a sealed union, which makes matters complicated for the former’s relationship 
with secession. The same norms govern foreign interventions in both civil wars and 
secession, but the rules on the use of force are more strict in reference to the latter.1401 
This is due to the inevitable fact that staging an armed intervention to realise secession 
would result in reforming accepted international borders through the use of force.1402 
Such armed force would threaten the purposes of the UN and Article 2(4) of its 
Charter.1403 
In any event, one of the most prominent questions raised by the Crimean crisis has 
been the application of intervention by invitation side by side with secession. Such a 
proposition is problematic, as the concepts of intervention by invitation and external self-
determination do not appear to be well matched. The first alternative, basing an 
intervention on the consent of the pre-existing host State, directly opposes the need to 
invoke external self-determination. The other alternative, basing the intervention on the 
consent of the seceding factor, also ends in stalemate. The core idea of intervention by 
invitation is based on the consent of a sovereign State — in other words, the doctrine 
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presupposes Statehood.1404 Thus, militarily supporting a secessionist movement upon 
request seems legally impossible as well,1405 at least until said secessionist factor manages 
to attain sovereignty.1406 
Due to these issues, the Crimean annexation was met with a predominantly negative 
response, which means that the case has been rejected as evidence of new international 
law.1407 However, certain questions remain. While this case failed, could a scenario akin 
to Crimea’s succeed under any circumstances? If so, what would those circumstances 
entail? To answer these questions, the arguments presented in the Crimean crisis will be 
dissected in more detail, in an effort to discover if they could become plausible from the 
perspective of international law.1408 
 
3.2.3. Consensual Use of Force and Secession: of Crimea, Aspiring States and 
Legitimate Representatives 
As noted above, invoking intervention by invitation and secession simultaneously 
borders on impossible, at least in the purely legal sphere. Still, these concerns did not stop 
one of the most controversial applications of intervention by invitation, the Russian use 
of force in Ukraine in 2014. As is now well known, the peninsula of Crimea was claimed 
by Russia in March 2014, when it announced the region’s annexation following its 
military intervention in Eastern Ukraine.1409 The Russian position on the matter has been 
striking, and the appearances of intervention by invitation and Crimea’s right to secession 
are no exceptions to this. In fact, the correspondence between the two concepts has been 
interesting and multi-faceted, as it has raised questions on the norms’ limits and co-
application.1410 
The Russian arguments on intervention by invitation can be categorised into two 
distinguishable parts, the consent of former President Yanukovych, and the request of the 
Crimean authorities in their autonomous capacity, which we should now examine in 
respect to the claim of Crimea’s secession.1411 We should first deal with the relatively 
obvious: the consent issued by former President Yanukovych. The legality of 
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Yanukovych’s invitation has been discussed before, and its validity has been established 
as questionable at best.1412 In any event, even if the consent could be seen as legitimate, 
it is difficult to see how such an invitation could be applied side by side with secession 
against the host State’s will, which is effectively what the Russian intervention resulted 
in.1413 Combining these two notions appears to create a paradox. 
Instead, the tentative Russian argumentation on the validity of the autonomous 
Crimea’s representatives is of particular interest.1414 Given that secessionist movements 
have gained notable support in recent decades, one may wonder if such an entity could 
validly invite a third State to intervene in order to reach this goal. Of course, in the case 
of Crimea, such propositions did not meet an excited response.1415 And indeed, given the 
legal limitation that any secession must take place without a foreign armed intervention, 
this seems to be quite an impossible task.1416 Still, international law is flexible and 
evolutionary by nature, which allows for fast turns. The changing stances towards 
intervening in civil wars could hence be formulating an additional question: if the 
principle of non-intervention has arguably been modified to allow such interventions, 
could an armed intervention to support a secessionist movement be plausible? 
The answer is negative. Intervention by invitation is a concept that rests on the premise 
of a State and its capacity to consent to the use of force in its territory.1417 If the actor 
purporting to ask for a foreign armed intervention is only in the process of gaining 
sovereignty, the armed measure should not be available to it. Moreover, unilateral 
intervention in a civil war is still a touchy subject, and therefore far from being a fait 
accompli under all circumstances.1418 Given that it shares much doctrinal ground with 
civil wars, the same will have to apply to secessionist conflicts as well. Thus, militarily 
supporting a separatist movement will inevitably violate the ban on the use of force and 
the duty of non-intervention, some of the most important cornerstones of international 
law.1419 
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For these reasons, it appears improbable that intervention by invitation as such could 
be used to enact external self-determination. Of course, given the flexible nature of the 
Charter,1420 it is theoretically possible for the rules governing the use of force to evolve 
to allow foreign interventions in support of secessionist movements.1421 However, if such 
evolution is to take place, it would be unlikely for the practice not be labelled as 
intervention by invitation. The concept is too firmly connected to the traditional take on 
sovereignty, meaning that it would have a difficult time catering to the more modern 
needs of external self-determination. Thus, use of force working towards such goals ought 
to be classified as a doctrine of its own, rather than as a part of intervention by invitation. 
Still, given the polarised responses that States generally give to secessionist attempts, 
it is difficult to see how such an evolution could happen. In fact, adding armed force into 
the already convoluted mix of secessionist attempts is unlikely to occur smoothly.1422 
Furthermore, accepting the use of force to realise territorial changes of any nature is 
fundamentally against the prohibition entailed in Article 2(4) of the Charter, meaning that 
the emergence of the aforementioned change would inevitably signify the collapse of the 
system.1423 Indeed, in such a case, little would be left of the prohibition on the use of force 
altogether. Thus, using foreign armed force to realise secession could threaten the world 
order, which is why the prohibition on the use of force must supersede secessionist 
aspirations under these circumstances.1424 
 
3.2.4. Intervention by Invitation, New-born States and Secession: Possible Future 
Prospects 
The thesis has thus far established that combining traditional intervention by invitation 
and secession is difficult, as in most cases this would result in inevitable violation of 
territorial sovereignty. However, additional scenarios are still to be considered when it 
comes to secession and intervention by invitation. For instance, what occurs in a situation 
when the secessionist movement has gained notable international support, perhaps 
causing some members of the international community to consider it a new sovereign 
entity? Could such an establishment validly invite a foreign intervention, even with the 
intention of joining that same intervening State? After all, under such circumstances, the 
                                                 
1420 Franck, Recourse to Force, pp. 5-7. 
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invitation to intervene would come from the new territorial State, which would most 
effectively solve the dilemma presented above.1425 
This scenario even has some reflection in practice, as it appears to be one of the 
tentative claims presented by Russia over the Crimean issue.1426 In March 2014, Russia 
ultimately stopped relying on the invitation supplied by Yanukovych, and apparently 
decided to depend fully upon the consent of the Crimean authorities, presumably in 
conjunction with developments concerning the region’s separation.1427 In this particular 
case, the argument found little success, as one of its biggest gripes is the staggering speed 
with which the secession was executed. Even if the Crimean calls for external self-
determination had been found to be valid, the region could not have attained instant 
sovereignty upon its declaration of independence and referendum. This is so because such 
actions do not by themselves meet the qualifications of Statehood.1428 Furthermore, the 
Russian use of force allegedly began before the Crimean authorities issued the plea for 
intervention, which further undermines the validity of this claim.1429 
However, this finding does not mean that such an argument could not succeed in other 
circumstances. In fact, given the concepts of intervention by invitation and secession, this 
proposition is the most conceivable means of putting the two norms into practice in order 
to reach a common goal. If a certain distance exists between the formation of the new 
sovereign State and the invitation to intervene, the scenario does remain plausible, albeit 
thinly. Of course, whether this situation is probable in practice is a completely different 
matter. A State absorbing another into itself, in particularly following an armed 
intervention, is inherently controversial, and thus such activities would not easily gain 
wide acceptance.1430 The lack of such support can be crucial for these aspirations. As 
evidenced by the situations of Southern Rhodesia and Crimea, in the legal sense other 
States are capable of blocking the birth of a new State or its transition into another.1431  
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Moreover, it does not seem too far-fetched to conclude that negative responses would 
be given if intervention by invitation was immediately applied to realise secession. The 
tentative connection between the two already proved well too much in the case of 
Crimea,1432 and thus it appears very unlikely that States would support such aspirations 
in the future. Even Russia, the most prominent advocate on the matter, does not seem 
keen on this argument, as the State very carefully avoided making infallible connections 
between the two doctrines in its own claims over the Crimean annexation.1433 
One can thus contend that any immediate relation between intervention by invitation 
and external self-determination against the host State’s will remains on a level of 
hypothetical speculation. The practical option of deploying the two concepts 
simultaneously ranges from highly improbable to borderline impossible, depending on 
the facts of any given case. The underlying cause for this is the different origins and goals 
of the doctrines in question. Unilateral secession aims at the construction of a new 
sovereign entity against the territorial State’s will,1434 whereas consensual use of force 
has attempted to tether global tensions to a sustainable level. 1435  Furthermore, 
intervention by invitation, purporting to base itself upon the sovereignty of the territorial 
State, cannot entertain secessionist aspirations because of their premise. Such aspirations 
are only intended to establish sovereignty instead of already possessing it, rendering 
intervention by invitation unavailable. 1436  Such armed interventions could perhaps 
become plausible following the birth of a new State; however, even in such 
circumstances, their chances of gaining international acceptance appear unlikely. The 
attainment of sovereignty and the use of force could be too close for comfort, risking 
further derogation of the Charter’s system. 
 
3.3. Invited Interventions and Internal Conflicts: Final Remarks 
While cases of domestic unrest have traditionally contributed to the increased use of 
intervention by invitation, applying the doctrine in full-scale internal conflicts has been a 
different matter.1437 In fact, such a practice was previously considered to be prohibited 
due to the principle of non-intervention.1438 Of course, foreign interventions in civil wars 
                                                 
1432 Record of the Security Council’s 7125th Meeting, p. 5; Territorial Integrity of Ukraine, paras. 
1-2 and 5-6. 
1433 Record of the Security Council’s 7144th Meeting, pp. 8-10. 
1434 Quebec, para. 111. 
1435 See Chapter III, Section 1. 
1436 Record of the Security Council’s 7125th Meeting, p. 5; Green, ‘Editorial Comment’, p. 7. 
1437 Marston (ed), ‘United Kingdom Materials’, p. 616. 
1438  Friendly Relations, Principle III; Rights and Duties, Articles 3-4; Inadmissibility of 
Intervention, paras. 1-2. 
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did take place regardless of this prohibition, and this practice has continued since the 
cessation of the Cold War as well.1439 The duty of non-intervention initially fended off 
the challenges these interventions posed to its legal position, but eventually the continuing 
practice had an effect on the principle.1440 As a result, foreign armed interventions have 
become more acceptable in certain non-international armed conflicts with international 
elements: in other words, in civil wars which cannot be classified as purely non-
international.1441 
One should not read too much into the statement presented above, as identifying the 
international element which can legitimise an external intervention is not simple. To state 
it differently, not all international elements automatically activate the right of foreign 
intervention, especially in a military form. As illustrated earlier, matters concerning 
international terrorism and collective security have been the clearest examples of global 
elements which may activate the right to resort to an armed intervention, and even they 
come with their share of issues.  
Furthermore, even these two elements have been at play for a relatively small periods. 
Their effect has thus far been restricted to specific eras, and whether they continue to have 
an impact in future eras remains to be seen. For example, the fight against international 
terrorism can be regarded as a state of exception instead of the new normal, meaning that 
its influence may lack longevity. Of course, this fight has now continued for decades, 
indicating that in terms of time, the situation appears to have exceeded that of an 
exception. 
The muddling distinctions between internal and international conflicts can also lead to 
the dissolution of the concept of a non-international armed conflict as we know it.1442 The 
presence of an international element inevitably suggests that the conflict is not internal in 
nature, bringing the entire idea of a civil war into question. This can mean that the conflict, 
which may have started as non-international, may subsequently be transformed in an 
international one if enough external elements and armed interventions persist.1443 
In any event, the effect of applying invited interventions in civil wars has not fully 
ascended to the legal realm of secession. Even if the duty of non-intervention has evolved 
to allow invited interventions in certain internal conflicts, the prohibition on the use of 
                                                 
1439 Gray, International Law and the Use of Force, pp. 86-87 and 113. 
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force has not yielded to permit such interventions to realise secession.1444 Moreover, 
intervention by invitation and external self-determination do not work towards identical 
objectives, making their immediate co-application virtually impossible. It also cannot be 
stated that the self-determination of peoples would have become pressing enough to 
validate external military intervention, for such a development would denote discarding 
the common values embodied in the prohibition to use force. Hence, the Charter’s 
framework for armed force still rules supreme to any perceived right to secession, 
resulting in military interventions becoming inapplicable.1445  
                                                 
1444 Green, ‘Editorial Comment’, p. 7. 
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4. Changes in Circumstances: Who Will Now Execute Invited 
Interventions? 
 
4.1. From Cold War Polarisation to Contemporary Issues 
In international relations, intervention has always primarily been part of the repertoire 
of the most powerful States.1446 This premise has applied to military and non-military 
interventions alike. 1447  Intervention by invitation has also reflected this imbalance. 
Throughout the centuries, it has tended be a doctrine often exhausted by an exclusive club 
of States, often with either geopolitical or post-colonialist interests.1448 Admission to said 
club have generally been granted according to different notions of power, most often of 
a political and military nature.1449 This was certainly the case during the Cold War, when 
invited interventions were frequently executed by the superpowers of the time, whereas 
smaller States were relegated to less prominent roles. 1450  However, the latest 
developments since the end of this polarisation of relations may be pointing in another 
direction.1451 And indeed, the cessation of the Cold War polarisation appeared to suggest 
that unilateral armed interventions, including consensual use of force by the world’s 
superpowers, had gone out of vogue in conjunction with the era’s politics.1452 
As it turned out, smaller States have begun to gain more traction in the field of invited 
interventions. This has been manifested in Africa, where various interventions have taken 
place between neighbouring countries.1453 Furthermore, many of these cases entail full-
scale armed interventions, instead of simply consisting of lesser means of military 
interference such as providing weapons or training.1454 The same issue has appeared in 
Europe as well, but perhaps in a subtler manner. The focus has been on different forms 
of regional military cooperation rather than fully-fledged interventions, making the 
situation markedly different.1455 Nevertheless, some European States, which formerly 
                                                 
1446 Corfu Channel, pp. 35-36; Koskenniemi, Politics of International Law, pp. 126-127. 
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stressed a strict duty of non-intervention, have been forced to re-evaluate their stances on 
the various forms of armed force, intervention by invitation included. A poignant example 
is the small country of Finland, which has decided to distance itself from its formerly very 
non-belligerent foreign policy by introducing new legislation on available forms of armed 
force.1456 The new legislation allows Finland inter alia to militarily intervene on request, 
even urgently under certain circumstances, 1457  a measure which was previously 
unavailable under the country’s legislation.1458 
But what has led to these changes? The immediate answer appears simple: 
circumstances. For instance, while various African States were already subjected to 
invited interventions throughout the Cold War, these operations were often executed by 
former colonial powers.1459 Since then, these intervenors have expressed restraint over 
possible foreign armed interventions, which has made the practice of neighbouring States 
intervening in each other’s territory more frequent.1460 Conversely, the European change 
has been spearheaded by the rise of various terror attacks inter alia in Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom.1461  
Of course, the on-going change does not necessarily mean that the most powerful 
States have completely yielded interventions to their smaller counterparts. As is well 
known, the United States continues to execute invited interventions in various manners, 
and Russia has also returned to the spotlight with its interventions in Ukraine and 
Syria.1462 In addition to the two former arch rivals, France has also abandoned its earlier 
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statements which declared interventions by invitation outdated, having intervened upon 
request in Mali since 2013.1463 Consequently, the former and current superpowers, few as 
they may be in today’s international community, still continue to be the frontrunners when 
it comes to intervening militarily upon request. 
Nevertheless, the increasing number of smaller States either engaging in or showing 
interest in invited interventions is undeniable and potentially transformative. Adding such 
States to the cast of possible intervenors may alter the position of intervention by 
invitation has in international relations. In fact, the doctrine may currently be shedding its 
long-lasting image as an elusive superpower tool, as it could instead evolve into a more 
general practice among States. By doing so, the doctrine could perhaps inch closer to 
becoming truly global and invoked for common values, rather than being a raw necessity 
during a power struggle. Thus, examining the current developments in the bill of 
intervenors is of importance, and said task will be undertaken next. 
 
4.2. Consensual Use of Force and Smaller States as Intervenors: the Effects 
of a Lopsided Balance 
As stated throughout this thesis, intervention by invitation is a manifestation of power 
politics. This has been the case since the doctrine’s inception in the 1800s, and the premise 
has certainly been upheld during the subsequent centuries. Furthermore, since the 
conclusion of the Second World War, intervention by invitation has chiefly emerged 
whenever globalisation, or collective security (to be more precise), has failed.1464 The 
doctrine has thus painted a rather controversial picture, one which is not easily 
appreciated by all nations despite the apparent acceptance consensual use of force has 
enjoyed. 
As a result, intervention by invitation has not been a plausible measure for States of 
smaller stature to exhaust. If anything, such countries have tended to be the targets of 
invited interventions, which has naturally stained the name of the doctrine amongst 
them.1465 Moreover, the hard realities behind the use of force have had an inevitable 
effect: militarily intervening in another State requires vast resources, which many 
countries simply do not have.1466 Still, this premise does not mean that such countries are 
complete non-factors when it comes to armed interventions. In fact, as established earlier 
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in the thesis, the right to resort to force has traditionally been an integral part of State 
sovereignty itself.1467 This traditional stance has since been at least partially dissolved by 
the Charter, but the core connection between the ability to use armed force and sovereign 
existence still stands.1468 All States must militarily ready themselves for the worst, even 
during our era of relative peace.  
And indeed, this core connection has resurfaced in a manner which has caused smaller 
States to become more active deployers of force, invited interventions included. This 
appears to be an outcome of the transformation which started at the end of the Cold War, 
and has escalated in the past couple of years. The situation is amplified by the unexpected 
bursts of instability which have rocked our perception of contemporary international 
relations. For instance, few would have foreseen the forceful Russian annexation of 
Crimea, the Brexit process currently challenging the European Union or the apparent 
political meltdown reflected in both internal and external affairs of the United States since 
the beginning of the Trump presidency.1469 When the continuous rise of international 
terrorism is added into the mix,1470 one is left with an international community which 
appears to be undergoing changes, leading it to become slightly off-balance.  
At the centre of this lopsided balance has been the relationships between the world’s 
great powers, the United States and Russia in particular. While the exact nature of the 
current relationship is debatable, it has evidently strayed away from the balance of terror 
that dictated the course of the Cold War and subsequently invited interventions.1471 
Moreover, given the diminished number of military operations by the United Kingdom 
and France, the field in which intervention by invitation has often been applied appears 
much less crowded, allowing other, smaller States to appear before the spotlight as 
well.1472 This has led the doctrine towards a transformation. Now ridded of previous 
world politics, intervention by invitation has been forced to reinvent itself. The 
reinvention has resulted in an opening that has since been exhausted by smaller States, 
mostly out of sheer necessity. 
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As it has turned out, the need for invited interventions has not waned in the decades 
since the Cold War. For instance, multiple countries in Africa have continued to suffer 
from internal crises which have required resolution through foreign interventions.1473 
Furthermore, as stated earlier, various European States have encountered situations, 
mostly relating to international terrorism, which have necessitated military help from 
third countries. 1474  In fact, since even the smallest of States cannot presume to be 
excluded from the threat of international terrorism in the current millennium, they may 
have no choice but to participate in the fight against it. This scenario has already been 
realised in practice, and it has led to several smaller States taking part in the military 
activities against ISIS in Iraq and Syria.1475 These measures have varied from small-scale 
help to airstrikes,1476 showcasing not only reverent but multi-layered application of the 
option. 
Thus, even though the Cold War intervenors have partially withdrawn from their 
earlier roles, said parts are still necessary in contemporary international relations. 
Recasting them has been left to other actors, who are inevitably less famous when it 
comes to military interventions. This necessity would seem to suggest that intervention 
by invitation has finally managed to become a commonly exhausted concept rather than 
being a superpower staple merely tolerated by others. Nonetheless, it is too soon to make 
a final judgment on the matter. In fact, while these developments may have polished the 
doctrine’s external image, they have not completely ridded it of its core realities, which 
may hamper the usage of consensual use of force by smaller actors. Hence, the change 
we are witnessing may be of a noticeably superficial nature, which keeps intervention by 
invitation from drifting too far from its roots. 
 
4.3. Assembling a New Cast: the Future Billing of Intervenors  
With new challenges emerging constantly, intervention by invitation has started to 
shed the trope of primarily existing to fulfil the needs of the Cold War’s great powers.1477 
As a result, they have indeed eased their grip on invited interventions, which has meant 
that smaller, regional States have begun to take a more active role on the matter.1478 
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Nevertheless, the doctrine has still not been fully released for all States to use. The 
changed circumstances within the international community do not erase the cold realities 
entailed in interventions of any type: they require military and political prowess, 
possessed by the select few. 
Of course, the evolved application of invited interventions provides more ground for 
smaller States to participate in such operations. For instance, the muddled distinctions 
between unilateral and collective military measures may open such options, as matters 
requiring global attention also often require a wide range of participating States.1479 
However, the chance of smaller States undertaking such measures completely unilaterally 
remain slim, for reasons mentioned above. Politically speaking, such States do not have 
the same arsenal as their more powerful counterparts. This leaves them more vulnerable 
to issues ranging from the commencement of the military intervention to its aftermath.  
As a result, smaller States are bound to be calculative in military operations, as well as 
seek assurance from their more powerful partners. This has inter alia been the case with 
the States that have undertaken military activities against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. The cast 
of intervenors is vastly more versatile in Iraq, the legally easier target of the two, where 
the deployed measures vary from military training to airstrikes. 1480  Conversely, the 
smaller States using force in Syria are not only fewer in number,1481 but also considerably 
more restrained in terms of activities.1482  Only a handful of States have undertaken 
airstrikes or provided assistance to factions of the conflict, and they have tended to invoke 
collective self-defence rather than pure intervention by invitation.1483  
Even more importantly, the military activities on both Iraqi and Syrian soil carry a 
political safety blanket provided by the participation of the United States,1484 arguably the 
most powerful State in the world. In addition, Russia’s apparent tolerance of the military 
                                                 
1479 Threats to International Peace and Security Caused by Terrorist Attacks, SC Res. 2249, para. 
5. 
1480 Mills, ISIS/Daesh: the Military Response in Iraq and Syria, pp. 27 and 36-39. 
1481  These States also tend to be members of NATO, which provides additional political 
protection. 
1482 Mills, ISIS/Daesh: the Military Response in Iraq and Syria, pp. 27-31. 
1483 Letter dated 10 February 2016 from Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Representative 
Mission of the Netherlands to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, 10 February 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/132; Letter dated 3 June 2016 from the Permanent 
Representative of Norway to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, 3 June 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/513; Letter dated 7 June 2016 from the Permanent 
Representative of Belgium to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, 9 June 2016, UN Doc. S/2016/523; Ruys, Ferro and Verlinden, ‘Digest of State Practice, 
1 January —30 June 2016’, pp. 304-305; Mills, ISIS/Daesh: the Military Response in Iraq and 
Syria, pp. 27-31. 
1484 Letter dated 23 September 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of 
America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 23 September 2014. 
 
  227 
 
 
activities taken against ISIS,1485 alongside its own proactive involvement,1486 is bound to 
cause the biggest objections on the matter to subside. In other words, the activities of the 
smaller intervenors, which have arguably been necessitated by distinguishable global 
threats,1487 still need to be tempered by the presence and policies of more powerful States. 
It can hence be concluded that the changed circumstances have not erased the myriad 
factors which make intervention best suited for bigger countries. One such factor is the 
reality of State responsibility, which is much more difficult to realise with powerful 
States. Certain States, particularly the five permanent members of the Security Council, 
hold a metaphorical royal flush in international relations, which effectively allows them 
to evade State responsibility to infinity. Smaller states, short of such trump cards, will 
have to plan their involvement in military operations much more carefully. 
Nevertheless, one should not utterly dismiss the emergence of smaller States 
intervening upon request, even if excessive optimism ought to be discarded. While the 
impact of smaller States deploying consensual use of force may not be massive, the 
doctrine’s functionality is still evolving. After all, as established on various occasions 
during this dissertation, intervention by invitation in its post-1945 incarnation is primarily 
a product of superpower politics. In the wake of its initial renewal, it appeared unlikely 
that the doctrine could ever evolve past that premise. The fact that the opposite is currently 
taking place, even in small doses, showcases the ability of the concept to reinvent itself 
in the face of changes.  
Therefore, the increased activity of smaller States reinforces the flexibility and 
adaptability of the doctrine. This ability of reinvention will play a central role in keeping 
intervention by invitation afloat, in one form or another. Still, reinvention should not 
come without determined intention, which is something that intervention by invitation 
may currently be lacking. After all, for all its instability and polarisation, the Cold War 
also provided consensual use of force with a definite objective, which kept the doctrine 
in check. Conversely, the current changes, although undeniably positive in some respects, 
may be muddling it. In other words, since the doctrine is currently evolving, it is also in 
limbo. Hence, in order to break this cycle and prevent intervention by invitation from 
becoming too unpredictable, the concept should find common values to uphold, while 
still being tethered to the stone-cold realities of the international community. 
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5. A Reminder from Realism: The Possibility of State 
Responsibility for Intervention by Invitation 
 
5.1. Preliminary Remarks 
The chapter presented discussion about the current tides of intervention by invitation. 
This has set the focus on the particular modern forms of the doctrine. What is further, the 
previous sections toyed with the idea of intervention by invitation becoming a champion 
of common values, which perhaps paints a hopeful picture of the doctrine’s future. 
However, these hopeful images should not turn into blind optimism: the use of force 
always leaves its marks, which stands true for intervention by invitation as well. By 
default, no armed intervention can end without irrevocable consequences, both in terms 
of casualties and material damage.1488 States often do their best to evade any liability in 
such issues, even when these consequences have been a direct result of their use of force. 
From the purely legal perspective, this problem can be attended to, as the regime of State 
responsibility is in place to ensure that States may be held accountable for their wrongful 
acts.1489  
However, true to international law, politics may hamper the proper interpretation and 
application of the regime, particularly where the use of force is concerned. This behaviour 
is well exemplified by the aforementioned military intervention in Libya in 2011, which 
in retrospect can be deemed as severely lacking.1490 The troops executing the intervention 
arguably acted beyond the mandate to use force, meaning that the aftermath of the 
intervention was left unplanned.1491 As a result, the democratic development in Libya was 
halted, which allowed new factions to gain momentum.1492 If anything, the intervention 
has pushed Libya into further chaos, and not least due to the manner in which the 
intervention was executed.1493 However, no serious questions about the accountability 
over the excessive military campaign, and its subsequent effects on Libya, have been 
raised.1494  
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Intervention by invitation serves as an interesting example in this respect. The doctrine 
in its current form is clearly reliant on the regime of State responsibility: the legal 
reasoning behind this has been explained in Chapters II and III.1495 As established earlier, 
the host State’s consent precludes the wrongfulness of the use of force deployed in its 
territory.1496 This premise can be linked to State responsibility, in particular Article 20 of 
the ILC Draft Articles on the matter.1497 While this premise widely removes the State 
responsibility of the intervenor, certain plausible openings remain. These openings mostly 
concern the situations in which the intervention has somehow spiralled out of control, 
reawakening the issue of accountability.  
Still, even in these cases, imposing State responsibility is not easy, as a sufficient link 
between the intervenor and the possible unlawful activities has to be established. Showing 
this connection becomes pertinent when one has to examine the actions of de facto organs 
of a State, in an effort to discern if they held sufficient control. In fact, in the context of 
invited interventions, the actions of de facto bodies provide the hardest conundrums in 
reference to State responsibility. After all, given the negative prospects that come with 
direct military activities, many may prefer intervening via proxy, a move which hinders 
the chances of State responsibility. 
Therefore, the possibility of State responsibility, in particular for the activities of de 
facto organs, is of upmost importance for current intervention by invitation. Whether the 
intervenor may be held liable for its actions forms a notable factor in the doctrine’s 
practice, since it affects the willingness of States to execute invited interventions. 
Consequently, this effect is felt in the possibly widening ensemble of intervening States, 
as well as the forms invited interventions may take. Thus, this chapter ends with a dive 
into the realm of State responsibility, and its part in the possible aftermath of intervention 
by invitation. 
 
5.2. Establishing State Responsibility for De Facto Organs: The Intervening 
State’s Control over the Military Activities in Past Case Law 
As established earlier in the thesis, in the case of a properly issued and followed 
invitation, the chances of realising the intervening State’s responsibility for its military 
activities are slim. 1498  However, if an invited intervention has either crossed the 
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boundaries of the host State’s consent or other limitations imposed by international law, 
State responsibility for the intervenor becomes possible. 1499  Furthermore, genuine 
consent may not exist to begin with, either due to coercion or an unauthorised 
representative issuing the invitation, which naturally upholds the problem of 
accountability over the military intervention.1500 Still, some major hurdles need to be 
cleared: as with any case of State responsibility, the unlawful military intervention has to 
be attributable to the intervenor. Since military intervention comes in many forms, the 
parts of the intervening States may range from the lead role to the stage designer, which 
can make tracing the responsibility difficult. 
Naturally, if the de jure actors of the State, such as its official military forces, have 
taken part in such invited interventions, the accountability of the intervenor is more easily 
established. This is due to the legal notion that all States bear responsibility for the actions 
of their officials.1501 Actions committed in such capacities are immediately attributable to 
the State itself, answering the question of responsibility. 1502  However, States often 
intervene upon a purported request indirectly, and settle for delivering military support 
— in the form of arms, training and financial aid — to the inviting authority.1503 In such 
cases, the intervening State does not send its own forces to the territorial State, but does 
nevertheless affect the military situation.1504 Is the intervening State capable of escaping 
its responsibility by delegating its tasks to a non-State actor, even if the State de facto 
controls it? 
In State practice, these invited interventions have often not been executed accordingly, 
for the invitation was not supplied by the representative of the host State. Traditionally, 
this has meant that the intervention was staged to enhance rebel support,1505 but military 
activities undertaken at the behest of an ousted government can fall under this scope, too. 
In any event, in such a case, the intervening State may have had deployed military force 
via delivering support inter alia in the form of arms or training, an act which in itself 
violates various norms of international law. 1506  However, does the intervenor bear 
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responsibility for the actions committed by the forces it has supported, including possible 
violations of international humanitarian law or human rights? 
The premise of this legal predicament lies with the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility. According to Article 8, a State must bear responsibility over the actions 
committed by individuals or groups acting under its direction or control. 1507  This 
essentially expands the scope of State responsibility from its immediately identifiable 
organs, and is in place so that States cannot deter liability by outsourcing their activities 
and duties to non-governmental entities. 1508  This means that a de facto relationship 
between a State and an entity can be enough to establish State responsibility under certain 
circumstances.1509 However, it is unclear if the actions of de facto organs and actors are 
immediately comparable to ones committed by official bodies of the State. Still, the core 
gist of Article 8 is to ensure that States do not escape their liability due to ‘technicalities’ 
over the organ acting on their behalf. 
In the field of armed force, this Article has proven important due to the growing 
popularity of private military companies and their execution of armed tasks traditionally 
undertaken by State militaries.1510 Moreover, the rise of State-sponsored terrorism has 
made the matter infamous as well.1511 For intervention by invitation, this question holds 
much weight both in history and the present day: for decades, States willing to intervene 
upon request have done so covertly, and often at the behest of more or less dubious 
inviters. Additionally, the intervening States have often carried out indirect military 
activities that do not immediately involve their own armed forces. Hence, it is vital that 
the scope of State responsibility expands to forces that are not officially acting for the 
intervening State but are de facto carrying out military operations on its behalf. 
However, Article 8 leaves much room for interpretation. It merely mentions the notion 
of control: it does elaborate on what it entails.1512 In other words, what remains debatable 
is the amount of control required to establish a sufficient link between an entity and the 
State in question. Fortunately, other actors have been willing to fill this void with their 
interpretations: however, the outcome of these interpretations is a conflicting one. 
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Notably, the issue has been discussed by two UN legal organs, the ICJ and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). During the merits phases 
of multiple cases, these courts have formulated two respective lines of interpretation, 
effective and overall control.1513 The notion of effective control requires strict conditions 
to establish State responsibility: overall control is more lenient and focuses on case-by-
case evaluation. Despite the on-going debate, unanimity on which principle is more 
suitable from the perspective of Article 8 of the ILC Draft Articles, or customary 
international in general, is yet to be found.1514 Given this confusion, it is first pertinent to 
examine the three main cases on the matter, and then evaluate how they have been 
responded to in international and scholarly community. 
The case analysis must begin with Nicaragua. The facts and outcome of the case have 
already been cited extensively in this thesis, but the imputability of the intervening State, 
the United States, is yet to be explored. When examining the legality and responsibility 
of the United States over its activities in Nicaragua, the Court had to consider how the 
regime of State responsibility applied in reference to the US support of the Nicaraguan 
contras. As established earlier in this dissertation, the financial and other support given 
by the United States was found by the Court to have contravened the principle of non-
intervention and the customary ban on force:1515 however, it still had to decide if the 
United States could be held responsible for the violations of international humanitarian 
law committed by the contras.  
In the end, the Court established that State responsibility over the actions of military 
or paramilitary groups not directly under the control of the State could only be realised 
strictly: the State must exercise effective control over the group, as well as have control 
over the military action in question.1516 Hence, according to the ICJ, the notion of control 
comes with two dimensions, one of which addresses the general effective control over the 
non-State military or paramilitary troops, while the other focuses on the discretion over 
the specific military operations that may have violated international law.1517 Curiously, 
the Court did not take much time to cite State practice to support its findings on the 
requirement of effective control: rather, it settled on relying upon the authority of the ILC 
and its work on State responsibility, while filling some gaps with its own 
interpretation.1518 
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 In the case of Nicaragua, the Court found that although the United States had indeed 
violated various norms of international law, its control over the actions of the contra 
troops was not strong enough to make the State accountable for the specific violations 
committed by these forces.1519 It was held that the connection between the United States 
and the contra troops was not one of such dependence and control that could make the 
latter a de facto military force of the former.1520 Moreover, the US had not commanded 
the specific acts of the contras which allegedly violated international humanitarian law, 
further weakening the link. 1521  Consequently, the United States did not bear State 
responsibility for the actions of the contras, despite its military support having enhanced 
the group’s capacities to engage in such conduct.1522 In addition, it was noted by the Court 
that the contras could have functioned independently even without US support, meaning 
that they were not a group assembled merely at the behest of the United States.1523 
The requirement of effective control over the supported groups is a strict one and not 
easily fulfilled. As stated above, the US involvement with the Nicaraguan contra troops 
was long-standing, prevalent and clearly in violation with international law. Yet, it was 
not enough to mark effective control over the troops. Hence, in the Court’s mind, general 
control or direct financial and military aid was not a sign of the contra troops acting on 
the State’s behalf or as its de facto organs. Moreover, the condition that the State must 
have asserted control over the particular military action further complicates the realisation 
of State responsibility and separates its implications on de jure and de facto organs of the 
State. The notion of effective control could also find some support from the commentary 
to the ILC’s Draft Articles, which appears to be quite cautious about the attribution of 
State responsibility.1524 
Nonetheless, the findings of the ICJ were challenged by the ICTY in the Tadic case, 
in which the interpretation of Article 8 and the notion of control became one of the central 
issues. While in the initial trial the effective control conditions established in Nicaragua 
had been evaluated and upheld, the appeal to the case led to a different outcome.1525 In its 
judgment, the Appeal Chambers took a great amount of time to evaluate the validity of 
the threshold of effective control, as it felt that this qualification could be too strict from 
the perspective of international law.1526 Only in the case of individuals not acting in the 
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official capacity of the State could the requirement of high level of control over that 
person and their actions be a suitable legal condition: in other words, such actors would 
have to be established as de facto actors of the State.1527 In matters concerning organised 
and hierarchic groups, particularly military ones, the lower level of overall control should 
be sufficient.1528 Moreover, the ICTY adjudged that where military or paramilitary groups 
are concerned, overall control over the group’s specific activities is enough to establish 
the intervenor’s State responsibility.1529 Finally, the ICTY appeared to stress case-by-case 
evaluation on many occasions, noting the many differences between various events that 
could make the formation of perfectly universal standards difficult.1530 
The Appeal Chambers based its conclusion on two aspects. Firstly, it tasked itself with 
the re-evaluation of the later updated ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, and 
while doing so, decided that requiring effective control over military or paramilitary 
forces would contradict the purpose of the regime of State responsibility. 1531  It 
particularly stressed Article 10, which imposes imputability on States even for actions of 
their officials who have acted in contradiction of orders or national legislation, and noted 
that the condition of effective control could nullify the application of this principle.1532 In 
other words, it was noted that States must be held accountable for the actions of the organs 
they do not fully control: if a threshold as high as effective control is required for de facto 
actors of the States, this principle will be compromised. Although the Appeal Chambers 
did admit that not all actors for States are strictly comparable, it still maintained that they 
should be treated equally from the perspective of Article 10, as otherwise States could 
easily evade responsibility for their actions.1533 
Secondly, the Appeal Chambers compared the principles established in Nicaragua to 
State practice and case law, and noticed a contradiction.1534 The Appeal Chambers went 
on to cite various cases in which the condition of effective control was not applied to 
military or paramilitary groups supported by third States, and noted that a more relaxed 
stance on the issue was prevalent amongst many States.1535 This claim directly supports 
the first line of argumentation adopted in the case, the contents and proper interpretation 
of the ILC’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility, which are thought to reflect customary 
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international law at least partially.1536 As both State practice and opinio iuris are the two 
components of international custom, the findings on the stances of different States should 
affect the reading of the Draft Articles and consequently Article 8 as well.1537  
The judgment of the ICTY thus impugns the conclusions of the Nicaragua case. Of 
course, the premises of the Nicaragua and Tadic cases are not similar, which can quickly 
be deduced by the legal platforms the cases were adjudged upon: the Nicaragua case was 
a matter between two States, whereas the Tadic case first and foremost dealt with 
individual criminal liability. 1538  Thus, the conclusions the Tribunal made on State 
responsibility were only conducted because they were necessary in determining matters 
concerning international humanitarian law. 1539  In other words, the regime of State 
responsibility was only addressed as a secondary source of legal information.1540 Hence, 
some have held that the Tadic case’s implications on the requirements for State 
responsibility may have to be taken with a grain of salt, best achieved in the form of 
extensive interpretation.1541 
And indeed, the ICJ itself rebutted ICTY’s claims in 2007, when it adjudged upon the 
Bosnian Genocide Case. Here, the Court had to determine if the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) held responsibility over the Srebrenica Genocide, in which the 
Bosnian Serb troops participated.1542 As the troops were not de jure organs of Yugoslavia, 
the ICJ had to analyse if a sufficient link existed between the State and the armed forces, 
making them de facto bodies of the FRY.1543 In its judgment, the Court upheld the 
principle it had established in Nicaragua, as it ended up favouring effective control ahead 
of overall control.1544 As no such amount of control was to be found between the FRY 
and the armed forces engaged in the genocide, the former could not be held responsible 
for the massacre in Srebrenica.1545 
The Court decided to cast aside the ICTY’s findings due to two major factors. The 
more prominent of them is the argument that the ICTY concentrated on the actions of 
individuals rather than States, meaning that the judgment’s implications on State 
responsibility could not be immediate ones.1546 The ICJ inter alia noted that the Tribunal 
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was more focused on discerning if the case concerned internal or international armed 
conflicts, and that the notions on State responsibility were made in different contexts.1547 
Moreover, the Court argued that the Tribunal’s argument on overall control would 
broaden the scope of State responsibility too much.1548 In addition to relying on its own 
precedents set up in Nicaragua, the Court noted that customary international law also 
supported this stance, as does Article 8 of the ILC Draft Articles.1549 However, as noted 
in scholarly analysis, the ICJ did not present much State practice and opinio iuris on the 
matter, even though it maintained that certain pieces of the Draft Articles are reflective 
of customary international law.1550 Such evaluations would have been pertinent to reach 
proper conclusions on the case.1551 
Which then holds supreme: effective control or overall control? While the findings of 
the ICJ have tended to have more immediate authority within the international community 
and scholars alike, the possibilities of the overall control requirement have not been cast 
aside. In fact, the ICJ’s rebuttal of the overall control condition in the Genocide Case has 
been deemed by some to have been hastily drafted and insufficiently argued. 1552 
Moreover, it has been noted that the supposed validation of the threshold of effective 
control can be regarded as a result of feedback loops involving the ICJ and ILC, where 
the two organs have validated each other’s statements without much regard to other 
sources.1553 
This does not automatically mean that the effective control principle established by the 
ICJ is invalid: instead, it is submitted that the overall control requirement should not be 
discarded purely based on the ICJ’s case law, in particular since the ICTY took great care 
to formulate its principle.1554 Indeed, the ICTY’s argumentation on the amount of control 
required to establish State responsibility is, at first glance, solid. In fact, its reflections on 
the state of customary international law and State responsibility are quite extensive and 
sophisticated when compared to the notions made by the ICJ in both Nicaragua and the 
Genocide Case. However, neither can it be stated that the Tribunal’s evaluation of State 
practice covers the entire subject matter: in fact, only some cases are analysed in 
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judgment, and according to some scholars this case law may have been misinterpreted.1555 
It should also be noted that much time has passed since delivery of the Tadic judgment: 
equally much has happened in that time, and these events have affected the regime of 
State responsibility as well.  
 
5.3. Current Issues Concerning State Responsibility, De Facto Organs and 
Indirect Military Support 
As the politics of international relations seldom stay stagnant, neither does the law 
which is connected to these political tides.1556 Matters concerning armed force have 
tended to be particularly prone to fast changes: the opinions and practice of States have 
often taken unprecedented turns, since members of the international community have 
chosen to adopt drastically different approaches to armed conflicts and incidents in the 
world.1557 These approaches have not only diametrically opposed the opinions of others, 
but also the previous stances of the involved States themselves. Examples of such practice 
on invited interventions were referenced earlier, notably in the section concerning the 
substantive requirements for the invitation. 
This inescapable character of international law means that State responsibility over the 
actions of non-State military and paramilitary groups must also be projected on the canvas 
of the current state of affairs. Both principles established in Nicaragua and Tadic — 
effective control and overall control, respectively — must therefore be examined in the 
context of the on-going debates on the matter, which range from combatting international 
terrorism and the events in Ukraine. Moreover, since the regime of State responsibility is 
based in customary international law,1558 it is vital that both formulas are compared to 
modern State practice and opinio iuris on the matter. 
In the last few years, notable debate concerning the responsibility of States and the use 
of force has occurred over international terrorism.1559 These debates have prevalently 
been fuelled by the 9/11 attacks executed by al-Qaida against the United States in 
2001.1560 The attacks had an immediate impact on not only the global community but also 
on international law: in very few days following 9/11, the scope of self-defence was 
famously broadened by the Security Council, which likened attacks by terrorist groups to 
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armed attacks.1561 This expansion has faced criticism, as observers have feared how the 
concept of self-defence could play out in its new, modified form.1562  
Nevertheless, this development has led to attributing the actions of international 
terrorist groups to certain States, even if those groups were not that State’s de jure 
organs.1563 This attribution has been critical as it has allowed countries victimised by 
terror attacks to enact self-defence against the States to which the terror groups are 
sufficiently connected.1564 This attribution of State responsibility was famously put into 
practice by the United States in the Afghanistan War, pursued as a response to the attacks 
by al-Qaida.1565 Still, it is worth noting that whether the connection was strong enough to 
legitimise the use of force in this particular case has been debated ever since the 
commencement of the operation.1566 
Attributing responsibility over terrorist attacks to sovereign States has mostly followed 
the minimum threshold described earlier: the group must at least be a de facto organ of 
the State.1567 However, some States have been willing to go even further by deploying the 
‘unwilling or unable’ doctrine, according to which a State may be held imputable for 
actions of terrorist groups residing on its territory if it fails to take sufficient action against 
them.1568 The proponents of this concept have held that such threshold would stop States 
from evading their responsibility for ‘harbouring’ or failing to attend to terrorists; the 
opposers have instead claimed that such qualifications could expand State responsibility 
too much, and leave openings for unprecedented interventions.1569 While linking States 
to terrorist groups is a special category of its own, these liberal interpretations could have 
certain effects on the general notion of de facto organs, especially since they so clearly 
exceed even the overall control principle formulated by the ICTY. 
Not surprisingly, the Ukrainian Civil War must be addressed as well. The issues 
concerning the initial armed intervention in early 2014 were discussed earlier in this 
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thesis, but the Russian military presence on Ukrainian soil does not end there. At this 
point, it is clear that in one way or another, Russia is involved in the subsequent civil war 
that has been taking place in Eastern Ukraine since the annexation of Crimea in March 
2014. 1570  According to allegations, the separatists operating against the Ukrainian 
government have been militarily supported by Russia: this support is claimed to have 
entailed delivering arms to the separatist groups as well as dispatching Russian troops.1571 
Russia has denied its military involvement throughout the escalation of the civil war, 
including its most startling event thus far.1572 
Matters took a dramatic and tragic turn in July 2014, when Malaysia Airlines flight 
MH17 crashed in the active war zone, at the time controlled by the separatist rebels, in 
Eastern Ukraine.1573 In the midst of an array of confusing theories and overwhelming 
international media scrutiny, it soon became clear that the passenger plane had been shot 
down, most likely with a surface-to-air missile.1574 This finding was confirmed in October 
2015, when the official investigation announced that the airline had been downed by a 
Russian-manufactured BUK missile.1575 However, neither the matter of who fired the 
missile nor their exact position was identified in the report concluded on the cause of the 
crash, leaving the issue unanswered.1576  
Accusations over this identity have been tossed back and forth since the tragedy. 
Ukraine, along with many Western States, has held that the pro-Russian separatists are 
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responsible for downing the plane with a missile they acquired directly from Russia, 
whereas Russia has maintained that the responsibility lies with Ukraine itself.1577 Within 
the international community, Ukraine’s perspective has gained most proponents at this 
stage, and various States have called for international judicial processes, including the 
establishment of a special international tribunal, to solve the case.1578 However, concrete 
attempts have been rebuked by Russia.1579 Hence, the international response over the 
liability for the tragedy has been limited to economic sanctions and other measures against 
Russia.1580 
At this stage, any examination of the matter of State responsibility over this particular 
case must remain at the level of hypothesis. Although the first investigation on the 
downing of MH17 has been released, it did not conclude who was responsible for firing 
the BUK missile. 1581  Still, simply for the sake of argumentation, the possible legal 
repercussions of the Western claims that the missile was fired by the separatist rebels 
militarily supported by Russia will be analysed. It cannot be stressed enough that the 
arguments presented here does not aim to resolve the issue of guilt: as not all the facts are 
on the table yet, the task is impossible. 
It has become more difficult to deny the Russian military involvement in the Ukrainian 
Civil War. In addition to the obvious military intrusion and annexation of Crimea in early 
2014, evidence seems to be mounting on the claim that the rebel separatists are indeed 
receiving support from Russia: members of Russian armed forces have allegedly taken 
part in action in the Ukrainian war zone, and the arms deployed by the rebels in combat 
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have been traced back to Russia.1582 In fact, as pointed out by the official investigation 
and Western media, shortly before the downing of MH17, surface-to-air missiles were 
reported as being transported from the Russian border, presumably to be used by the 
rebels.1583 Indeed, there is an undeniable link between Russia and the separatists; whether 
this link is strong enough to impose State responsibility on the former is, however, a 
completely different issue. For State responsibility to be invoked, Russia should have a 
sufficient amount of control over the rebels.1584 Only in such a case could the separatist 
group be regarded as a de facto organ of Russia, which could establish responsibility. We 
must hence, yet again, ponder what amount of control suffices, and how the approaches 
adopted by the ICJ and ICTY would play out in this matter. 
If the approach adopted by the ICJ was to be applied, the outcome on Russia’s 
purported State responsibility would come to nothing. Effective control is a high 
threshold, and if it was not reached in the case of Nicaragua, it would be difficult to reach 
here as well. Furthermore, in order to impose State responsibility, the ICJ demanded not 
only effective control over the military or paramilitary groups in general, but also over 
the specific operations that allegedly violated international law.1585 Russia’s actions in 
Ukraine are more than worthy of condemnation, but arguing that the State would 
knowingly order the rebel forces to shoot down a passenger plane carrying 298 civilians 
does not seem plausible. If anything, much of the available evidence would seem to 
suggest that if the rebels shot the plane down, it was due to a series of misunderstandings 
and sheer incompetence.  
Reportedly, the rebels initially thought that the downed plane was performing military 
duties:1586 however, when operated correctly, a BUK missile system should be able to 
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identify the type of the aircraft it is aimed at, eliminating such mistakes.1587 It would 
therefore seem that if the rebels did fire the missile that destroyed MH17, the plane was 
targeted because the separatists were unable to properly use the missile and hence identify 
the aircraft as a passenger plane.1588 Although this does not remove the illegality of this 
purported action, it does suggest that the downing did not follow proper military 
procedures, which would in turn indicate lack of effective control from Russia, at least in 
this particular operation. 
Despite this conclusion, many actors have more or less clearly hinted at Russian 
responsibility over the downing of MH17.1589 This should mean that these States, in this 
case at least, seem to prefer the relaxed qualification of overall control in assessing State 
responsibility. The notion overall control, which was formulated in the Tadic case,1590 
could have a better chance to succeed. The separatists in Ukraine could be identified as a 
military group, meaning that the requirement for effective control need not be fulfilled. 
Moreover, the condition of sufficient control over the specific military operation, in this 
case the downing of MH17, need not be fulfilled either, making the possibility of Russian 
responsibility easier. However, at this stage it is difficult to say if States that are calling 
Russia responsible genuinely wish to pursue legal routes, or if this is rather a case of 
political finger-pointing. After all, States are often unwilling to expand legal regimes that 
could heighten their legal responsibilities. In addition, Russia is by no means to the only 
State that has offered questionable support to factions in countries engulfed by a civil 
war.1591 This puts the States questioning Russia’s responsibility in a difficult position, 
particularly if the military groups they have supported end up committing unlawful acts. 
The current issues surrounding State responsibility and de facto organs show that even 
if there has been a growing will to make States accountable for delivering military aid, 
putting such aspirations into practice remains difficult. States tend to have convoluted and 
at times conflicting interests in such matters, which means that taking a stern legal 
position could put them at risk as well. Regularly intervening States appear to be 
particularly careful in crafting such arguments, as the written word of statements does not 
always match their actual intention. 
 
                                                 
1587  Henrik Suni, ‘BUK-järjestelmällä osuu matkustajakoneeseen lähes “sataprosenttisella 
varmuudella”’, Helsingin sanomat, 18 June 2014, <www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/a1405658289924> (in 
Finnish).   
1588 Ibid. 
1589 BBC, ‘MH17 Malaysia plane crash: What we know’, BBC News, 28 September 2016; Ivshina, 
‘Flight MH17: Russia and its changing story’, BBC Russian Service, 16 October 2015. 
1590 Tadic, paras. 120-123. 
1591 Van Steenberghe, ‘The Alleged Prohibition on Intervening in Civil Wars Is Still Alive’, EJIL: 
Talk!, 12 February 2015.   
 
  243 
 
 
5.4. Political Considerations on the Effect of Heightened State 
Responsibility 
The idea of intervention by invitation can be a lucrative proposition for an intervening 
State. If a valid invitation is sought and the intervention is executed accordingly, no 
accountability for harm should arise. Given its flexibility, intervention by invitation has 
also turned out be a politically alluring option, a situation currently best exemplified by 
the various foreign military interventions in the on-going Syrian Civil War.1592 Most of 
the world’s powerful States are currently engaged in combat in the conflict, to support 
opposing factions but with a common purported goal: the annihilation of the terrorist 
group ISIS.1593  
Given this common goal, one might question why collective security was not deployed 
instead. After all, under the current system intervention by invitation should be inferior 
to collective measures authorised by the Security Council.1594 This conundrum can be 
resolved easily, as action under Chapter VII requires political consensus, which currently 
cannot be reached in the case of Syria.1595 Hence, the intervening States have relied on 
what they unilaterally regard to be the consent of the valid Syrian representative, which 
allows each participant to maintain their own political position. However, certain 
developments since the 2015 Paris attacks may have raised hopes of a unified response 
to the crisis, even though no official collective military measures have been accepted 
yet.1596 
This political and practical allure of intervention by invitation could easily suffer 
should the scope of State responsibility become too extensive, especially concerning 
control over the actions of de facto organs. The use of force is always a risky business for 
States: regardless of the specific nature of the military operations, the outcome is bound 
entail unpleasant qualities, casualties included.1597 Consequently, military support short 
of a full-scale armed intervention is often much preferable. Intervention by invitation, in 
its flimsiness, has offered a manageable legal basis for States that pursue military 
activities on another State’s soil. Expanding the scope of State responsibility would 
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therefore contravene the political goals of the intervening States. While many would 
welcome this as a positive change, the realities of the international community cannot be 
forgotten: the conduct of States is based on their own motives, and hence any expansion 
of liability is a difficult proposition to fulfil.1598  
Perhaps partially due to these reasons, the ICJ found it better to require effective 
control over military and paramilitary groups to establish imputability for the intervening 
State. After all, while it is a heavy statement to decide that a State has violated the 
sovereignty of another or the principles of non-use of force and non-intervention, it is not 
nearly as politically condemning as adjudging that State responsible for crimes against 
humanity, violations of international humanitarian law or breaching human rights.1599 
Such would definitely have been the case in Nicaragua. Had it been found responsible 
for the actions of the contras, the United States would have been held imputable for gross 
violations such as mass rape and other abuse by the armed forces.1600 Establishing US 
responsibility for the actions would have also implied that the State could have prevented 
them, and failed to do so. This scenario also applies to the hypothetical responsibility of 
Russia over the downing of flight MH17: holding the State liable for a mass killing 
involving hundreds of civilians is a political gamble for other members of the 
international community, even if the Russian-backed rebels are ultimately determined to 
have been behind the tragedy. 
Of course, liberally interpreted expansions of State responsibility have been circulating 
in the new millennium; however, one should also bear in mind that these assertions have 
often concerned international terrorism.1601 The global responses to terrorism have tended 
to be of special nature, and thus one should not be too leisurely in regarding them as 
having given rise to more general precedents. In fact, the measures taken to fight terrorism 
have at times appeared to spite the law, which has been reflected in establishing a 
sufficiently strong link between a terrorist organisation and a sovereign State.1602 Hence, 
the findings on attributing the actions of terrorist groups to particular States should be 
viewed through corrective lenses, as applying them literally in other contexts would 
hardly achieve sustainable results. 
Furthermore, even if the scope of State responsibility could be expanded in theory, 
putting such liability into practice is a completely different matter. Enforcement is a 
notorious problem in international law, and imposing State responsibility would be no 
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different. And indeed, the existing legal structures offer few bodies effectively capable of 
holding States accountable for their wrongful conduct. The ICJ is hardly an efficient 
candidate, as its jurisdiction is voluntary and it lacks enforcement methods all 
together.1603 The Security Council would ideally be the most obvious option, but practice 
will equally obviously explain why such aspirations are hopeless. With the most frequent 
intervenors as permanent members of the Council, the likelihood of the organ adopting 
measures against them sits firmly at zero.1604 
We have once again arrived at the notion that has made modern intervention by 
invitation both a necessity and an option: the policies and capacities of the most powerful 
States in the world.1605 Just as these States — with the help of their influence and position 
in the global community — were able to allow intervention by invitation to re-emerge 
during the political impasses of the Cold War, they are also ultimately capable of evading 
their responsibility due to the lack of effective central enforcement.1606 The structure of 
the global legal order, or lack thereof, allows for this.1607 The situation could only change 
if this order was reformed or torn down, options which can be considered unrealistic and 
undesirable, respectively. Either way, the international community would lose or modify 
its common ingredients, the global values which hold it together. The loss of these values 
would inevitably derange intervention by invitation as well, since they have provided the 
concept with the necessary backdrop and subtext throughout its existence in the UN era. 
Still, the most recent practice of intervention by invitation may point towards a slight 
change regarding State responsibility, albeit not a wholly hopeful one. The focal point of 
the doctrine has more firmly shifted to interventions that are applied between regional 
States, many of which do not hold significant power within the global community in the 
wider sense.1608 In such settings, realising State responsibility over wrongly conducted 
invited interventions does become more plausible, since smaller States do not wield tools 
with which they may endlessly evade accountability. Naturally, this is only a partial 
solution, as smaller States still do not tend to be the frontrunners when it comes to 
intervening upon request. 
Therefore, the core problem created by superpower politics continues to remain 
dormant, and leaves its imprint on the use of force as a whole. The States which 
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established these politically tilted limitations remain practically impervious to 
responsibility, making them much more likely to engage in military activities. This 
plausible scenario includes intervention by invitation, either directly or by proxy. 
Moreover, the uneven realisation of accountability between States of different stature may 
widen the rift between them, hindering the possibility of the use of force truly serving 
common purposes. 
 
5.5. Final Remarks 
State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts is a vital regime of international 
law, but its practical realisation in cases of intervention by invitation remains difficult. If 
an invited intervention is executed according to the host State’s invitation and other 
pertinent limitations, the unlawfulness of the use of force by the intervenor is precluded 
by the consent. Only in cases in which the intervention exceeds the limits of this consent 
or violates the peremptory norms of international law does responsibility become 
possible. In such situations, the intervening State may be held accountable for the 
unlawful use of force: this responsibility is most easily established when the intervenor 
has staged a direct military intervention with its own troops. If such an intervention either 
oversteps accepted boundaries, State responsibility for wrongful conduct becomes 
possible, at least on paper. 
Much more pressing problems for State responsibility are the acts committed by the 
de facto groups, when a foreign State decides to support military or paramilitary groups 
instead of intervening directly. For a State wishing to pursue an invited intervention this 
is often the preferred course of action, as it not only diminishes the chances of suffering 
politically damaging losses in the State’s own armed forces, but also reduces the 
likelihood of enforcing State responsibility on them. Still, State responsibility over the 
actions of militarily supported troops is at least possible, even if such situations are not 
completely comparable to attribution of acts committed by de jure organs. 
However, the opinions on what establishes a sufficient connection between a military 
group and the intervening State are decidedly divided. Both arguments, effective control 
and overall control, have convincing bases, but also notable shortcomings. The threshold 
of effective control over both the military group and the specific operation is politically 
more appealing, but it does not fully conform to the existing customary international law 
on the matter.1609 The overall control criteria established by the ICTY is more considerate 
of State practice and case law, but it cannot be regarded as a fully exhaustive answer.1610 
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After all, even the ICTY stressed the need for a higher level of control under certain 
circumstances.1611 
In any event, regardless of one’s take on the matter of control, the difference between 
‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’ may yet again prove too much. State responsibility 
over armed interventions concerns very touchy subjects, on which States flippantly tend 
to change their opinions. This back and forth can reach a point at which they could easily 
find themselves cornered when their previous statements and actual actions are 
juxtaposed. Many States could hence be intimidated by establishing too clear a guideline, 
which means that the confusion over the threshold of control is likely to persist for some 
time. Moreover, these States include the actors capable of evading the enforcement of 
international law, leaving only a slim chance of accountability. This rather cynical 
perspective offers little relief, but it does reflect the position of intervention by invitation 
as a prominent piece of the most powerful States in the world in their mutual game.  
This statement on State responsibility also supports the earlier finding that while 
consensual use of force has begun to shed its previous role as the necessary evil, it is yet 
to have a new one cast. The doctrine is no longer a privilege belonging to the most 
powerful States in the world, while others are relegated the roles of mere spectators. 
However, the limitations imposed by pure realism have not been erased either, which has 
left the transformation of consensual use of force incomplete. The concept is therefore 
attempting to reformulate itself so that it can cater to the needs of the international 
community. This has caused it to adapt many forms in the past few decades, ranging from 
countering international terrorism to serving an illegal annexation of territory. What is 
debatable, then, is whether the concept will be able to attend to the global community as 
a whole, or if its opportunities will only be seized by the select few.  
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Final Remarks — How to Perceive Intervention by 
Invitation 
 
1. Decoding the Core Nature of Contemporary Armed 
Intervention by Invitation 
 
Intervention by invitation is a misleading concept in many respects. From the practical 
point of view, it appears to be simple at first sight: the territorial State consents to an 
armed intervention, which leads to a third State executing said intervention accordingly. 
However, this simplicity is a mere decoy which distracts us from the various difficulties 
the doctrine entails, particularly in the international legal landscape following the end of 
the Second World War. Under today’s international law, intervention by invitation finds 
itself locking horns with the regulation on the use of force, as it is not included in the UN 
Charter as such. 1612  Furthermore, the doctrine’s application, while not diametrically 
opposed to it, can also stretch the limits of the duty of non-intervention, particularly in 
non-international armed conflicts.1613 
Despite this premise, intervention by invitation has been embraced by various States 
over the course of decades, which has led to all the major UN organs accepting the 
concept.1614 However, said practice has not come without its share of controversy, which 
has brought the applicability of the scope of intervention by invitation into question.1615 
As a result, State practice has confirmed that while few would deny the legal admissibility 
of the doctrine, its exact limits and other practical aspects remain debated.1616 This creates 
an ambivalence, one which has persisted throughout the UN era and caused the doctrine 
to appear contradictory in many aspects, for its hazy parameters can be spun in various 
ways. 
The juxtaposition should come as no surprise, since — as noted very early in this 
dissertation — even as a term intervention by invitation contains an inevitable oxymoron. 
Intervention is often understood as meddling in a matter against the subject’s will, 
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whereas an invitation entails a plea to take part in something. No matter how one spins it, 
combining these two words results in a conflict. Thus, it is logical that the paradox has 
not been limited to the terminological sphere either, as the conundrums caused by the 
doctrine’s application in practice are merely a reflection of its conceptual dilemma. 
Given the paradox that intervention by invitation carries at its core, parsing these issues 
can seem overwhelming. This adds another, apparently paradoxical layer to intervention 
by invitation. Surely, given its prominent use, States would much prefer the concept to 
be detailed in a clear manner? Nonetheless, the haziness is not without reason. In fact, 
such evasiveness is a key ingredient in the success of intervention by invitation. All this 
is for the goals and purposes of sovereign States, which tend to bend international norms 
to fit their agenda. Intervention by invitation is no stranger to this: in fact, it is a doctrine 
which follows this dilemma by design.1617 The flexibility of intervention by invitation 
makes it so alluring for States to exhaust, and thus defining the doctrine too robustly 
would hinder its application. 
Consequently, one must accept that when it comes to intervention by invitation, 
ambivalence is an integral part of the legal concept itself. Very notably, this is 
prominently manifested in the doctrine’s re-emergence following the adoption of the 
Charter in 1945. When the centralisation of the use of force unravelled fast, intervention 
by invitation managed to reclaim support from the most powerful members of the 
international community, which deployed the doctrine to further their own policies.1618 
This superpower advocation was later echoed by support from other States and UN 
organs, albeit not in a very straight-forward manner.1619 Furthermore, intervention by 
invitation has managed to reinvent itself continuously throughout its existence; however, 
these reinventions have come about in an effort to accommodate new contexts, not the 
original intent of the Charter. 
 The concept therefore both reappeared and thrived due the regulation on the use of 
force having failed, necessitating the return of this notion rooted in traditional law. This 
falls well short of ideal law-making, even when judged by the standards of international 
law. In fact, it could be stated that intervention by invitation resurged to serve 
international politics rather than law, meaning that by default it appears to champion the 
individual interests of powerful States. One might thus say that intervention by invitation 
bore a rather villainous role, especially when contrasted with the goals of the Charter. 
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24.  
1619 Definition of Aggression, Article 3(e); Nicaragua, para. 246; DRC v. Uganda, paras. 42-54; 
Mali, SC Res. 2100, Preamble. 
 
  250 
 
 
Despite this rather cynical finding, intervention by invitation had a purpose even 
during the decades of the Cold War: containing the political polarisation within the 
international community.1620 Although this theme is once again more immediately based 
in politics than law, it has provided intervention by invitation with a general goal to serve. 
Furthermore, during these decades of political polarisation, the objective of intervention 
by invitation came with two distinguishable, yet apparently opposed layers. On one hand, 
the doctrine was unmistakably invoked to cater to the politically powerful, a situation 
made necessary by their global power struggle. Yet, on the other hand, intervention by 
invitation kept this struggle tethered to a manageable level, thus preventing the global 
polarisation from turning into a full-scale war. The ambivalent concept was thus a 
necessary evil, a thoroughly unpleasant doctrine invoked to prevent catastrophes on a 
larger scale. 
Hence, the undeniably hostile nature of intervention by invitation has been laced with 
an underlying purpose in the past, which further deepens the oxymoronic concept. 
Moreover, the lack of such a purpose in contemporary international law may cause the 
concept to go into a tailspin, when it frantically attempts to find a new course for itself. 
After all, international law is not the sturdiest legal discipline of the lot, which constantly 
leaves it subject to the whims of the politically mighty. This unavoidable fact will be 
reflected on intervention by invitation as well. Without a common goal, either explicit or 
implicit, the concept will be vulnerable to the changes initiated by the agendas of the 
politically powerful. While it is impossible to predict the effects of these future changes 
in an exact manner, certain more general observations can be made on how the doctrine 
is bound to pan out. 
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2. Piecing Together an Impossible Puzzle: What Is Modern 
Intervention by Invitation? 
 
2.1. Discarding the Part of the Necessary Evil 
In the first chapter, a metaphor which likened intervention by invitation to a jigsaw 
puzzle that is impossible to complete for a variety of reasons was introduced.1621 The 
puzzle has too many pieces, some of which appear to be missing, and these pieces seem 
unwilling to form a coherent picture despite multiple attempts. This conundrum exists 
because the puzzle’s pieces originate from several legal sources, including but not limited 
to State sovereignty, the use of force, the duty of non-intervention and the regime of State 
responsibility. The jigsaw puzzle in question cannot form an original picture to begin 
with, but rather it can end in a distorted collage of others. Hence, given the sheer 
complexity of the task, a person attempting to solve the puzzle will likely feel tempted to 
arrange the available pieces into an imitation of a solution and call it a day. 
However, remaining satisfied with this inevitably misconstrues intervention by 
invitation as a legal doctrine. After all, despite its outward appearance, the concept has 
carried not only a theme but also a subtext since its reinvigoration during the Cold War: 
maintaining yet containing the political status quo of the international community, the 
balance of terror between the superpowers. Therefore, the concept could have been 
characterised as the necessary evil, the apparent antagonist that was needed to not only 
hold the story together, but to allow the plot to advance as well. And indeed, we have now 
moved to a new era. However, due to this setting, the cessation of the Cold War also 
marked a possible beginning of troubles for intervention by invitation. The changes meant 
that the doctrine no longer worked to uphold the superpower balance, and thus it has been 
forced to seek an alternative goal to serve. 
This has been the case ever since. While the change in political pace was welcomed 
by many who had become weary by the seemingly endless decades of political 
polarisation, it also meant that intervention by invitation lost its backdrop, which it has 
been unable to recover. Having been rid of its objective, the doctrine has been in free fall, 
which further distorts its appearance. This is particularly troubling given the current, 
unpredictable developments to which the international community has been subjected. 
While no one knows what the future has in store, as of late, the global community has had 
to endure heavy turbulence at the courtesy of particular members, a development which 
may profoundly impact the world community as we currently know it.1622 
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Given its flexibility, intervention by invitation is bound to make appearances in these 
contexts; in fact, it has already done just that.1623 The concept positively thrives where 
dysfunction reigns, ensuring its durability against even the most challenging changes. 
However, although it has been featured in some of the most notable armed interventions 
of the past couple of decades, consensual use of force does not appear to be following a 
particular theme. On the contrary, the doctrine appears undeniably ambivalent, having 
been invoked for a variety of reasons and political goals. 
When combined with potentially disastrous circumstances, said flimsiness can result 
in the realisation of actual catastrophes. For instance, what if intervention by invitation is 
added into a fast escalating mix, perhaps even an inter-State war? Or what about a 
wartime situation that could include the use of nuclear weapons? Even less explosive 
contexts are difficult enough when it comes to managing intervention by invitation, 
meaning that these threats could reveal an even more vicious side of the doctrine. This 
hazard could perhaps be reined in by discovering a shared value which intervention by 
invitation could emulate. However, forging such a value may prove difficult due to the 
politically charged international community. 
Naturally, this is by no means a new issue for intervention by invitation to contemplate: 
its practice during the Cold War took place in the midst of a constant fear of an escalated 
conflict between the powerful.1624 Still, for quite a few decades now, the international 
community has been spared from taking such a threat too seriously. This has allowed 
concepts such as invited intervention to adopt new roles, ones which may more explicitly 
serve global values and collaborate with collective uses of force.1625 However, matters 
relating to a global tensions and possible conflicts may no longer solely reside in post-
apocalyptic literature. Thus, norms regulating international relations appear to be destined 
for a rough ride, which does not bode well with a concept as tender as intervention by 
invitation. Hastily packaged legal doctrines, excel as they might during turbulence, are 
not bound to offer solid solutions to unforeseen dilemmas.  
Of course, intervention by invitation is not alone in such a situation, since legal norms 
of any kind, especially those encoded in international law, must always accept the 
possibility of unforeseeable circumstances.1626 For instance, since even the use of nuclear 
weapons cannot conclusively be ruled out from the scope of admissible armed force, the 
                                                 
1623 Record of the Security Council’s 7125th Meeting, pp. 3-4 and 6-7; Record of the Security 
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unthinkable remains ever present in international relations.1627 This reality conditions the 
limits of law, since in law-making it is borderline impossible to determine all the 
situations in which the regulation in question becomes applicable.1628 This causes all legal 
norms, even those accordingly legislated with clear goals in mind, to come with a touch 
of haziness on the side, as no rule can be completely definite.1629 
Thus, intervention by invitation is ultimately going through the same struggle as all 
concepts of international law. In other words, the doctrine suffers from the irrevocable 
condition of being an international norm, which means that its haziness is not about to be 
settled any time soon. Such a scenario would only arise if international law as an entity 
began to function in a more wholesome manner, a situation which is unlikely to present 
itself, especially given the currently testy state of international relations.1630 As a result, 
intervention by invitation will continue to serve as the likely caterer to the different needs 
of the interventionist States, albeit not in a manner immediately comparable to the times 
of the Cold War. This simultaneously underlines the concept’s dual position as a wild 
card, a role it has played for some decades now, and also as a partial enhancement of 
superpower politics. 
 
2.2. Reining in Intervention by Intervention: What Is Its Point? 
While the most modern form of intervention by invitation has partially remained a 
superpower staple, it has also begun to serve global goals more explicitly, yet still 
limitedly. Although this can be considered to be positive, in particular from the 
perspective of the international community at large, the concept has also become 
unpredictable as a result. This means that the doctrine is privy to modifications, perhaps 
those of an even unexpected and sudden nature. 
But how can this situation be prevented from becoming an abomination? The answer, 
quite predictably, lies with the theme discussed in this dissertation throughout: further 
emphasising the values which the international community as a whole holds in high 
regard. Of particular importance would be the adoption of common objectives, which 
then rein in the use of invited interventions. This would bring forth some much needed 
balance between sovereign and common interests, allowing consensual use of force to 
become a more functional legal concept.  
Of course, as noted above, this evolution has already occurred in certain contexts. 
However, thus far its effects have been left on more superficial levels, since the specific 
supranational goals have appeared to coincide with individual objectives. The military 
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actions staged to contain the threat of ISIS around the globe illustrate such ambivalence. 
While tentative cooperation exists, the matter of ISIS is attended to case-by-case in 
accordance with sovereign interests, rather than with a clearly-cut plan pursuant of 
uniformly agreed upon objectives.1631 
And indeed, the promotion of common purposes should currently be a priority. Reining 
in the application of invited interventions is vital, for even in recent years, the concept 
has showed its ugly side in practice. This was the case when the doctrine was invoked by 
Russia in its arguments on the Crimean crisis.1632 While this piece of legal argumentation 
was widely debunked, it can unfortunately encourage further appearances of invited 
interventions under even more controversial circumstances. Moreover, these 
circumstances can stretch the doctrine’s limits even further, perhaps to the point where 
its already sketchy legal requirements are utterly discarded in favour of political interests.  
While the current developments concerning intervention by invitation have thus far 
strayed from becoming a full-scale catastrophe, they have not inspired confidence in the 
doctrine becoming a sturdier legal concept. Moreover, modern intervention by invitation 
suffers from a certain deficit, one which was not present during the Cold War. While the 
polarisation of relations and the threat of full-scale conflict was palpable during that time, 
the Cold War still bore a tentative, often hidden rationale amidst all its anomalies. The 
superpowers engaged in the continuing crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union, 
both agreed to avoid the escalation of matters, and instead sought to use indirect 
means.1633  
Intervention by invitation served this understanding — sometimes perhaps too 
effectively.1634 The concept allowed the powerful States to engage with each other in a 
manner which, while keeping the crisis afloat, stopped the situation from reaching an 
unwanted apex. 1635  In other words, while invited interventions often supported 
superpower politics, they also helped to contain the delicate balance of terror. In contrast, 
the issues presently engulfing the international community lack such an underlying 
understanding, making the precise prediction of further developments a job best 
prescribed for a prophet. 
Thus, foreseeing the exact future of intervention by invitation falls outside the toolkit 
of this dissertation. The following, however, is perfectly clear. Intervention by invitation 
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was reborn out of both sheer necessity and well-disguised common interests during the 
Cold War era. Consensual use of force is therefore, by its very nature, capable of 
addressing even the extreme needs of the society of States. Consequently, should the 
doctrine ultimately fail in acknowledging a new, commonly agreed agenda to serve, it 
would be due to the international community facing unprecedented difficulties. Such a 
situation is yet to present itself. 
For now, the impossible jigsaw puzzle known as intervention by invitation remains in 
a shambles, as post-Cold War developments have failed to clarify the concept. With no 
definite purpose in sight, forming a coherent picture out of the pieces of the doctrine has 
not become any easier. Thus, the current lines of the doctrine must be threaded while 
remembering the obvious wisdom on the use of force: any form of unilateral armed 
intervention ought to be exercised with caution.1636  Unfortunately, both history and 
present have shown that such caution cannot be taken for granted. The international 
community has proven its tendency of faltering over important matters, the non-use of 
force included. What is further, intervention by invitation has had the habit of appearing 
during such blunders, often with undesirable results. 
However, optimism should be retained even during the worst of times, particularly 
when they are very different from the biggest atrocities faced by humankind.1637 What is 
further, for all the trouble it has caused, throughout history, intervention by invitation has 
also managed to leave stabilising effects in its wake, an achievement it remains perfectly 
capable of. Furthermore, the mere fact that intervention by invitation managed to both re-
emerge and later persevere showcases the concept’s contingency, even if it is hidden 
underneath political clutter. It can therefore be safely assumed that intervention by 
invitation will survive the current turbulence, in one form or another.  
One can only hope that this survival will come with a refined sense of purpose. Of 
course, forming such an objective is not wholly — or at all — dependent on intervention 
by invitation itself. Rather, the process relies on the international community, as well as 
its various actors. Modern intervention by invitation in any form is merely the outcome 
of the policies and decisions these participants make, a stance which is not very reassuring 
given the persistent dysfunction present in international law. Nonetheless, even when 
matters seem dire, it can still be assumed that the members of the global community are 
not dead set on wreaking havoc, as even an imitation of harmony should be a preferable 
option. This premise will continue to be reflected on intervention by invitation, building 
it a common framework, albeit perhaps a fragile one. Nonetheless, such a framing, no 
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matter how delicate, will give the doctrine much needed perimeters within which it can 
function into the foreseeable future. 
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